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1. Introduction
Background At least since the Euro crisis starting in 2010, fiscal variables such as budget
deficits and debt levels of member countries as well as the construction of the Eurozone
as a whole have received renewed attention. Furthermore, in the wake of the preceding
global financial crisis, the economic profession faced accusations of not being able to
generate satisfactory answers to pressing questions from the models commonly used in
public institutions and academic circles.
Motivation These issues arise from and drive different strands of the macroeconomic
literature. The intersection of topics studied in the present thesis is motivated by per-
sonal experience: Towards the end of my studies, I happened to stumble upon a rather
verbal textbook rendition of the ‘fiscal theory of the price level’ (in Görgens, Ruckriegel,
and Seitz 2008) which was equally baffling and intriguing. Then, as a teaching assistant
at the Chair of Economic Policy, I had to familiarize myself with the ‘New-Keynesian’
model now taught in graduate classes at the University of Hohenheim. To keep it short,
when the fiscal theory reappeared on my horizon (after having fallen into oblivion for
a while) and was met by the ambition to master the literature on dynamic stochastic
general-equilibrium (DSGE) models, my dissertation project was born.
Research Goals Against this backdrop, the present thesis can be summarized in two
main research questions:
1. How do common modern DSGE models work, that is, how do they arrive at un-
ambiguous descriptions of macroeconomic events as equilibrium outcomes?
2. What is the role of the two main fields of macroeconomic policy, monetary and
fiscal policy, and the interrelations between them, in these descriptions?
Rather than simply bundling a number of isolated andpossibly incompatible approaches,
I want to build and maintain a unified framework throughout the dissertation to tackle
these questions. The development of this framework should proceed as clearly and
comprehensibly as possible.
Plan of the Book While I hope it has enough structure to be ‘easily’ read from cover to
cover without repeatedly circling back to the introduction for guidance, I want to give
a brief outline of this dissertation as a golden thread.
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Laying the groundwork for most of the thesis, Chapter 2 develops a baseline micro-
founded DSGE model and takes first steps in the determination of equilibrium. After
a brief excursus into the interactions arising from the consolidated-government budget
equation and some traditional approaches to their description in Chapter 3, Chapter 4
returns to the baseline model (without money) and closes it by defining simple policy
rules. It is shown that, depending on the respective constellation of policy parameters,
several regimes emerge which are discussed with regard to stability and determinacy.
Chapter 5 makes three additions to the model used hitherto—money, the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates, as well as debt limits—and examines their implications
for determinacy of equilibrium. The extension of the theory tomonetary unions is stud-
ied in Chapter 6. The final and most demanding advancement is the New-Keynesian
model variant expounded in Chapter 7, a linearized version of which is simulated to
generate graphical impulse responses to technology as well as policy shocks.
Chapter 8 hints at empirical issues in the distinction between policy regimes. Finally,
Chapter 9 provides a discussion of the results obtained in the course of the thesis. Chap-
ter 10 concludes.
∗ ∗ ∗
Notation & Stylistic Matters Symbols are explained (sufficiently, I hope) in the sym-
bol list at the beginning and upon their introduction in the main text. I managed to
avoid nonstandard abbreviations almost entirely, which is why there is no respective
list. External URLs and internal cross-references are clickable throughout the PDF, often
indicated by the ‘link symbol’↗. The only notational issue which may not be straight-
forward are underlined equation numbers, they indicate that the respective equation is
explicitly derived in the appendix.
Files This PDFfile aswell as theMatlab/Dynare files necessary to produce the impulse-
response functions in Chapter 7/Appendix F are available upon request.
2. Baseline Optimizing Model
The model laid out in this chapter is the foundation for all formal analysis in the
present thesis. In an infinite-horizon representative-household setup, I derive opti-
mality conditions, construct the present-value budget equation that is at the heart
of the ‘fiscal theory,’ present a simplified constant-endowment version of the model,
and start up the discussion about equilibrium determination.
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2.1. The Model
Utility An infinitely-lived representative household maximizes per-period utility
u(ct,mt) 〈2.1〉
by choosing real sequences of consumption c, money m, and bonds b. The utility func-
tion satisfies the usual properties, that is, marginal utility of either argument is positive
but decreasing:
u′(·) > 0
u′′(·) < 0
〈2.2〉
It is often assumed that utility 〈2.1〉 is additively separable in its arguments ct and mt,
where the properties 〈2.2〉 apply to each summand individually. In the context of the
baseline model, I generally adopt this simplification (at the cost of some generality).
Future utility is discounted by the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
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Budget Constraint The household has to respect the flow budget constraint
Ct +Mt +QtBt = Yt + TTHt + Bt−1 +Mt−1
⇔ Ptct +Mt +QtBt = Ptyt + PttTHt + Bt−1 +Mt−1
〈2.3〉
⇔ ct +mt +Qtbt = yt + tTHt +
bt−1 +mt−1
Πt
, 〈2.4〉
in each period. Pt denotes the time-t goods price level in terms of money Mt. In most
cases, lower-case symbols denote real variables (an obvious exemption are interest rates),
where identities analogous to Ct ≡ Ptct hold. Bt is the amount of discount bonds issued
in period t at the bond price Qt (see also↗Bond Prices on p. 25 below).
Fisher Equation The equivalence of Equations 〈2.3〉 and 〈2.4〉 follows from the Fisher
equation
1+ rt =
1+ it
Πt
, 〈2.5〉
which describes the relationship between the real interest rate, nominal interest rate,
and inflation rate
Πt ≡ PtPt−1 〈2.6〉
in equilibrium. All three variables are dated t, and they are allmeant to connect periods
t− 1 and t (which is a somewhat unconventional, yet more consistent, notation in the
case of interest rates).
The Fisher equation 〈2.5〉 is necessary to prevent arbitrage between real and nominal
assets (it could be formally derived in a model that includes real capital, cf. Walsh 2010,
pp. 35-39, for instance). In models with a constant real interest rate (see Section 2.4), it is
often—but not exclusively—understood to determine the nominal interest rate between
t and t+ 1, it+1, as a function of expected inflation:1
1+ it+1 = (1+Etrt+1)EtΠt+1 〈2.7〉
1 An alternative interpretation is that it can also determine (expected) inflation since the nominal interest
rate is usually set by the central bank (cf. Section 4.2.1.1) and real interest rates are determined by other
factors such as time preference and productivity. Some references on this ‘Neo-Fisherian’ view, ordered
by length, are Williamson (2016), Uribe (2017), and Cochrane (2016).
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it+1 is not preceded by the time-t expectation operator Et because, while it is contractu-
ally set based on expectations (in period t), it does not change ex post if the underlying
variables deviate from these expectations (in period t+ 1).
Bond Prices In period t, Bt nominal discount bonds are issued at the priceQt. In period
t+ 1, they are redeemed at par, paying out Bt units of money. No-arbitrage requires that
the implied yield is equal to the nominal interest rate (cf. Woodford 2003b, p. 66):
Qt =
1
1+ it+1
〈2.8〉
Bond Types As a side note, there is an alternative to the present specification in that
debt could also be issued in the form of coupon bonds. Which type of bond is chosen
is mostly a matter of notation (see also Section 2.3.2); once the first-order conditions are
combined into the standard equilibrium conditions, the contractual form of bonds is
immaterial in this model. For the sake of clarity: The flow budget constraint 〈2.3〉 uses
discount bonds. If, alternatively, coupon bonds are used, it reads
Ptct + Bt +Mt = Ptyt + PttTHt + (1+ it) Bt−1 +Mt−1. 〈2.9〉
The same no-arbitrage argument as above requires that coupon bonds also pay a yield
equal to the nominal interest rate; discount and coupon bonds are equivalent in this
respect.
Endowments The household is endowed with a real income stream y in each period
which is typically assumed constant for simplicity (cf. Section 2.4).
Treasury Policy The treasury decides on spendingGt and net transfers to the household
TTH . If TTH is negative, the household effectively pays taxes. The treasury’s budget
surplus S is defined as
St ≡ −
(
Gt + TTHt
)
. 〈2.10〉
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Lagrangian The maximization problem can be expressed by the Lagrangian
max
{cj,mj,bj}∞j=t
Lt = Et
∞
∑
j=t
{
βj−tu
(
cj,mj
)
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−λj
[
cj +mj + bj − yj − tTHj −
(
1+ rj
)
bj−1 −
mj−1
Πj
]}
, 〈2.11〉
where λ is the Lagrange coefficient on the budget constraint 〈2.4〉. (I use coupon bonds
and omit discount bonds here for brevity; as already stated, this does not affect the
resulting first-order conditions below.)
First-Order Conditions The first-order conditionswith respect to real consumption, real
money, and real treasury-bond holdings, respectively, are
∂Lt
∂ct
= uc(ct,mt)− λt != 0 ⇔ λt = uc(ct,mt) 〈2.12〉
∂Lt
∂ct+1
= βEtuc(ct+1,mt+1)−Etλt+1 != 0 ⇔ Etλt+1 = βEtuc(ct+1,mt+1) 〈2.13〉
∂Lt
∂mt
= um(ct,mt)− λt + Etλt+1
EtΠt+1
!
= 0 ⇔ um(ct,mt) = λt − Etλt+1
EtΠt+1
〈2.14〉
∂Lt
∂bt
= −λt +Etλt+1 (1+Etrt+1) != 0 ⇔ 1+Etrt+1 = λt
Etλt+1
〈2.15〉
(Equation 〈2.13〉 does not constitute a first-order condition in its own right as it only
repeats Equation 〈2.12〉 one period ahead; it is stated for convenience).
Stochastic Discount Factors In theDSGE literature, reference is oftenmade to the stochas-
tic discount factor. It is equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and
sometimes also called pricing kernel (predominantly in the context of asset pricing; cf.
Cochrane 2005a, p. 7). When dealing with real values, one uses the real stochastic dis-
count factor
Etvt,t+1 ≡ βEtuc(ct+1, ·)uc(ct, ·) ; 〈2.16〉
accordingly, the nominal stochastic discount factor
EtVt,t+1 ≡ Et
[
β
uc(ct+1, ·)
uc(ct, ·)
Pt
Pt+1
]
= Et
[
β
uc(ct+1, ·)
uc(ct, ·)
1
Πt+1
]
=
Etvt,t+1
Πt+1
〈2.17〉
is used in combination with nominal values (cf. Cochrane 2005a, pp. 6-10). Usually,
uc(ct+1, ·) (just as Pt+1) is preceded by the expectation operator Et because it is not
known with certainty in t, so the same applies to the stochastic discount factors.
Using Equations 〈2.12〉, 〈2.13〉, and 〈2.15〉, it can be shown that the real stochastic
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discount factor is equal to the inverse of the gross real interest rate in equilibrium:
Etvt,t+1 =
1
1+Etrt+1
〈2.18〉
Asimilar relationship holds for their nominal counterparts ifmaximization is performed
using nominal equations (that is, using the budget constraint 〈2.3〉 instead of its real
counterpart 〈2.4〉 in the maximization problem 〈2.11〉). Adding the fact that the inverse
of the gross nominal interest rate is equal to the bond price here (Equation 〈2.8〉), we
have
EtVt,t+1 =
1
1+ it+1
= Qt. 〈2.19〉
Both the nominal and the real stochastic discount factor can be ‘linked’ such that, for
example,
EtVt,t+1 ·EtVt+1,t+2 ·EtVt+2,t+3 = EtVt,t+3 =
2
∏
j=0
1
1+Etit+1+j
. 〈2.20〉
Furthermore, vt,t = Vt,t = 1.
Consumption Euler Equation Combining Equations 〈2.12〉 and 〈2.15〉 gives the con-
sumption Euler equation
uc(ct,mt) = β (1+Etrt+1)Etuc(ct+1,mt+1) . 〈2.21〉
(Implicit) Money Demand Further, plugging the first-order conditions 〈2.12〉 and 〈2.15〉
as well as the Fisher equation 〈2.7〉 into the first-order condition with respect to money
〈2.14〉 implies that money demand is a function of the nominal interest rate and (the
marginal utility of) consumption:
um(ct,mt) = uc(ct,mt)− uc(ct,mt)
(1+Etrt+1)EtΠt+1
=
[
1− 1
1+ it+1
]
uc(ct,mt) = I˙t+1uc(ct,mt) . 〈2.22〉
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At this, the shorthand
I˙t+1 ≡ it+11+ it+1 . 〈2.23〉
represents the opportunity cost of holding money (cf. Woodford 2003b, p. 67).
Alternatively, solving money demand 〈2.22〉 for the nominal interest rate
it+1 =
um(ct,mt)
uc(ct,mt)− um(ct,mt) 〈2.24〉
shows that it is a decreasing function of real money Mt/Pt: If real money increases,
its marginal utility goes down, which decreases the right-hand side of the equation via
both the enumerator and the denominator.
Liquidity Preference Given the standard properties of utility 〈2.2〉, marginal utility of
consumption decreases as consumption increases. By Equation 〈2.22〉, ceteris paribus,
marginal utility of money has to decrease as well—in short, real money demand in-
creases in the level of consumption. Similarly, real money demand depends negatively
on the nominal interest rate since I˙t+1 increases in it+1. Consequently, one can restate
implicit money demand 〈2.22〉 to isolate mt by using a liquidity preference function
L(ct, it+1),
Mt
Pt
= L(ct, it+1) , 〈2.25〉
with
Lc(·) > 0
Li(·) < 0.
〈2.26〉
Of course, L(·) in Equation 〈2.25〉 is just as general as um(·) and uc(·) in Equation 〈2.22〉
unless a particular utility function is specified, meaning that it only allows tomake basic
qualitative assertions such as 〈2.26〉.
Goods Market Clearing In equilibrium, goods markets clear so that
yt = ct + gt. 〈2.27〉
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Borrowing & Ponzi Games Another important condition for equilibrium is that the house-
hold can not use debt to attain infinite utility by engaging in ‘Ponzi games.’ I discuss
the formal aspects of this requirement in Section 2.3.1 below.
2.3. Budget Constraints and Infinite Time Horizons
2.3.1. Household Borrowing, Ponzi Games, and the Transversality Condition
Ponzi Games Without further constraint, a household facing the flowbudget constraint
〈2.3〉/〈2.9〉 has an incentive to play a ‘Ponzi game,’ that is, finance the nominal of an
original loan plus interest on it by taking upmore debt, postponing ultimate repayment
indefinitely to a nonexistent last period. This way, it could attract infinite resources and
thus derive infinite utility.
Borrowing Limit Of course, a hypothetical lender would not accept this and instead
impose a borrowing limit, the least constraining form of which holds that the household
can at most borrowwhat it is able to pay back, with interest, over the course of its entire
(infinite) lifetime.
Define (predetermined) nominal wealth of the household in period t as
Zdist−1 ≡ Bdist−1 +Mt−1 〈2.28〉
Zcpnt−1 ≡ (1+ it) Bcpnt−1 +Mt−1, 〈2.29〉
where the ‘dis’ and ‘cpn’ superscripts indicate use of discount bonds (budget constraint
〈2.3〉) or coupon bonds (〈2.9〉), respectively. Then, using either notation, the formal
representation of the borrowing limit reads
Zt ≥ −Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt+1,t+1+jPt+1+j
(
yt+1+j + tTHt+1+j
)
, 〈2.30〉
which implies that the household’s nominal wealth position can in fact be negative, but
not less thanwhat it expects to have disposable tomake good on its debt. Put differently,
the borrowing limit determines the value of liabilities Zt that the household can carry
over from period t, which, in period t+ 1, must be at least equal to the present value of
the stream of available resources. In order to lead to a meaningful equilibrium, the sum
on the right-hand side must be finite,
Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+jPt+j
(
yt+j + tTHt+j
)
< ∞, 〈2.31〉
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or else the household would still be able to attain infinite utility even though the de-
scribed financial-market ‘loophole’ is closed (Equation 〈2.31〉 in fact goes beyond this
requirement by positing finiteness in the current period t as well).
Present-Value Budget Constraint of the Household Either household budget constraint
〈2.3〉/〈2.9〉 can be rearranged to read
Zt−1 = EtVt,t+1Zt + Ptct + I˙t+1Mt − Pt
(
yt + tTHt
)
, 〈2.32〉
which, upon repeatedly iterating, yields
Zt−1 = Et (Vt,t+J+1Zt+J) +Et
J
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j
[
Pt+jct+j + I˙t+j+1Mt+j − Pt+j
(
yt+j + tTHt+j
)]
.
〈2.33〉
If the transversality condition
lim
J→∞
Et (Vt,t+J+1Zt+J) = 0 〈2.34〉
is satisfied, the equation above can accordingly be rearranged to the present-value bud-
get constraint of the household:
Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j
(
Pt+jct+j + I˙t+j+1Mt+j
)
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+jPt+j
(
yt+j + tTHt+j
)
+ Zt−1 〈2.35〉
(I go into a little more detail on the formal aspects in Section 2.3.2 below.) A borrowing
limit such as 〈2.30〉 also holds for current outstanding nominal wealth Zt−1 (however, it
is predetermined in period t). The smallest value it can have takenwouldmake the right-
hand side equal exactly zero, implying that all current and future disposable income is
pledged for repayment so that the household will never be able to consume or hold pos-
itive money balances again.2 Otherwise, for nominal wealth Zt−1 larger than this, pos-
itive consumption levels and money balances are feasible. Note that the present-value
budget constraint 〈2.35〉 is equivalent to the combination of the flow budget constraint
〈2.3〉/〈2.9〉 and the transversality condition 〈2.34〉 (cf. Woodford 2003b, p. 70).
2 This is an unrealistic case if, as is often the case, the utility function is assumed to satisfy the ‘Inada
conditions’ (cf. Inada 1963) because marginal utility approaches infinity as the respective argument of
the utility function goes towards zero. In short, an optimizing household would never choose such a
consumption profile (for example).
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2.3.2. Present-Value Budget Equation of the Consolidated Government
Using Discount Bonds Imposing no-arbitrage 〈2.8〉 and goods-market clearing 〈2.27〉
on the household budget constraint 〈2.3〉 implies the consolidated-government budget
equation
1
1+ it+1
Bdist +Mt = Pt
(
gt + tTHt
)
+ Bdist−1 +Mt−1. 〈2.36〉
(Note that I do not call it a consolidated-government budget constraint; the reason is
discussed in Section 9.2.) With only two sectors, nominal wealth of the private sector Z
equals nominal liabilities of the public sector, allowing continued use of Zdist−1 as defined
in Equation 〈2.28〉. Combining this with Equations 〈2.10〉, 〈2.23〉, and 〈2.36〉 gives
Zdist−1 = Z
dis
t −
it+1
1+ it+1
Bdist + St
= Zdist −
it+1
1+ it+1
(
Zdist −Mt
)
+ St
=
Zdist
1+ it+1
+ I˙t+1Mt + St. 〈2.37〉
Using Coupon Bonds Using budget constraint 〈2.9〉 instead of 〈2.3〉, the budget equa-
tion of the consolidated government becomes
Bcpnt +Mt = Pt
(
gt + tTHt
)
+ (1+ it) B
cpn
t−1 +Mt−1. 〈2.38〉
Accordingly, definition 〈2.29〉 takes into account that the structure of the bond contract is
different from the discount-bond case. The consolidated-government budget equation
〈2.38〉 can now be written as
Zcpnt−1 = Z
cpn
t − it+1Bcpnt + St.
Like this, the flow budget equation 〈2.38〉 can be rearranged into
Zcpnt−1 = Z
cpn
t − it+1
(
Zcpnt −Mt
1+ it+1
)
+ St
=
Zcpnt
1+ it+1
+ I˙t+1Mt + St, 〈2.39〉
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which looks equivalent to Equation 〈2.37〉, at least on the face of it (see ↗Comparison
below).
The Actual Present-Value Budget Equation Dividing throughby Pt, dismantling the nom-
inal interest rate in either Equation 〈2.37〉 or 〈2.39〉 using the Fisher equation 〈2.5〉/〈2.7〉
as well as Equation 〈2.18〉, and dropping the ‘cpn’/‘dis’ superscripts, we have
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
(
vt,t+1
Zt
Pt+1
)
+ I˙t+1mt + st. 〈2.40〉
Iterating forward,
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
[
vt,t+1
(
vt+1,t+2
Zt+1
Pt+2
+ I˙t+2mt+1 + st+1
)]
+ I˙t+1mt + st
...
= Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Zt+J
Pt+J+1
)
+Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
I˙t+j+1mt+j + st+j
)
〈2.41〉
The first term on the right-hand side represents the possibility to postpone the redemp-
tion of open contractual positions to the far-distant (indefinite) future; it is excluded by
imposing
lim
J→∞
Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Zt+J
Pt+J+1
)
= 0, 〈2.42〉
the transversality condition for equilibrium.3
3 Some remarks are in order. First, Equation 〈2.42〉 is derived from a budget equation in real terms 〈2.40〉,
whereas the household’s transversality condition 〈2.34〉 stems from a nominal budget constraint 〈2.32〉.
With this in mind, Equations 〈2.16〉-〈2.17〉 imply that the two versions are equivalent.
Second, Equation 〈2.42〉 actually follows from two separate arguments. Keeping wealth indefinitely
instead of consuming it would offer room for improvement, so positive wealth levels in in the ‘final’
period can not be optimal. Hence, if and to the extent that it is possible, optimizing households would
prefer non-positive lifetime wealth (initial wealth plus the expected stream of available income). How-
ever, it is not possible: As explained in the context of the no-Ponzi argument and borrowing limit 〈2.30〉,
households are required by lenders tomaintain non-negative lifetimewealth. The obvious compromise
and only solution is the transversality condition’s actual form 〈2.42〉. (Cf. Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996,
pp. 64-65; Bergin 2000, p. 40, for example. Earlier, and somewhat more technical, treatments include
Gray and Salant 1981; Gray 1984; Dixit 1990.)
Finally, McCallum (2001, p. 21) splits it into two separate conditions for real money m and treasury
debt b on the grounds that a joint transversality condition can be satisfied for m → ∞ and b → −∞,
which is deemed implausible. Whether one considers this as a good (enough) reason or an unnecessary
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The remainder of Equation 〈2.41〉,
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
I˙t+j+1mt+j + st+j
)
, 〈2.43〉
is called intertemporal or present-value budget equation of the consolidated government. I
mostly use the latter expression because flow budget equations such as 〈3.1〉, 〈4.2〉, or
〈2.3〉 are also intertemporal in that they link two adjacent periodswhereas present-value
budget equations like 〈2.43〉 contain stocks (outstandining liabilities on the left-hand side
to discounted sums of flows on the right-hand side).
If endowments as well as treasury expenditure are fixed, the real interest rate is con-
stant (cf. Section 2.4) and Equation 〈2.43〉 simplifies further to
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
βj
(
I˙t+j+1mt+j + st+j
)
. 〈2.44〉
Comparison There is indeed a difference between the coupon-bond and the discount-
bond version of the present-value budget equation: Outstanding government liabilities
Zwere defined differently in Equations 〈2.28〉 and 〈2.29〉, so that the respective present-
value budget equations also differ:
(1+ it) B
cpn
t−1 +Mt−1
Pt
Bdist−1 +Mt−1
Pt
 = Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
I˙t+j+1mt+j + st+j
) 〈2.45〉
Is it a problem that the cases differ on the left-hand side? While it would certainly be
convenient to get exactly the same results (as is the case with the first-order conditions),
the case differentiation 〈2.45〉 poses no fundamental—that is, economic—problem. In
simple models, it is a mere modeling choice without severe consequences. Discount
bonds yield interest implicitly by redeemingmore thanwhatwas initially paid out to the
debtor whereas coupon bondsmake this interest payment explicitly. In actual numbers,
(1+ it) B
cpn
t−1 would be equal to Bdist−1 if one switched from one bond type to the other.4
ad-hoc restriction is certainly a matter of opinion.
4 To give an example: At a market interest rate of 100%, a treasury in need of one billion Euros will either
issue coupon bonds with a face value of 1 bn. e in period t and pay back 2 bn. e in period t + 1 or,
alternatively, issue discount bonds with a nominal of 2 bn. ewhich are to be redeemed in full in period
t + 1 but only equip the treasury with 1 bn. e in period t. As a means to finance the same project
(costing 1 bn. e), both types of bonds lead to exactly the same payment streams in both periods.
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In richer models, the treasury could be modeled to use both kinds of contracts, leading
to outstanding liabilities of the form
[
(1+ it) B
cpn
t−1 + B
dis
t−1 +Mt−1
]
/Pt.
Finally, note that the appearance of the nominal interest rate on the left-hand side
does not cancel out Pt in the denominator. By Equation 〈2.7〉, the gross nominal interest
rate is given by 1+ it = β−1Et−1Πt = β−1Et−1Pt/Pt−1 (assuming constant endowments
and therefore a constant real interest rate, cf. Section 2.4). SinceEt−1Pt is not necessarily
equal to Pt, these two terms do not cancel out. The nominal interest rate it is completely
predetermined in period t.
2.4. Equilibrium Determination in the Constant-Endowment
Economy
Since a nontrivial part of this thesis is devoted to the questionwhether certain variants of
the model are determinate, it is probably helpful to summarize some common elements
already at this point.
Constant Real Interest Rate To make the model as simple as possible, real income y is
often assumed to be an exogenous endowment. An even stronger assumption is that
it is constant over time. If, in addition, the treasury keeps real spending g constant,
goods-market clearing 〈2.27〉 implies that consumption c is also invariant. Furthermore,
if utility 〈2.1〉 is additively separable, the consumption Euler equation 〈2.21〉 uniquely
determines the gross real interest rate (1+ r)—which is constant and equal to the inverse
of the household’s discount factor β:5
1+ rt = β−1 ∀t 〈2.46〉
As a consequence, the Fisher equation 〈2.7〉 reduces to
1+ it+1 = β−1EtΠt+1. 〈2.47〉
Counting Variables and Equations Tables 2.1b and 2.1a list all available equations and
variables of the model, respectively. The paragraph on the↗Constant Real Interest Rate
5 Another way to achieve the simplification of a constant real interest rate would be to include treasury
expenditure in the household’s utility function so that u(ct + gt, ·) = u(yt, ·), which never changes in its
first argument if the endowment y is assumed to be constant. Woodford (1996; 2001) uses this approach,
for instance.
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no. variable determination description
‘truly’ exogenous
1 y exogenous endowment
quasi-exogenous in the constant-endowment economy
2 g policy treasury expenditure
3 c 〈2.27〉 consumption
4 λ 〈2.12〉 Lagrange parameter for the budget constraint
5 r 〈2.15〉 real interest rate
endogenous by definition
6 Π 〈2.6〉 inflation rate
7 s 〈2.10〉 budget surplus of the treasury
8 v 〈2.16〉 real stochastic discount factor
9 V 〈2.17〉 nominal stochastic discount factor
10 I˙ 〈2.23〉 opportunity cost of holding money
11 Z 〈2.28〉/〈2.29〉 nominal wealth (household)/liabilities (cons. gov.)
to be determined by equations or set exogenously by policy
12 M money supply
13 tTH net transfers from the treasury to the household
14 B bonds
15 i nominal interest rate
16 P price level
17 Q bond price
Table 2.1a: Overview of Variables in the Baseline Optimizing Model. ⋄ Expla-
nations: See↗Counting Variables and Equations on p. 34.
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no. Equation description
‘normal’ equations
1 〈2.3〉(/〈2.9〉) flow budget constraint of the household
2 〈2.5〉/〈2.7〉 Fisher equation
3 〈2.8〉 no-arbitrage condition for bond prices
4 〈2.12〉 first-order condition with respect to consumption
5 〈2.14〉 first-order condition with respect to money
6 〈2.15〉 first-order condition with respect to bonds
7 〈2.27〉 goods-market clearing
‘mere definitions’
8 〈2.6〉 inflation rate
9 〈2.10〉 budget surplus of the treasury
10 〈2.16〉 real stochastic discount factor
11 〈2.17〉 nominal stochastic discount factor
12 〈2.23〉 opportunity cost of holding money
13 〈2.28〉(/〈2.29〉) nominal wealth (household)/liabilities (cons. gov.)
‘everything else’
14 exogenous variable
15-17 set by policy
Table 2.1b: Equations Available for EquilibriumDetermination in the Baseline
Optimizing Model. ⋄ Explanations: See ↗Counting Variables
and Equations on p. 34.
already explains how the first five variables in Table 2.1a are determined (the determi-
nation of λ is implicit in this). Moving on, six variables are ‘mere definitions.’ One
slight exception might be the definition of inflation 〈2.6〉: It could be argued that the
equation explains either inflation or the price level given that the respective other vari-
able is determined by another equation, depending on the policy regime. However, the
relationship between inflation and price levels seems too basic and the actual determi-
nation of both variables too obvious to warrant (even more) lengthy discussions. As a
final note, the bond price Q depends solely on the nominal interest rate i because of the
no-arbitrage condition 〈2.8〉.
Since three equations (〈2.3〉, 〈2.5〉, 〈2.14〉) remain to determine the final five variables
(M, tTH , B, i, P), two of them have to be set exogenously by policy.
Sequential vs. Simultaneous Equilibrium Determination It has to be noted that this ap-
proach to equilibrium determination—solving for variables ‘one after another’—is se-
quential in spirit whereas it is an important property of equation systems that they can
often only be solved simultaneously. However, as long and insofar as it is possible to pair
individual variables with certain equations, I do so because I believe it helps explain the
underlying economics.
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Infinite Recursion So far, it might seem as if the number of equationsmatched the num-
ber of endogenous variables, but this is not the case. In intertemporal optimization
problems like the present one, expectations about the future play a crucial role. Even
if one argues that the expected marginal utility of consumption Etuc(ct+1, ·) in the Eu-
ler equation 〈2.21〉 is invariant in the constant-endowment case, the model still features
expected inflation EtΠt+1 and thus adds the expected price level EtPt+1 to the list of
variables that have to be determined. Since the latter is determined in period t + 1 in
the same way Pt is determined in the current period t (introducing EtPt+2, and so on),
finding equilibrium ultimately amounts to solving the same problem infinitely often (cf.
Blanchard 1979, p. 115).
Arbitrary expectations can lead to viable equilibria; the model is prone to indetermi-
nacy. Of course, the solution lies in the adequate design of policy. While there already
exists a provision related to infinite recursion—namely, the transversality condition—it
might not be able to restrict the set of possible solutions to a single path as there may be
many equilibria that satisfy Equations 〈2.34〉/〈2.42〉. Therefore, it is necessary to find a
policy constellation that leads to a unique equilibrium path on which the transversality
condition is satisfied (whereas it is not on all other paths). Chapter 4 does this.
Key Takeaways from Chapter 2
The present-value budget equation of the consolidated government emerges as a com-
bination of the household budget constraint and goods-market clearing. In principle,
even if all contemporaneous variables are determined, the presence of expectations
leads to infinite recursion and indeterminacy of the model.

3. Interactions Arising from the
Consolidated-Government Budget Equation
I hint at the difficulties in clearly separating between fiscal and monetary policy and at
the formal interconnection of the two policymakers, the central bank and the treasury,
in particular with regard to debt, money, inflation, and seigniorage. Towards the end,
I present two traditional analyses that discuss the “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”
of fiscal dominance over monetary policy and unearth the fiscal roots of high (or
even hyper-) inflation, respectively. The present chapter represents a digression from
the main path of the thesis insofar as the approaches described here are not entirely
compatible with the model developed in Chapters 2 and 4.
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Derivations for this chapter can be found in Appendix A.
3.1. What Is Fiscal, What Is Monetary Policy?
Who Does It? A typical classification often found in textbooks or dictionaries is based
onwho carries out policymeasures: Fiscal policy is understood as action taken by elected
government bodies, i.e., spending and taxation at the local, state, national, or possi-
bly even supranational level while monetary policy is carried out by a central bank
that is independent from the former entities (cf. Abel, Bernanke, and Croushore 2014,
p. 34; Kocherlakota 2008). In a formal representation, the respective entities would be
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equipped with separate budget equations; however, there can still be a link in the form
of remittances (see Section 3.2 and↗More Applications at the end of Chapter 9).
One example demonstrating the pitfalls of this ‘player-based’ approach is the fact that
setting short-term interest rates has not always been a task of the central bank (and does
not necessarily need to be, cf. Goodhart 2011, pp. 141-142).6 This way, the same policy
measure could be considered monetary policy at one point in time and fiscal policy at
another. Therefore, while being easily understood, a classification of policies according
to ‘who does it’ is not consummate. Monetary policy is not simplywhat the central bank
does, to draw on a proverbial definition of art, neither is fiscal policy merely what the
treasury does.
Intended Effects On a more practical note, since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis
in 2010, it has often been stated that monetary policy is overreaching because it in effect
assumes responsibilities that should belong to fiscal policy (see, for instance, Fuest 2011,
The Guardian 2012, Sinn 2014b, Legrain 2015, Stark 2016). This line of argument implies
that rather than the executing entity, it is the responsibility for a certain outcome or
intended effect which makes a policy measure monetary or fiscal. Unfortunately, this
approach is not perfectly clear-cut either.
I want to start with an intuitive argument which relies on macroeconomic common
sense: Typically, levying taxes, not least with the intention of redistribution between
certain groups, is thought to be a fiscal responsibility. However, it is also frequently said
that “[i]nflation is a tax” (Walsh starts his 2010 textbook chapter on “Money and Public
Finance” with this quote; see also ↗Optimal Policy, p. 182). More broadly, monetary
policy often develops redistributive ‘side effects’ which may be unintended but blur the
lines nonetheless.
It is not cast in stone that certain objectivesmust be reached by one of the twobranches.
Kocherlakota (2008, Lesson 1) goes even further, stating that “monetary policy is merely
fiscal policy by another name.” He gives three examples: The first is that monetary and
fiscal policy are linked via budget and resource constraints (see↗WhoDoes It? above as
well as Section 3.2). Second, aiming at the effects of policy, he likens the interest rate to a
sales tax in that an increase in bothwould deter the purchase of goods. Finally, monetary
policy affects relative prices if some goods’ prices are more flexible than those of others;
again, the same effect could also be achieved by fiscal policy, namely if it introduced a
good-specific tax (cf. Correia, Nicolini, and Teles 2008).
6 In a discussion about budget equations, such as in Section 3.2 below, one typically argues in terms of
the monetary base instead of a short-term interest rate, but this would not pose a problem since money
supply can also be set (by adjusting it along a money demand curve) such that a desired level for the
interest rate is achieved. Interestingly, in his seminal article on the choice between money supply and
the interest rate as monetary policy instrument, Poole (1970) concludes by suggesting that fiscal policy
is faced with a similar problem, namely, the choice between tax rates and tax volumes.
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No Satisfaction All in all, a distinction between monetary and fiscal policy is always
blurry on closer inspection. Because they are inseparably linked in the end, the two
macroeconomic policy branches can not be sufficiently separated by either the player-
based or the intended-effects approach. Any dividing line is drawn arbitrarily so that
discussions about, for instance, monetary interfering with fiscal policy are always in
danger of being impaired by (or even reducing to nothing but) semantics.
Working Titles To leave it at that and stop using the termsmonetary and fiscal policy al-
together is of course not an option. Going forward, I typically separate between the two
using the player-based approach: In the following section, I introduce the consolidated-
government as well as the treasury’s and central bank’s individual budget equations,
which naturally lends itself to a distinction based on entities.
Furthermore, the clarity of exposition is probably greater with the terms ‘monetary’
and ‘fiscal’ tied to specific instruments (or, put formally, variables) than to more or
less well-defined desired results that are supposed to obtain after possibly complicated
policy transmission. To give an example: Defining an increase in transfers (to cer-
tain groups of society) as fiscal policy seems more clear-cut than ‘relaxing (certain)
household-sector budget constraints.’ This is exactly because the latter could be achieved
by transfer payments just as well as interest-rate decreases—or suitable (relative-) price
movements which, in turn, could be brought about by yet other instruments.
3.2. Separating the Consolidated-Government Budget Equation
The Consolidated Government A flow budget equation like
Gt + itBHt−1 + T
TH
t =
(
BHt − BHt−1
)
+ (Mt −Mt−1) 〈3.1〉
is part ofmanymodels inmonetarymacroeconomics. The left-hand side of the equation
starts with government consumption Gt and ends with net-of-tax transfers to house-
holds TTHt (cf. also Footnote 7). In between are the interest payments on the part of
treasury debt that is held by the private (household) sector BHt−1. Recall that it is defined
to be the net nominal interest rate between periods t− 1 (when the contract is closed)
and t (when the interest payment is due; see↗Fisher Equation, p. 24). On the right-hand
side, the consolidated government acquires means by either increasing the outstanding
stock of debt (BHt − BHt−1) or money supply (Mt −Mt−1).
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Branches The consolidated-government budget equation can be split up into two sep-
arate parts:
Gt + itBTt−1 + T
TH
t =
(
BTt − BTt−1
)
+ TCTt 〈3.2〉(
BCt − BCt−1
)
+ TCTt = itB
C
t−1 + (Mt −Mt−1) 〈3.3〉
Equation 〈3.2〉 is attributed to a treasury branch andEquation 〈3.3〉 to amonetary branch
of the consolidated government or, in short, the central bank. Treasury debt is a liability
to the treasury (BT) and an asset to the central bank if it holds it (BC). Further,
BT = BH + BC ⇔ BH ≡ BT − BC 〈3.4〉
which represents two interpretations of the same fact: Treasury debt can be held either
by the central bank or by households (on the left) and the private sector is counterparty
to a net debt position of the consolidated government sector (on the right, cf.Walsh 2010,
Ch. 4, for example). For the sake of clarity, I will not use ‘treasury’ and ‘government’
synonymously when discussing such separations.7 Finally, TCT are remittances from
the central bank to the treasury.
What is the point of this exercise? Equation 〈3.1〉 is the pivotal element in macroeco-
nomic policy. It can be expanded to allow for greater detail, as in Equations 〈3.2〉 and
〈3.3〉 or in amore in-depth analysis of the interplay between the treasury and the central
bank. Benigno and Nisticò (2015; 2017) deliver such an analysis and show that macroe-
conomic outcomes can critically depend on the interplay between these two institutions
and their balance sheets, where central-bank remittances to (and possible ‘backing’ of
central-bank losses by) the treasury play a crucial role.8
This interplay also has serious implications for real-world policy. To give an example,
central-bank independence might be upheld in fair weather and in times of modest ten-
sion, but when push comes to shove, incentives to ‘adjust’ the institutional setup might
grow stronger (wars are a typical example, but also the Eurozone crisis starting in 2010).
7 The pitfalls of notation: In a trade-off between simplicity and consistency throughout this thesis, I have
decided to use the symbol T for transfers and the superscript T for the treasury. To denote treasury
consumption, I therefore ‘have to’ fall back on the common use of G (‘government expenditure’).
8 Their approachwouldmake for an interesting extension of the sticky-pricemodel developed inChapter
7. I abstain from this possibility for three reasons: First, they consider↗Optimal Policy (p. 182), which
involves a fair amount of additional formalism and discussion of consistency. Second, first-order Tay-
lor expansions are not sufficient to capture the effects of risk (cf. Isoré and Szczerbowicz 2017, p. 101),
implying even an even greater formal extent if handled correctly. The final and most important argu-
ment is also related to risk characteristics: I am unsure about the equality of risk-free and risky rates in
a model with risk-averse households and a ‘one-sided’ (i.e., strictly positive) shock variable as implied
by Benigno and Nisticò 2017, pp. 6-10.
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The change in circumstances and the transitions between the resulting regimes are sel-
domly part of the literature. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011, p. 941) note that a pos-
sible “war of attrition” between monetary and fiscal authorities has not been formally
modeled yet: “How would financial markets react? Would they limit the government’s
purchasing power [...]? Would they impose a risk premium on government debt or an
inflation premium on all nominal assets? Who would give in first?”
In the subsequent sections, I followWalsh (2010, Ch. 4) in broad strokes and describe
the interactions betweenmonetary and fiscal policy that arewell-established, but it does
not hurt to explain notation and do some groundwork in the pertinent issues.
3.3. Treasury Debt, Monetization, and Unexpected Inflation
Monetization Monetization describes central-bank purchases of treasury debt in ex-
change for newly createdmoney. As Equations 〈3.1〉-〈3.4〉 show, monetization is mainly
a compositional issue in the consolidated-government budget equation; however, its
effect on inflation and the interest-rate savings it allows might make it interesting for
policymakers (cf. Section 3.4).
Debt Debasement Via Unexpected Inflation More relevant to this section is the share of
treasury debt that is held by the private sector. Dividing Equation 〈3.1〉 by the price
level Pt leads to the real consolidated-government budget equation
gt + rtbHt−1 + t
TH
t =
(
bHt − bHt−1
)
+
(
mt − mt−1Πt
)
. 〈3.5〉
The difference between the ex-ante and the ex-post real interest rate can be used to define
a ‘surprise inflation’ term sit:
Et−1rt − rt =
[
(pit −Et−1pit) (1+Et−1rt)
Πt
]
≡ sit 〈3.6〉
Adding the difference between what the private sector expected to earn and what it
actually earns on its public-debt holdings in real terms, i.e., (Et−1rt − rt) bHt−1 = sit · bHt−1,
to both sides of Equation 〈3.5〉 then yields
gt +Et−1rt · bHt−1 + tTHt =
(
bHt − bHt−1
)
+ sit · bHt−1 +
(
mt − mt−1Πt
)
. 〈3.7〉
In comparison, the latter equation features the ex-ante instead of the ex-post real interest
rate on the left-hand side and an additional term on the right-hand side (more on this
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in Section 3.4). To make it more intuitive, add and subtract unity to turn net into gross
inflation rates in the surprise-inflation term:
sitbHt−1 =
{
[(1+ pit)− (1+Et−1pit)] (1+Et−1rt)
Πt
}
bHt−1.
The numerator of the fraction is the difference between the gross nominal interest rate
that would completely insulate creditors given actual inflation and the gross nominal
interest rate that is actually paid because of expected inflation. Made real by the denom-
inator and multiplied by the real notional amount bHt−1, this is the consolidated govern-
ment’s yield from unexpected inflation.
3.4. Seigniorage
3.4.1. Seigniorage Measures
Real-Money Seigniorage After adding as well as subtractingmt−1 in 〈3.7〉 and rearrang-
ing, real-money-related seigniorage can be written as
ςmt ≡ (mt −mt−1) +
pit
Πt
mt−1. 〈3.8〉
One source is represented by the bracket on the right-hand side: If the private sector
wants to hold higher amounts of real money (mt − mt−1 is positive), the consolidated
government as its monopoly supplier can acquire real resources in exchange for newly
created balances. The second term describes another source: Households adjust their
nominal money holdings to a rising price level in order to maintain a constant real
money stock. (Cf. also Friedman 1971, p. 847.) As long and insofar as the private sec-
tor simply adjusts nominal money holdings at the rate of inflation, the government can
obtain real resources even if no new real money is created. The real value of this effect
is the rate of adjustment, i.e., pit, times the existing real money stock mt−1, devalued by
the gross inflation rate (1+ pit).9
Interest-Saving Seigniorage Another definition shows that seigniorage can also be pos-
itive if the inflation rate is zero. To see this, define total consolidated-government debt
9 Consider the following example: Let M1 = 100 and P1 = 1 so that m1 = 100. If the rate of inflation is
5%, P2 = 1.05. In order to maintain m2 = m1 = 100, the consolidated government must set M2 = 105,
i.e., it must create 5 additional units of nominal money. Their real value is 5/1.05 ≈ 4.76, which the
consolidated government now has at its disposal.
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as
Zt ≡ BHt +Mt 〈3.9〉
and add Et−1rt ·mt−1 on both sides of Equation 〈3.7〉; after several rearrangements, the
result is
gt + (1+Et−1rt) zt−1 + tTHt = zt + sitzt−1 +
(
it
1+ pit
)
mt−1. 〈3.10〉
Using this form, an alternative seigniorage measure is defined as
ςit ≡
(
it
Πt
)
mt−1 〈3.11〉
and describes the real value of interest expenses that the consolidated government saves
by printing money instead of issuing bonds. A simple one-for-one exchange between
the two keeps total consolidated-government debt Z constant, but the share of interest-
bearing debt changes. Note that this measure (following Walsh 2010, p. 140) does not
include the effects of surprise inflation sitzt−1, which is an arbitrary definition.
More Measuring Somewhat similarly, but in a different formal representation, Drazen
(1985) also distinguishes two money-related sources of revenue for the consolidated
government, one from an expansion of money supply (cf. his p. 327) and another from
an interest-rate differential relating to the stock of existing money (p. 328), subsuming
previously suggested measures under his approach as special cases.
King and Plosser (1985, pp. 149-150) define six measures of seigniorage for the United
States, among which are also the aforementioned. Further, they relate the Fed’s total
earnings (i.e., nominal interest on its portfolio), its net interest earnings (i.e., net of op-
erating costs), remittances to the treasury, as well as a hybrid income variable relative
to GNP to get four additional seigniorage measures in terms of real GNP.
3.4.2. Stylized Facts
In industrialized countries, seigniorage is typically in the low single digits as a percent-
age of GDP:
 Interest-saving seigniorage amounted to 0.30% of GDP in the United States in 2007
and 0.27% of GDP in the Eurozone in 2009 (cf. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2010, p. 308).
 Defining seigniorage as the mere change in base money, Grilli, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini (1991, pp. 360-361) find the average ratio of seigniorage to GNP has been
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relatively constant at around 1% on average while tax revenues increased signif-
icantly. (King 1995 complements their data with a study by Hudson and Nolan
1995 which is undiscoverable unfortunately.)
 The six measures of King and Plosser (1985) for the United States range between
0.02% and 1.37% of real GNP before World War II and between 0.25% and 0.47%
after (1953 until 1982).
 An appended table in Aisen and Veiga (2008) shows that Israel has the highest
mean real-money seigniorage earnings with 8.6% of GDP; the median of these
time-dimension means is 1.4% of GDP. Note that the underlying IMF dataset car-
ries information on 119 countries, that is, not only industrialized countries.
 As a share of (consolidated-) government revenues, seigniorage can play a sig-
nificantly larger role: While the average figure in industrialized countries is still
low at 1.64%, it amounts to 14.65% on average in developing countries (Aisen and
Veiga 2008, p. 30).
3.4.3. The Seigniorage Laffer Curve
A Minimalistic Model This section rests on the baseline optimizing model of Section 2,
adding the specific utility function
u(ct,mt) = ln ct +mt (OI −OII lnmt) 〈3.12〉
taken from Calvo and Leiderman (1992). OI andOII denote some variables not specified
in more detail, I assume them to be time-invariant for simplicity (Table A.1 at the end
of Appendix A.1.2 lists all such ‘minor’ coefficients used in this chapter). Consequently,
money demand 〈2.22〉 takes the specific form
mt = OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct
· it+1
1+ it+1
)
, 〈3.13〉
where OIII ≡ exp[(OI/OII)− 1] (see Appendix A.1.1 for derivations of the equations in
this section). Plugging this into the definition of interest-saving seigniorage 〈3.11〉,
ςit =
(
it
1+ pit
)
OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct−1
· it
1+ it
)
, 〈3.14〉
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Figure 3.1: The Microfounded Seigniorage Laffer Curve. ⋄ Source: Own il-
lustration replicating Figure 4.1 in Walsh (2010, p. 155). ⋄
Explanations: Sketch for illustrative purposes based on Equa-
tion 〈3.14〉 (inflation is an argument of the nominal interest
rate).
and rearranging, it is possible to trace the seigniorage-maximizing inflation rate:
pimaxt =
1
(1+ rt) (1−OIIct−1) − 1 〈3.15〉
This corresponds to the maximum of the seigniorage Laffer curve in Figure 3.1. Below
pimaxt , the government can increase seigniorage by pushing up inflation; on the contrary,
inflation rates above pimaxt curb money demand so strongly that seigniorage falls again
(via higher nominal interest rates in Equation 〈3.13〉). Note that Equation 〈3.15〉 implic-
itly makes this a steady-state representation as the expectation operator is left out, that
is, expected equals actual inflation (cf. Walsh 2010, pp. 154-155).
Terminology: Laffer vs. Bailey Of course, the term ‘Laffer curve’ originated only later
and put a name on the long-known fact that increasing tax rates not always leads to
rising tax volumes (cf. Laffer 2004, Wanniski 1978). Some authors (McCandless 2008,
p. 217, for instance) would call Figure 3.1 a ‘Bailey curve’ after Bailey (1956), who applies
this notion to the study of inflation (tax) rates and seigniorage revenues directly.
Traditional Literature vs. Microfoundations The above microfounded result is not com-
pletely ‘backward compatible’ with the traditional literature. Cagan (1956) is a classic
reference in the discussion of seigniorage and hyperinflations. There, money demand
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takes the form
mC56,t ≡ exp(−OIVEtpit+1) , 〈3.16〉
where OIV is a coefficient. By comparison, money demand from Calvo and Leiderman
(1992) 〈3.13〉 can be rearranged to read
mt = OVI exp
(
OV
1
EtΠt+1
)
, 〈3.17〉
where OV and OVI are shorthands for more complicated terms (see Appendix A.1.2).
Building a money demand equation like 〈3.16〉 on microfoundations is not possible,
however. Figure 3.2 sketches both types: the solid line corresponds to themicrofounded
argument
Cagan: exp(-argument)
microf.: exp[1/(1+argument)]
Figure 3.2: Similarity of Certain Exponential Functions Which Are Part of
Money Demand Functions. ⋄ Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Ex-
planations: The dashed and solid lines would correspond to
the money-demand specifications of Equation 〈3.16〉 (Cagan
1956) and Equation 〈3.17〉 (microfoundations), respectively.
money demand in Equation 〈3.17〉 and the dashed line to the traditional form intro-
duced byCagan (1956) in Equation 〈3.16〉. It is obvious that the curves behave somewhat
similarly for positive inflation rates (cf. Walsh 2010, p. 154; Appendix A.1.2 provides a
more in-depth discussion), which is why I take the liberty of making some subsequent
arguments (in Sections 3.5 and 3.6) based mostly on the traditional approach.
Different Functional Forms As a final technical note, the utility function 〈3.12〉 is not
an arbitrary choice or a pars pro toto for a whole class of similar utility functions, other
microfounded setups simply do not produce Laffer-type curves for seigniorage (see Ap-
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pendix A.1.3 for two examples). Depending on how much value one places on micro-
foundations, this poses a severe detriment to the generality of the Laffer-curve result.
3.5. Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic
Overview In their 1981 paper, Sargent and Wallace challenge the monetarist dictum
that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” (Friedman 1963)
by varying the balance of power between the treasury and the central bank—in a mon-
etarist setting. As already laid out in Sections 3.1-3.2, the two policymakers are con-
nected through the consolidated-government budget equation. Cooperative coordina-
tion schemes aside, one of both assumes a dominant position which allows it to decide
on its policy stance first whereas the other can only go second and has to adjust policy
to ensure the budget equation is satisfied. The unpleasantness of the underlying arith-
metic derives from the possibility of a dominant treasury that sooner or later rids the
central bank of its power to control inflation.
Assumptions While Sargent and Wallace (1981) employ an overlapping-generations
model with growth, the main points of their analysis can be transferred to the represen-
tative-agent model without growth as laid out in Section 2.10 Importantly, the results
obtained in the following hinge on the assumption that the real interest rate on debt is
greater than the (zero) growth rate of the economy. Also, it is assumed that the ability
(or willingness) of the private sector to hold consolidated-government debt is limited to
a certain maximal real value. Since their model assumes perfect foresight, the expecta-
tion operator is dropped in this section.
Money Demand Money demand proportionately depends on real income but not on
expected inflation, at least in its basic variant. Further, since endowments y as well as
treasury expenditures g and thus (via goods-market clearing 〈2.27〉, see Section 2.4) also
consumption c are fixed by assumption here, L(·) can be replaced by the constant LSW81
in Equation 〈2.25〉, so that the price level varies with money supply:
Pt =
Mt
L(ct, it+1)
=
Mt
LSW81
〈3.18〉
It should be noted that this assumption about money demand and the resulting Equa-
tion 〈3.18〉, like Equation 〈3.16〉 in Section 3.4.3, represent a departure from pure micro-
foundations.
10 The 1981 paper is reprinted in Sargent (2013, Chapter 5) with the formulae typeset more neatly but also
several typing errors.
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Policy Initial outstanding real debt bt−1 as well as money balances Mt−1 are predeter-
mined. The novelty in Sargent and Wallace (1981) is that they assume the treasury to
be dominant: In t, it exogenously decides upon and announces a path for real future
budget deficits dt; the usual assumption is that they are positive.
By contrast, the central bank’s policy is two-tiered: At first, it chooses a net growth
rate for money supply µM so that
Mt+1 = (1+ µM)Mt. 〈3.19〉
Because of Equation 〈3.18〉, this determines the inflation rate, which is also equal to
(1+ µM). Still considering the case in which the combination of both policies with debt
dynamics (a real interest rate greater than the growth rate) increases real consolidated-
government debt b, the ‘debt limit’ assumption implies a second stage: Starting with
some future period T, real debtmust remain constant, which requires the central bank as
the passive policymaker to set money supply in a way that generates sufficient seignior-
age. Defaulting is not an option—not even in real terms, which is to say that treasury
debt b is in effect indexed (Sargent and Wallace 1981, p. 4, argue that “such a default
option [inflating the debt away] is not available as a policy to which a government can
plan to resort persistently”).
The course of action in the following is to demonstrate how the growth rate of money
affects the real value of treasury bonds outstanding in T, given the path of budget
deficits set by the treasury, and how this amount of bonds affects inflation thereafter.
Since there are no stochastic elements or ‘surprises’ of any kind, the credible policy an-
nouncements made in t are enough to determine a perfect-foresight equilibrium path.
HowMoney Growth Drives Debt Until T The consolidated-government budget equation
with coupon bonds 〈2.38〉 can be rearranged to read
bt = (1+ rt) bt−1 + dt − Mt −Mt−1Pt for t ≤ T, 〈3.20〉
which becomes
bt = (1+ rt) bt−1 + dt − µM1+ µM LSW81 for t ≤ T
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when combined with Equations 〈3.18〉 and 〈3.19〉. Shifting this expression forward to
time T and expressing it in terms of variables known in t by repeated substitution,
bT =
T
∏
j=t
(
1+ rj
)
bt−1 +
T
∑
j=t
[
T
∏
k=j
(1+ rk)
](
dj − µM1+ µM LSW81
)
,
reveals that the lower is money growth µM the higher is real debt in T. (Do not con-
fuse this with the present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉—the latter features a forward-
looking sum term, ranging from t into the indefinite future, while the equation above
is ‘backward-looking in the future,’ ranging from a future period T back to the present
period t.)
Inflation After T In the second stage, real debt is to be held constant at bT so that the
budget equation 〈3.20〉 (in combination with Equation 〈3.18〉 solved for M) becomes
bT = (1+ rt) bT + dt − Mt −Mt−1Pt ⇔ Πt =
LSW81
LSW81 − rtbT − dt for t > T.
〈3.21〉
Inflation after T increases in bT. (The right half of Equation 〈3.21〉 also implies the as-
sumed debt limit: An unboundedly large bT would make the right-hand side and thus
also gross inflation on the left-hand side negative, whichwould in turn imply a negative
price level. Cf. Sargent and Wallace 1981, p. 4.)
Tighter Money Now, Higher Inflation Later To sum up, if restrictive monetary policy
(in the form of lower money growth µM) drives up real consolidated-government debt
until a certain point in time and if, afterwards, this higher amount of debt is to be stabi-
lized via endogenousmonetary policy, the result is that “[t]ighter money now canmean
higher inflation eventually” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, p. 2).
To add a qualification, this is true only if
LSW81
LSW81 − rtbT − dt > 1+ µM,
that is, if the inflation rate after T (on the left-hand side, from Equation 〈3.21〉) actually
turns out to be greater than that before (on the right-hand side, implied by Equations
〈3.18〉 and 〈3.19〉). In very restrictive domains, this is obvious: Given nonnegative bud-
get deficits, lowering money growth µM from an already low value to zero (implying a
gross inflation rate of unity) further increases real debt bT, which then serves to decrease
the denominator in the above inequality and thus yields a gross inflation rate greater
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than unity.
A bit more drastic is the “inflation juggernaut” of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011,
p. 940): In a representative-agent setup, they show that lowering inflation by ∆pi in pe-
riod t leads to an increase by (1+ r)j ∆pi in period t+ j because the treasury is forced to
incur (real) debt in this case that is compounded at the real interest rate—“[a]n inflation
hawk at the central bank can look good during his term in office, but only at the expense
of his successors.”
Tighter Money Now, Higher Inflation Now The analysis carried out so far is of course
very simple. Mostly in an appendix, Sargent and Wallace (1981, pp. 5-6, 10-15) study
a richer model in which, similar to Cagan (1956), money demand depends not only on
consumption but on expected inflation as well (cf. also Section 3.6). Equation 〈2.25〉,
Mt/Pt = L(ct, it+1), applies ‘fully’ again (however, the specific function used by Sar-
gent and Wallace 1981, p. 10, can not be derived using microfoundations either). This
complicates matters so much that the results reported eventually are only numerical
and exemplary rather than analytical and general—but still “spectacular” (pp. 6, 14-15):
Given certain parameter constellations, a tighter monetary policy can lead to higher
inflation instantaneously, not only after T. The reason is that the expectation of faster
money creation after T associated with tigher monetary policy beforehand raises infla-
tion expectations and thus lowers real money demand. With the money growth rate
given before T, only prices remain to adjust to lower L(·), which overcompensates the
downward effect of slower initial money creation on inflation.
It should be noted, however, that Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000, p. 25) consider this
outcome a “theoretical curiosity” because the interest elasticity of money demand (as a
proxy for the influence of inflation expectations) would have to be greater than unity,
which it is not empirically.
3.6. Fiscally Induced High and Hyperinflations
3.6.1. The Model of Bruno and Fischer (1990)
Preliminaries In the present subsection, I abandon the path of pure microfoundations
and loosely follow Bruno and Fischer (1990) in adopting a Cagan (1956) money demand
function to study how an economy can slide off into high or even hyperinflation.
I abstract from debt issuance, so the budget equation 〈3.5〉 reduces to
gt + tTHt = mt −
mt−1
1+ pit
.
Recalling the definition of real-money seigniorage 〈3.8〉 and denoting the treasury’s
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nominal and real primary budget deficit by
Dt ≡ Gt + TTHt ⇔ dt ≡ gt + tTHt , 〈3.22〉
respectively, the budget equation becomes
dt = ςmt ; 〈3.23〉
the primary budget deficit is solely financed by seigniorage.
A peculiarity of the translation from continuous into discrete time (Cagan 1956 as
well as Bruno and Fischer 1990 use the former) is that growth rates need to be defined
slightly differently from usual, that is, with time-t instead of time-(t− 1) variables in
the denominator:
µ′M,t ≡
∆Mt
Mt
, pi′t ≡
∆Pt
Pt
, 〈3.24〉
This adjustment is also made in the money demand function of Cagan (1956) 〈3.16〉:
m′C56,t ≡ exp
(−OIVEtpi′t+1) 〈3.25〉
With real-money seigniorage 〈3.8〉 rearranged to ςmt = ∆Mt/Pt, the combination of
Equations 〈3.23〉, 〈3.24〉, and 〈3.25〉 yields
dt =
∆Mt
Pt
=
∆Mt
Mt
· Mt
Pt
= µ′M,tmt = µ
′
M,t exp
(−OIVEtpi′t+1) . 〈3.26〉
In line with previous results, there is a limit to what the consolidated government can
finance via seigniorage (see↗Steady-State Equilibria below).
Steady-State Condition Aiming for a maximal sustainable (read: steady-state) level of
seigniorage revenues means that mt = Mt/Pt does not change anymore:
∆mt =
∂mt
∂Mt
∆Mt +
∂mt
∂Pt
∆Pt =
1
Pt
∆Mt − MtP2t
∆Pt
!
= 0 ⇔ µ′M,t = pi′t 〈3.27〉
(The equation is written with normal time indices instead of SS subscripts because it
is used again later.)
54 3. Interactions Arising from the Consolidated-Government Budget Equation
Figure 3.3: Inflation as a Function of Money Growth. ⋄ Source: Own illus-
tration based on Bruno and Fischer (1990, p. 355) and Walsh
(2010, p. 157). ⋄ Explanations: Plot of Equation 〈3.29〉 (the
positively sloped straight line is the steady-state condition
〈3.27〉). The budget deficit enters as a negative intercept.
Steady-State Equilibria Continuing in this fashion, inflation (and, since this is a steady-
state deliberation, also expected inflation) can be substituted by the net rate of money
growth in Equation 〈3.26〉, which then allows to find the seigniorage-maximizing rate
of the latter:
max
µ′M
µ′M exp
(−OIVµ′M) ⇒ exp(−OIVµ′M)−OIV exp(−OIVµ′M) µ′M != 0
⇔ µ′maxM =
1
OIV
〈3.28〉
Plugging this into Equation 〈3.26〉 yields the maximal amount of seigniorage and, thus,
the maximal budget deficit:
ςm ,max = dmax = [OIV exp(1)]
−1
In a graphical analysis, solving Equation 〈3.26〉 for the expected inflation rate,
Etpi
′
t+1 =
1
OIV
ln
(
µ′M,t
dt
)
=
ln µ′M,t
OIV
− ln dt
OIV
, 〈3.29〉
yields the curved lines in Figure 3.3; the straight (45◦) line represents the steady-state
condition 〈3.27〉 (see also Equation 〈3.31〉 and the surrounding discussion below). The
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solid and the dashed lines differ insofar as they are associated with different budget
deficits; as can be seen from Equation 〈3.29〉, a higher deficit pushes the graph down.
For dmax, the dotted graph intersects the 45◦ line at a single point (C), meaning there
is a unique steady state. Higher deficits are not associated with steady-state equilib-
rium since the seigniorage equation 〈3.29〉 (or 〈3.26〉) and the steady-state-condition
line 〈3.27〉 do not intersect anymore. For deficits below dmax, the two resulting intersec-
tion points (A and B or A’ and B’, respectively) indicate that there are two steady states,
one with low and one with high inflation rates. (The discussion of balanced budgets
and budget surpluses is more complicated due to the logarithmic form, see Appendix
A.1.4.1.)
Adaptive Expectations Assume inflation expectations change adaptively following
∆Etpi′t+1 ≡ Etpi′t+1 −Et−1pi′t = æ
(
pi′t −Et−1pi′t
)
, 〈3.30〉
where æ is the adaptive-expectations coefficient. At time t, Et−1pi′t is predetermined,
the consolidated government can influence pi′t, and will thereby also influence Etpi′t+1
which is, in turn, relevant for money demand 〈3.25〉 and thus for seigniorage. How is
actual inflation determined? Equation 〈3.27〉 implies that
∆mt
mt
= µ′M,t − pi′t.
To get ∆mt, we use the total differential of money demand 〈3.25〉,
∆mt ≡ ∂mt
∂t
=
∂mt
∂Etpi′t+1
· ∆Etpi′t+1 = −OIV exp
(−OIVEtpi′t+1)∆Etpi′t+1
⇒ ∆mt
mt
= −OIV∆Etpi′t+1,
so that
pi′t = µ′M,t +OIV∆Etpi
′
t+1.
Inserting the adaptive expectation formation scheme 〈3.30〉 gives
pi′t =
µ′M,t − æOIVEt−1pi′t
1− æOIV .
56 3. Interactions Arising from the Consolidated-Government Budget Equation
Finally, re-inserting this into the expectation formation scheme 〈3.30〉 leads to the ac-
tual change in inflation expectations as a function of the lagged expectation Et−1pi′t and
current policy µ′M,t:
∆Etpi′t+1 =
æ
(
µ′M,t −Et−1pi′t
)
1− æOIV . 〈3.31〉
In steady state, it is zero because µ′M,SS = pi′SS = ESSpi′SS.
Dynamics Outside of Steady State Suppose that in t the consolidated government de-
cides to increase money growth over and above the steady-state level µ′M,t−1 (= Et−1pi′t):
µ′M,t = µ
′
M,t−1 + ∆µ
′
M,t = Et−1pi
′
t + ∆µ
′
M,t 〈3.32〉
As a direct effect, seigniorage earnings are increased, yet at the same time, rising infla-
tion expectations indirectly depress seigniorage via money demand 〈3.25〉. In order to
balance these two effects and thus be able to keep the desired budget deficit constant in
Equation 〈3.26〉, a given change in money demand would require a certain adjustment
of inflation expectations:
∆
(
ln dt
OIV
)
=
∂
(
ln µ′M,t−1/OIV
)
∂µ′M,t−1
∆µ′M,t −
∂Etpi
′
t+1
∂µ′M,t−1
∆µ′M,t
!
= 0
⇔ ∆Etpi′t+1 =
1
OIVµ′M,t−1
∆µ′M,t 〈3.33〉
(The partial derivatives feature µ′M,t−1 to indicate the ‘point of departure,’ while ∆µ′M,t
denotes the deviation of money growth from this steady state at time t. A slightly dif-
ferent derivation that arrives at the same result is laid out in Appendix A.1.4.2.)
However, the actual change 〈3.31〉 (combined with Equation 〈3.32〉)
∆Etpi′t+1 =
æ
1− æOIV∆µ
′
M,t 〈3.34〉
typically deviates from the requirement 〈3.33〉, leading to the question whether it is
greater or smaller. Comparing the coefficients of Equations 〈3.33〉 and 〈3.34〉 (indicating
steady-state money growth by the SS subscript), the actual is greater than the required
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change in inflation expectations if
1
OIVµ′M,SS
<
æ
1− æOIV ⇔ µ
′
M,SS >
1− æOIV
æOIV
. 〈3.35〉
Thismeans that the ‘point-of-departure’ steady state has to be above a certain threshold,
which is in line with Bruno and Fischer (1990, p. 357); in Figure 3.3, points B and B’ are
natural candidates (I skip the discussion of points A and A’ here; see↗Elegance below).
Further, in order for ∆Etpi′t+1 not to change signs (i.e., in order for the denominator to
be positive) in Equation 〈3.34〉, it must hold that
1− æOIV > 0 ⇔ æ < 1OIV , 〈3.36〉
otherwise inflation expectations decrease when money growth is increased. If these
two conditions are fulfilled, an increase in money growth over and above its steady-
state level will increase inflation expectations ‘too much,’ depressing money demand
below the level that fits a constant budget deficit in Equation 〈3.26〉, thus leading the
consolidated government to increase money growth even further in a futile attempt to
defend said budget deficit. Because this happens on an explosive path, the result is
hyperinflation.
Specific Example It can only serve as an example, but using the seigniorage-maximizing
money growth rate 〈3.28〉, condition 〈3.35〉 becomes
1
OIV
>
1− æOIV
æOIV
⇔ æ > 1
1+OIV
.
In short: Given µ′maxM , if the speed of expectation adjustment satisfies (1+OIV)
−1 < æ <
O−1IV , a further increase in money growth leads to hyperinflation. (How such hyperinfla-
tions end is explained by Sargent 1982b in a study that also emphasizes fiscal influences
and that foreshadows some of the results derived in the subsequent chapters.)
3.6.2. Caveats and Remarks
Elegance I must concede that the present subsection is not as elegant in constructing a
hyperinflationary result as the main literature followed (Bruno and Fischer 1990, Walsh
2010, pp. 156-159), which is mostly due to the attempted translation into discrete time.
In the continuous-time version of the model, an increase in money growth creates a
direct feedback between the respective equivalents of the actual adjustment of inflation
expectations 〈3.31〉 and the 45◦ line 〈3.27〉: With the respective adjustments, the change
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in inflation expectations adheres to
∂Etpi
∂t
=
æ (µM −Epi)
1− æOIV ,
which has inflation expectations increasing instantaneously formoney growth above the
45◦ line et vice versa. Such a feedback can not be generated as easily with discrete time
if one cares for the exact timing of expectation formation. Strictly speaking, Figure 3.3
suffers from an inconsistency because Equations 〈3.29〉 and 〈3.27〉 require different ordi-
nates: Etpi′t+1 for the former and pi′t for the latter. All the same, against the background
of the discussion around Equation 〈3.31〉 (constant inflation and inflation expectations
in steady state) and knowing that the derivation is smoother with continuous time, this
seems tolerable.
Asymmetry To touch on another issue, the continuous-time dynamics also rest on con-
dition 〈3.36〉, but nothing further (Equation 〈3.35〉 for instance). If it is satisfied, points
B and B’ in Figure 3.3 are unstable equilibria, leading to hyperinflation if money growth
is increased or to the attracting equilibria A and A’, respectively, if it is decreased. The
unique equilibriumC is stable for lower and unstable for higher money growth rates be-
cause the respective graph lies below the 45◦ degree line entirely. This is an interesting
result because it allows for hyperinflation but not hyperdeflation.
On the Importance of Adaptive Expectations Adaptive expectations are not crucial, sim-
ilar results can also be obtained using rational expectations (although the stability prop-
erties of the equilibria are ‘switched,’ cf. Evans and Yarrow 1981). The condition is that
agents’ money holdings adjust only slowly, which amounts to introducing a certain fric-
tion to bring about the desired result (cf. Bruno 1989, p. 285; this approach is reminiscent
of the commonplace insertion of Calvo 1983 pricing into real business cycle models, see
Chapter 7). However, the justification of this friction seems arguable today because it
is as easy as never before for the general public to adjust money balances given modern
information technology and endogenous money supply.
The Olivera/Tanzi Effect Another alternative to sluggish adjustment of money balances
proposed by Kiguel (1989, pp. 155-156) would be the introduction of tax-collection lags
mocking the ‘Olivera/Tanzi effect’ (1967/1977), which posits that taxes can be devalued
in real terms by the time they are collected if the respective collection lag or the inflation
rate (or both) are sufficiently large. In addition, if treasury expenditure tracks price de-
velopmentsmore closely—which does not seem too unrealistic given that a certain share
of public spending is purchased from private vendors—there is a structural influence
on deficits which might lead the consolidated government to seigniorage generation in
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order to raise revenue.
The Olivera/Tanzi effect is an example of the interactions between monetary and fis-
cal policy in itself. However, its importance should be little and diminishing in low-
inflation countries in which the advantages of information technology also diffuse into
the tax-collection process, which is why it is only mentioned here in the context of high
(or hyper-)inflations.
Key Takeaways from Chapter 3
Monetary and fiscal policy are inextricably intertwined and the treasury and the cen-
tral bank are often considered to form a consolidated government. Money and unex-
pected inflation allow the latter to appropriate real resources over and above the exac-
tion of taxes. A dominant fiscal policymaker might try just that, forcing the monetary
authority to play along and accept loss of control over inflation (unpleasant mone-
tarist arithmetic). Slipping beyond the optimal point of an inflation-tax Laffer curve,
overdoing such seigniorage generation can lead to high or even hyperinflation.

4. Different Policy Regimes in the Baseline
Optimizing Model
In the constant-endowment model of Chapter 2 without money, I equip monetary and
fiscal policy with simple rules, the parameters of which are critical for determinacy,
stability, and thus viability of equilibrium. I characterize the two stable (out of a total
of four) equilibria and cover terminology.
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4.1. Modifications to the Baseline Model
Excluding Money Deviating from the constant-endowment variant of the baseline opti-
mizingmodel laid out in Chapter 2, the representative householdmaximizes the period
utility function
u(ct) 〈4.1〉
subject to the budget constraint
Ptct +QtBt = Pty+ Pt
(
gt + tTHt
)
+ Bt−1. 〈4.2〉
As there is no money, the price level Pt is the amount of treasury bonds Bt required to
buy one goods unit.
Consolidated-Government Budget Constraint As a consequence of the household’s bud-
get constraint 〈4.2〉 and goods-market clearing 〈2.27〉, policiesmust satisfy the flowbud-
get equation of the consolidated government:
Bt−1 = QtBt + Ptst 〈4.3〉
(With the exclusion of money from the model, the central bank practically becomes an
institution without a balance sheet, so Equation 〈4.3〉 could also be called the flow bud-
get equation of the treasury.) The present-value budget equation reads
Bt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
βjst+j 〈4.4〉
and can be derived analogously to Section 2.3.2. With Mt = 0 (or rather: nonexistent)
in Zt ∀t, the general formulation of Equation 〈2.34〉/〈2.42〉 makes it the appropriate
transversality condition also in the present variant of the model.
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4.2. Equilibrium Determination with Active and Passive Policies
4.2.1. Policy Rules and Laws of Motion
4.2.1.1. Monetary Policy and the Nominal Interest Rate
Taylor Rule Pursuing its inflation target pi∗, the central bank sets the short-term nomi-
nal interest rate it+1 according to
it+1 = iSS + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + εit, 〈4.5〉
where SS subscripts demark steady-state values, γCpi is the Taylor coefficient, and εit de-
notes an interest-rate shock (or, put differently, discretionary monetary policy).11 Trac-
ing back to Taylor (1993), the central bank is said to adhere to the Taylor principle if
γCpi > 1 and violate it for γCpi < 1.
Law of Motion for Inflation Combining the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉with the (constant-real-rate)
Fisher equation 〈2.47〉 yields the inflation difference equation
Etpit+1 − pi∗ = βγCpi (pit − pi∗) + βεit 〈4.6〉
(see Appendix B.1.1 for derivations).
4.2.1.2. Fiscal Policy and Surpluses
Fiscal Policy Rule The treasury decides upon net transfers to households tTHt and is
assumed to leave expenditure constant for simplicity (gt = g ∀t) so that policy can be
conveniently described in terms of the budget surplus st by Equation 〈2.10〉. Since some
of the subsequent arguments loosely follow Leeper and Leith (2017), I also adopt their
fiscal policy specification (cf. their p. 11), inwhich the surplus is adjusted by the treasury
to deviations of debt from steady-state (coefficient γTb ):
st = sSS + γTb
(
bt−1
1+ it
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
+ εst 〈4.7〉
11 The notation of the nominal interest rate it+1 emphasizes that, while being set in t, it is connected to
the future period t+ 1. This might beg the question why it is not the (expected) future inflation rate
pit+1 that the central bank reacts to but the current realization pit. The full answer is beyond the scope
of this thesis, but a short version reads: because of issues with determinacy other than those which
are discussed here. In what follows, we could not develop Equation 〈4.6〉 as it is; rather, it would read
Etpit+1−pi∗ = (β−1− γCpi)−1εit (cf. King 2000, p. 80). References relating to ‘inflation forecast targeting’
are Woodford (1994), Svensson (1997), and Bernanke and Woodford (1997), among others.
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It considers the market value of debt, which is why the bond price Qt = (1+ it)−1
(cf. Equation 〈2.8〉) also enters the equation. Similar to monetary policy, fiscal policy
can be discretionary, which is represented by the policy shock variable εst. (See Section
4.4 below for an alternative surplus rule that helps distinguish ‘Ricardian’ from ‘non-
Ricardian’ policy.)
Law of Motion for Real Debt Similar to the procedure formonetary policy, the combina-
tion of surplus rule 〈4.7〉with the respective equilibrium condition (i.e., the flow budget
equation of the treasury 〈4.3〉, which also leads to the intertemporal budget equation
〈4.4〉), produces a difference equation in real debt:
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
=
(
1+ r− γTb
)( bt
1+ it+1
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
−Etεst+1 〈4.8〉
(See Appendix B.1.1.2 for derivations.)
4.2.2. Active and Passive Policies
Active vs. Passive Policy The laws ofmotion 〈4.6〉 and 〈4.8〉 have the same form as those
of Leeper (1991, p. 136), who is often credited with a popular classification of policies: If
the policy is such that the coefficient of the respective difference equation is greater than
unity in absolute value (leading to an unstable difference equation), it is said to be active.
Conversely, if the coefficient is smaller than unity in absolute value, the policy is called
passive. Note that this classification does not refer to the coefficients of the individual
policy rules (γCpi in the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉 and γTb in Equation 〈4.7〉) but to those of the
respective laws of motion which are combinations of a policy rule and an equilibrium
condition. (See Figures 4.3a-4.3b on p. 79 for a graphical representation.)
Active/Passive vs. the Taylor Principle Monetary policy is called active if the inflation
process 〈4.6〉 is unstable because the central bank sets γCpi > β−1; it is called passive
if we have γCpi < β−1 and thus obtain a stable difference equation. Since β < 1 ⇔
β−1 > 1, activemonetary policy satisfies the Taylor principle (γCpi > 1, cf. Section 4.2.1.1).
However, the reverse is not necessarily true: In a small interval 1 < γCpi < β−1, the Taylor
principle is satisfied, but monetary policy still has to be considered passive because the
respective law of motion 〈4.6〉 converges to the steady state value pi∗.
Autonomous Policy A policy is called autonomous if it does not adapt to variables un-
der control of the respective other policymaker. For instance, autonomous monetary
policy does not take any fiscal variable into consideration (cf. Woodford 2001, p. 672;
non-autonomous monetary policy is not part of the current discussion).
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4.2.3. Equilibrium Determination
Counting Variables and Equations The basics of equilibrium determination are as de-
scribed in Section 2.4 (in particular, Tables 2.1b-2.1a). One obvious difference is that
money supply M and the respective first-order condition 〈2.14〉 drop out for the time
being. Hence, there remain two equations—the flow budget constraint 〈4.2〉/〈4.3〉 (re-
placing Equation 〈2.3〉 of the baseline model withmoney) as well as the Fisher equation
〈2.7〉/〈2.47〉—to determine the amount of bonds B and the price level P.
Fallacious Independence & Equilibrium Selection Superficial inspection of Equations
〈4.6〉 and 〈4.8〉 might make it appear as if they were independent of each other. In
this case, a unique equilibrium could be found by setting the policy coefficients γCpi, γTb
such that they produce two unstable forward-looking difference equations with a single
stationary state for each: For instance, in the case of monetary policy, the central bank
would choose an active strategy with γCpi > β−1 and thus produce a phase line steeper
than the 45◦ line in Figure 4.1; like this, all initial values pi0 ̸= pi∗ would lead farther and
farther away from the unique equilibrium pi∗, which is why such a destabilizing initial
value would never be implemented in a forward-looking equation (cf. Woodford 2003b,
p. 128).
Joint Equilibrium Determination However, the two paths are not independent because
the price level Pt is part of pit+1 as well as bt. Equilibrium determination still works sim-
ilarly to the procedure described in↗Fallacious Independence & Equilibrium Selection, but
has to be mindful of said interconnection: A unique stable equilibrium only occurs for
certain combinations of policy parameters γCpi, γTb . (As it stands, the previous paragraph
possibly contains a second fallacy regarding the validity of explosive equilibria which
is unveiled in Chapter 9.4.1.)
Policy Regimes Four elementary regimes arise out of the combination of two policy
fields (monetary and fiscal) with two strategies (active or passive): First, Section 4.3.1
describesmonetary dominance, which consists of activemonetary (γCpi > β−1) and passive
fiscal (γTb > r) policy. Second, Section 4.3.2 on fiscal dominance describes a reversal of
roles, so monetary policy is passive (γCpi < β−1) and fiscal policy active (γTb < r). Third,
both policies could try to behave actively, and fourth, both could content themselves
with being passive; these two regimes are described in Section 4.3.3.
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Figure 4.1: Inflation Dynamics under Monetary Dominance. ⋄ Source: Own
illustration based onWoodford (2001, p. 710). ⋄ Explanations:
Seemain text of Section 4.2.3 and, for ‘MonetaryDominance,’
Section 4.3.1.
4.3. Four Regimes
4.3.1. Monetary Dominance
4.3.1.1. Regime and Determinacy
Monetary Policy As already indicated, the inflationdifference equation 〈4.6〉 has a unique
solution
pit = pi
∗ − 1
γCpi
Et
∞
∑
j=0
(
1
βγCpi
)j
εit+j 〈4.9〉
if
(
βγCpi
)−1
< 1 ⇔ γCpi > β−1, 〈4.10〉
i.e., if the Taylor coefficient is greater than the real interest rate, or put differently, if
the central bank is the (only) active player. Formally, selection of this equilibrium in-
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cludes the imposition of a “forward convergence condition” (Cho and Moreno 2011,
p. 260; given by Equation 〈B.1〉 in Appendix B.1.1.1) which is somewhat similar to the
transversality condition in that it disallows explosive behavior of the inflation path—
however, stark emphasis has to be put on the ‘somewhat’ since this is the crucial point
in an argument about the validity of the different regimes’ equilibria below (again, cf.
Chapter 9.4.1).
Return to Figure 4.1 for a graphical representation: Since the law of motion 〈4.6〉 is
the combination of an equilibrium condition (the Fisher equation 〈2.5〉) and a policy
rule (the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉), each point on the respective phase line Etpit+1 = F(pit) is
associated with equilibrium—even if this implies explosive paths for inflation and the
price level, which occurs for all initial pi0 ̸= pi∗. Therefore, pi∗ is the unique stable equi-
librium, but it only constitutes a unique equilibrium if we exclude explosive paths by
adding an ‘ad hoc equilibrium condition’ such as the above forward convergence condi-
tion as a selection device. (Cf. Woodford 2001, pp. 709-711; Cochrane 2011, pp. 576-577;
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 2011, pp. 945-946. Besides Chapter 9.4.1, my Chapter 5.2
also picks up on this and makes related arguments.)
Fiscal Policy Following Leeper (1991) and Leeper and Leith (2017), fiscal policy is as-
sumed to be passive here (γTb > r). (Alternatively, monetary dominance could be char-
acterized by the ‘less demanding’ requirement of Ricardian fiscal policy which would
guarantee a stable real debt process for all price paths. It is introduced in Section 4.4
below.)
Equilibrium Determination To complete the analyses of Sections 2.4 and 4.2.3 for this
specific case, note that Equation 〈4.9〉 returns a unique value for the current inflation
rate. With Pt−1 predetermined, this also pins down Pt. Finally, the flow budget con-
straint 〈4.2〉/〈4.3〉 determines Bt as the residual.
4.3.1.2. Policy Shocks
Interest-Rate Shock Starting in steady state, consider a decrease in the path of εi, which
is generally called discretionary expansionary monetary policy (increases would work
vice versa inwhat follows). It lowers the interest rate in the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉 and increases
inflation by Equation 〈4.9〉.The result is determined by three ceteris paribus effects:
1. An instantaneous increase in inflation raises the price level Pt.
2. With higher Pt, the value of outstanding debt on the left-hand side of the present-
value budget equation 〈4.4〉 is diminished. This negative wealth effect to the rep-
resentative household as holder of the bonds leads to a reduction in aggregate
demand and, thus, downward pressure on the price level (cf. alsoWoodford 2001,
p. 684).
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3. There is no instantaneous reaction by the treasury as it reacts only to lagged real
debt (cf. the fiscal policy rule 〈4.7〉), but of course, the present reduction in real
debt entails lower surpluses in the future. Equivalent to higher net transfers, this
induces the household to increase demand and thereby push up the price level.
Within the present-value budget equation 〈4.4〉, lower expected surpluses on the
right-hand side are compatible with a higher price level on the left-hand side.
Which effect dominates? With γTb > r, it might seem as if the treasury even added to the
pressure on prices because overly decreased surpluses mean higher expected transfer
streams (or, discounted to the present: wealth) to the household, which then strongly
increases demand and causes the price level to rise even above the initial plan of the
central bank. As already mentioned above, however, a surplus-rule coefficient greater
than the net real rate of interest ensures that real debt always returns to its steady-state
value over time. Even if the present model assumes it is rolled over every period, which
might ‘disguise’ it as a flow, debt is a stock. If it starts with an expected long-run value
of x in a distant-future period t + n before the policy shock is announced and the ex-
pectation remains that it is still x at t + n after all shock-induced (flow) adjustments
have occured, nothing concerning treasury policy has changed from today’s perspec-
tive; real debt started in steady state before the inflationary policy shock and returns
there given a sufficient amount of time. Depending on the coefficient γTb , it might take
longer or shorter to do so, but it does not seem expedient to argue in this direction in
an infinite-horizon setup. So while there might be compositional effects on the path of
future surpluses, the net effect of treasury policy on household wealth is nil—items 2
and 3 cancel out. The end result is item 1, an increase in inflation brought about by the
central bank.
Inflationary policy in more than just the current period also affects the nominal in-
terest rate. Plugging the equilibrium inflation rate 〈4.9〉 into the Fisher equation 〈2.47〉
gives the equilibrium nominal rate of interest
1+ it+1 = (1+ iSS)−Et
∞
∑
j=1
(
1
βγCpi
)j
εit+j 〈4.11〉
which is not affected by a policy shock in just the current period εit. An increase in the
nominal interest rate (for longer-lasting policy shocks) is equivalent to lower bond prices
Qt by Equation 〈2.8〉 and thus affects the treasury in its debt issuance. Higher interest
payments to households could be seen as a wealth effect, but this is also offset by higher
future surpluses (cf. Leeper and Leith 2017, p. 2318).
Surplus Shock Consider now a discretionary policy that decreases only the current sur-
plus st by one unit (for simplicity): εst = −1 in policy rule 〈4.7〉. With Bt−1 predeter-
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mined in t and Pt in the hands of the central bank, the only way to satisfy its flow bud-
get equation 〈4.3〉 is for the treasury to increase nominal debt Bt by −εstPt/Qt = Pt/Qt
units. In the next period, t + 1, the surplus rule 〈4.7〉 reacts to the increase in (then-)
lagged debt Bt. To make it short, there is again no ‘relevant’ change in the present-value
budget equation 〈4.4〉, only a recomposition of the path of surpluses. (This is an ex-
ample of Ricardian equivalence brought about by Ricardian fiscal policy, cf. Section 4.4
below.)
4.3.2. Fiscal Dominance
All derivations for this subsection can be found in Appendix B.1.1.2.
4.3.2.1. Regime and Determinacy
Fiscal Policy As a second case, consider now a passive fiscal policy rule. For simplicity,
it does not react onlyweakly to changes in real debt but it does not respond at all (γTb = 0;
see Section 4.4 for this kind of policy):
st = sSS + εst, 〈4.12〉
This leads to the following solution for the respective difference equation 〈4.8〉:
bt
1+ it+1
=
bSS
1+ iSS
+Et
∞
∑
j=1
βjεst+j 〈4.13〉
Monetary Policy Like before, the ‘other’ policymaker is assumed to be passive. There-
fore, the central bank reacts only weakly to inflation (γCpi < β−1 in the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉).
Equilibrium Determination In Section 4.3.1.1, the unique equilibrium is found by ana-
lyzing the law of motion related to the active policy and then proceeding to the passive
policy. Unfortunately, this isolationist procedure can not simply be repeated under fis-
cal dominance. The reason is that the nominal interest rate—which is the central bank’s
policy instrument and closely linked to the inflation rate—also appears in the respective
equations, namely 〈4.8〉 and 〈4.13〉, which therefore do not lend themselves as easily to
a graphical analysis as the law of motion for inflation 〈4.6〉 in Figure 4.1. (Note that
this also holds for simpler surplus rules than Equation 〈4.7〉, with an example given by
Equation 〈4.20〉 in Section 4.4. However, the interest-rate peg discussed in Section 5.1.5
resolves this problem and should make good on the omission at this point.) The way
out is the verbal description in the following subsection.
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4.3.2.2. Policy Shocks
Surplus Shock To illustrate the properties of the fiscal-dominance regime, I play through
a one-off discretionary decrease in surpluses by the treasury. For simplicity, this policy
shock is assumed to occur only in period t and to show zero persistence (εst < 0 and
Etε
s
t+j = 0 ∀j ≥ 1).
Following Equation 〈4.3〉, a decrease in the current surplus st could be offset by taking
on more debt on the part of the treasury at t. With γTb = 0 in policy rule 〈4.12〉, the re-
spective law of motion 〈4.8〉 shows that real debt explodes once it deviates from steady-
state. How could Equation 〈4.13〉 be a solution if it potentially violates the transversality
condition (not shown in themain text, seeAppendix B.1.1.2)? What ismore, how should
this conceivable real debt increase in t be reconciled with the fact that εst does not even
appear in Equation 〈4.13〉? The answer lies in the consideration of what could change
in response to the surplus policy shock. In the following, it is shown that prices and the
reaction of monetary policy are what allows for a regime with passive fiscal policy to be
viable.
Plugging the solution for real debt 〈4.13〉 into the flow budget equation 〈4.3〉 pins
down current inflation
Πt = bt−1
(
sSS
1− β +Et
∞
∑
j=0
βjεst+j
)−1
. 〈4.14〉
Since last period’s price level Pt−1 is predetermined, this determines the current price
level Pt. In reaction to increasing inflation (recall that εst < 0), the central bank raises the
contemporary nominal interest rate via the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉:
it+1 − iSS = βγCpi
 bt−1
β
1−β sSS + βε
s
t
− (1+ iSS)
+ εit 〈4.15〉
With surplus shocks equal to zero from t+ 1 on, the market value of real debt in period
t remains at its steady-state level (note that the sum index starts at j = 1 in Equation
〈4.13〉). Consequently, by Equation 〈4.14〉, inflation is not driven by discretionary fiscal
impulses anymore from t+ 1 on. Nonetheless, as the one-period-ahead version of Equa-
tion 〈4.15〉 shows, there still is an interest-rate ‘afterglow’ of the central bank’s period-t
reaction it+1 to fiscally induced inflation:
Etit+2 − iSS = βγCpi (it+1 − iSS) +Etεit+1 〈4.16〉
The initial fiscal policy shock leads to a path for nominal interest rates that is potentially
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explosive, depending on the coefficient of the interest-rate difference equation 〈4.16〉. It
is a defining characteristic of the fiscal-dominance regime that it is smaller than unity
(i.e., γCpi < β−1); the solution of the inflation difference equation 〈4.6〉 is thus backward-
looking here. The central bank acts passively, adjusting interest rates only moderately
to inflation, and thereby contains the amount of interest the treasury has to pay on its
debt.
From the perspective of the household sector, a one-off reduction in surpluses with-
out any compensating adjustments in the future is an increase of net wealth that allows
for higher consumption demand. To present the other alternative, namely the central
bank reacting to higher inflation by increasing the nominal interest rate more than one-
to-one, higher interest incomewould add further towealth-driven demand and upward
inflation pressure, taking the economy on an explosive path via Equation 〈4.16〉. If this
happens, (per se harmless) fiscally induced inflation is made unstable by active mone-
tary policy (cf. Leeper and Leith 2017, p. 2320). In the context of Figure 4.1, fiscal policy
typically implements a pi0 ̸= pi∗ so that activemonetary policy leads to explosive behav-
ior (see Section 4.3.3.1) whereas passive monetary policy leads back to pi∗ (cf. Woodford
2001, pp. 711-712).
Interest-Rate Shock As before, consider a single-period shock without any persistence.
Assuming an increase, we have εit > 0 and Etεit+j = 0 ∀j ≥ 1. The easiest way is to
resort to the flow budget equation of the consolidated government 〈4.3〉 again: With
Bt−1 predetermined and surpluses unresponsive to the interest-rate hike (γTb = 0 in
rule 〈4.7〉), the equation can only hold if nominal debt Bt increases accordingly—a lower
bond price Qt means the treasury has to issue more debt titles Bt to achieve the same
nominal volume. Equation 〈4.14〉 implies that current inflation Πt and thus also the
current price level Pt are not affected by these events. Therefore, real debt bt increases
with its nominal counterpart. Since these changes are proportional, or in other words,
the fractions Bt/(1+ it+1) and bt/(1+ it+1) = Bt/(Pt[1+ it+1]) remain constant, the law
of motion 〈4.8〉 does not trigger an explosion in real debt. In the next period, however,
Equation 〈4.13〉 comes into effect and (since the term in parentheses on the right-hand
side is unaffected) increases future inflationΠt+1 proportionally to then-lagged real debt
bt, which itself increases proportionally to the nominal interest rate in the period before.
This induces the central bank to raise interest rates via the Taylor coefficient in rule 〈4.5〉,
so the whole process starts over, but since monetary policy is passive, its amplitude
decreases over time similar to the proceedings relating to Equation 〈4.16〉. All the central
bank achieves is a transitory increase in inflation.
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4.3.3. The Two Unfriendly Regimes: Explosions and Sunspot Equilibria
4.3.3.1. On the Explosiveness of Real Debt in Doubly Active Policy Regimes
Active Monetary and Fiscal Policy Combining active monetary policy (γCpi > β−1) with
active (potentially non-Ricardian: 0 ≤ γTb < r, see Section 4.4) fiscal policy yields two
unstable difference equations 〈4.6〉 and 〈4.8〉 inwhich both respective processes explode
unless their steady-state values are hit exactly. To show the interactions between both
laws of motion, either one can be taken as a starting point:
 Beginning on the fiscal side, the solution 〈4.13〉 to the real-debt law ofmotion 〈4.8〉
also implies a certain inflation rate 〈4.14〉. If this is different from the inflation
target pi∗, the inflation process explodes (cf. Woodford 2001, p. 711). This, in turn,
feeds back on the composite term in Equation 〈4.8〉 by affecting real debt b = B/P
as well as the nominal interest rate i. Therefore, even if the fiscal side is in steady
state initially, it is pulled out of it later. Being active, treasury policy does not
counteract this development strongly enough, so that the real debt process also
explodes.
 Alternatively, one can start on the monetary side. Given last period’s price level
Pt−1, the target inflation rate pi∗ implies a current price level Pt as well as the nomi-
nal interest rate it+1 = iSS (since inflation will only deviate from steady state in the
subsequent period if a shock occurs), both of which may let the composite term in
Equation 〈4.8〉 deviate from steady state and thus explode.
Of course, it is not entirely inconceivable that there aremutually consistent steady states
for inflation and real debt so that neither of the two explodes right away. However, rec-
onciliation of the respective targets would require close coordination betweenmonetary
andfiscal policy and such a steady-state equilibrium could be described as fragile at best.
Real-Debt Explosions A slightly rearranged variant of the law of motion for the com-
posite real-debt term 〈4.8〉 reads
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
)
= (1+ r)
bt
1+ it+1
− r bSS
1+ iSS
=
bt
1+ it+1
+ r
(
bt
1+ it+1
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
,
〈4.17〉
where the policy shock Etεst+1 is dropped because the focus lies on the dynamics (for
which it can be a trigger, however). Further, treasury policy is assumed not to react
to debt at all (γTb = 0), which is the most extreme case imaginable at this point (later,
Section 5.2.1.2 goes even farther by suggesting a negative policy parameter as a policy
prescription). Note that a special case can emerge for 0 < γTb ≤ r, see ↗Active Ricar-
4.3. Four Regimes 73
dian Policy in Section 4.4.2. Equation 〈4.17〉 confirms that the composite real-debt term
explodes. Two subcases can be distinguished:
 Starting to the right of the steady state, bt/(1+ it+1) > bSS/(1+ iSS), the right-
hand side of Equation 〈4.17〉 shows that the term constantly increases and ap-
proaches infinity. Such a process can be triggered by too low inflation, which
increases real debt bt via its effect on the current price level Pt and further leads to
a lower nominal interest rate it+1 via the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉.
 Starting to the left, bt/(1 + it+1) < bSS/(1 + iSS), the term in parentheses turns
negative and makes Et[bt+1/(1+ it+2)] smaller than its lag bt/(1+ it+1). Analo-
gously to the above case, the respective trigger would be too high inflation (and
the corresponding price level as well as nominal interest rate, which are also too
high to keep the composite real-debt term in steady state). After a certain time,
b/(1 + i) turns negative itself, that is, the treasury becomes a net lender to the
private sector. In principle, the process approaches minus infinity.
While it is obvious that the real-debt process explodes, the more important question
is whether or not it does so ‘fast enough’ to violate the transversality condition 〈2.42〉,
which would then rule out the respective equilibrium-candidate paths.
Growth Rate of Real Debt Recall that Equation 〈4.8〉 is derived from the consolidated-
government budget equation 〈4.3〉 and the surplus rule 〈4.7〉. With γTb = Etεs = 0, the
latter two can be combined to
Bt−1 = QtBt + PtsSS ⇔ bt−1Πt =
1
1+ it+1
bt + sSS ⇔ bt = (1+ it+1)
(
bt−1
Πt
− sSS
)
and used to find the steady-state value:
bSS = (1+ r)Π∗
(
bSS
Π∗
− sSS
)
⇔ bSS = (1+ iSS) sSSr ⇔
bSS
1+ iSS
=
sSS
r
Plugging this into Equation 〈4.17〉 gives
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
)
= (1+ r)
bt
1+ it+1
− sSS,
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which implies that the market value of real debt grows at the gross rate
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
)
bt
1+ it+1
=
(1+ r)
bt
1+ it+1
− sSS
bt
1+ it+1
= 1+ r− sSSbt
1+it+1
. 〈4.18〉
Depending on the sign of bt, it is smaller or greater than the real interest rate r.
Satisfaction of the Transversality Condition? In Equation 〈2.42〉, the discount factor vt,t+J+1
can be split into two parts by use of Equations 〈2.16〉-〈2.20〉, which allows to write
lim
J→∞
Et
(
vt,t+J
Πt+J+1
1+ it+J+1
Zt+J
Pt+J+1
)
= lim
J→∞
Et
[(
1
1+ r
)J bt+J
1+ it+J+1
]
= 0 〈4.19〉
(note that Zt = Bt here because there is no money in the current setup). The term in
brackets on the right-hand side can have an unpleasant implication: Themarket value of
real debt bt/(1+ it+1) is discounted by the gross real interest rate, which can be greater
than the growth rate of real debt given by Equation 〈4.18〉. In particular, real-debt ex-
plosions to the right of the steady state (cf. the first bullet point on p. 73) unambiguously
deduct a non-negative value from the gross real interest rate so that the net growth fac-
tor, i.e., the combination of the growth rate and the discount factor, is smaller than unity.
Like this, the transversality condition 〈4.19〉 is always satisfied and can thus not be used
to rule out the respective real-debt paths.
Violation of the Transversality Condition? Starting with the obvious case, real-debt ex-
plosions to the left of the steady state clearly violate the transversality condition 〈4.19〉
because the growth rate 〈4.18〉 exceeds the discount rate for negative real-debt values
(even if only marginally). As stated in the second bullet point on p. 73, lending from the
treasury to the representative household would become infinitely large. To be precise,
this represents a violation of the no-Ponzi condition 〈2.30〉, but it is also covered by the
transversality condition.
However, some authors see a violation of the latter in any case: Christiano and Fitzger-
ald (2000, p. 14) argue that the last term on the far-right-hand side of Equation 〈4.18〉
becomes smaller and smaller over time so that the growth rate of the composite real-
debt term converges to the gross real interest rate (1 + r). If this is true, the present
value of the expected market value of real debt is not discounted all the way to zero, so
that the transversality condition is violated and the respective paths do not constitute
equilibria.
4.3. Four Regimes 75
Remaining Doubts Given an infinite amount of time, both the discounting of a finite
market value of real debt to zero in the transversality condition 〈4.19〉 and the con-
vergence of the respective growth rate to the real interest rate in Equation 〈4.18〉 are
straightforward—individually. Considering both processes jointly is more complicated,
however, because the argument is about relative speeds in infinity then: If the growth
rate of real debt in Equation 〈4.18〉 converges ‘first,’ that is, before real debt is discounted
all the way to zero, the transversality condition is violated because some finite amount
of real debt is multiplied and divided by the same gross rate (1 + r) in every period
afterwards.
Putting it bluntly, it is not clear infinity works this way: Assuming such convergence
(in the spirit of Christiano and Fitzgerald 2000) is literally premature because it implies
that one process which requires an infinite amount of time is completed before another
process that also requires an infinite amount of time. The counterargument would be
that, in every period, the market value of real outstanding debt is reduced more strongly
by discounting than it is increased by the growth rate of Equation 〈4.18〉; therefore, the
present value approaches zero and the transversality condition is always satisfied if real
debt explodes to the right of the steady state. One could consider this result especially
unsatisfying because it represents an asymmetry in a model which is so simple that it
‘should’ be symmetric (by contrast, the zero-lower bound on net nominal interest rates is
a ‘welcome’ example as it embodies a necessary friction tomake an otherwise symmetric
model asymmetric in a certain respect, cf. Section 5.2.1).
To be fair, one could probably come upon good arguments for both positions in a dis-
cussion that turns evermoremathematical. Exactly this is the only conclusion I can sup-
port personally at this point: The validity of equilibrium-candidate paths in the active-
monetary-active-fiscal policy regime hinges on a mathematical subtlety. Nonetheless,
since this question of validity is either a non-issue or (in the case of the aforementioned
Christiano and Fitzgerald 2000) treated like only a minor complication in the literature,
and because of the asymmetry mentioned above, I choose to lean towards the generally
accepted classification of active-active policy configurations as regimes that do not lead
to equilibria (instead of describing them as asymmetric regimes with no equilibrium for
negative and infinitely many indeterminate equilibria for positive deviations from the
real-debt steady state).
4.3.3.2. Sunspot Equilibria
When both policies are passive, matters are much simpler. Figure 4.2 illustrates the
situation generally: For any initial value t ̸= ∗ (substitute pi or b/(1+ i) for , re-
spectively), the process reverts back to the steady state ∗ over time. Since this also
means that the transversality condition 〈2.42〉/〈4.19〉 is never violated, all initial val-
ues and the ensuing paths are valid equilibria, which makes the model indeterminate.
76 4. Different Policy Regimes in the Baseline Optimizing Model
t
Ett+1
45
phase
line

Figure 4.2: Dynamics under Passive Policy. ⋄ Source: Own illustration. ⋄
Explanations: Substitute pi and b/(1+ i) for , respectively;
see main text of Section 4.3.3.2.
In terms of Section 2.4, the↗Infinite Recursion problem can not be solved fully because
bothmonetary andfiscal policy fail tomake themodel determinate by ‘picking’ a unique
equilibrium (cf. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 2011, p. 948).
4.4. Ricardian Equivalence and Ricardian vs. Non-Ricardian Policy
4.4.1. Ricardian Equivalence
Alternative Surplus Rule Consider an alternative to surplus rule 〈4.7〉 here, namely
St = γTBBt−1, 0 < γ
T
B ≤ 1. 〈4.20〉
The treasury sets surpluses St so as to redeem a certain fraction γTB of oustanding lia-
bilities Zt−1 = Bt−1. (The shock term εst is omitted for simplicity. At least if modeled
in the usual way, that is, either as white noise or a stable first-order autoregressive pro-
cess driven by white noise, it would not add anything substantial to the argument to be
made here.)
Effects on the Present-Value Budget Equation Combining the alternative surplus rule
〈4.20〉 with the flow budget equation of the consolidated government 〈4.3〉 (and Equa-
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tion 〈2.18〉 for the stochastic discount factor v) yields
Et
(
vt,t+1
Bt
Pt+1
)
=
(
1− γTB
) Bt−1
Pt
〈4.21〉
and, by forward substitution,
Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Bt+J
Pt+J+1
)
=
(
1− γTB
)J+1 Bt−1
Pt
〈4.22〉
⇒ lim
J→∞
Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Bt+J
Pt+J+1
)
= 0. 〈4.23〉
Expression 〈4.23〉 is equivalent to the transversality condition 〈2.42〉. In other words,
the latter is always satisfied for all paths of the endogenous variables, so its imposition
as an equilibrium condition does not restrict the set of equilibria in this case.
Ricardian Equivalence Alternatively, plugging fiscal rule 〈4.20〉 into the present-value
budget equation 〈4.4〉 (in the first line of Equation 〈4.24〉 below) and using Equation
〈4.22〉 (in the second line) then reveals that it is always identically satisfied:
Bt−1
Pt
= Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+jst+j = Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+jγTB
Bt+j−1
Pt+j
= γTB
Bt−1
Pt
J
∑
j=0
(
1− γTB
)j
= γTB
Bt−1
Pt
1
1− (1− γTB) = Bt−1Pt 〈4.24〉
Put differently, given the surplus rule 〈4.20〉, Ricardian equivalence obtains: The trea-
sury ensures that the present value of future budget surpluses is equal to the real value
of its currently outstanding liabilities. Even price level pathswith unbounded growth or
strong deflation do not impede thismechanism. (Cf.Woodford 1995, p. 29, for instance.)
The Bohn-Woodford Criterion The result that Ricardian equivalence holds for γTB > 0
is shown by Bohn (1998, Technical Appendix A1). It leads to the following distinction
used in this thesis: Fiscal policy is considered Ricardian for γTB > 0 and non-Ricardian
for γTB = 0. To avoid confusion: Equation 〈4.20〉 is a simplified version of a broader
class of policy rules that allows for other (unspecified) influences on surpluses apart
from outstanding debt (cf. Bohn 1998, p. 951), so γTB = 0 does not necessarily imply
St = 0 ∀t for all non-Ricardian rules. (To add confusion: Section 5.2.1.2 describes a
policy proposal that actually sets the respective parameter below zero.)
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The distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian fiscal policy by reference to the
transversality condition (that is, its unconditional satisfaction via surpluses) is mostly
credited to Woodford (1995; 2001). Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b) derive basi-
cally the same criterion in a model that scales variables on nominal GDP in order to fa-
cilitate empirical considerations. In the same spirit, they add that, in an infinite-horizon
setup, γTB has to be “bounded away from zero infinitely often,” but not in every period.
This increases the degree of plausibility associated with the Ricardian regime, but also
introduces an issue which may complicate the interpretation of real-life events: “A sta-
bilizing policy could be in effect every other year, or every third year, or every decade.
Indeed, the fiscal retrenchment need not occur in the next 100 years, or in any finite
dataset!” (Both quotes on their p. 1226.)
Finally, Cochrane (1999, p. 340) considers a real surplus rule st(Pt) = S/Pt which is a
function of fixed nominal surpluses (hence no time index) and the price level. He calls
fiscal policy Ricardian if it moves in line with the price level, which may unnecessarily
limit the focus on this single variable but, in his example, amounts to the same criterion
as the previous approaches.
Implications for Determinacy The main finding is already indicated twice below Equa-
tions 〈4.23〉 and 〈4.24〉, but it is worth stating it clearly again: Ricardian fiscal pol-
icy does nothing to restrict a given set of possible equilibria but always satisfies the
transversality condition 〈2.42〉/〈4.23〉 (which is tantamount to the present-value bud-
get equation 〈2.43〉/〈4.4〉, cf. Section 2.3.2), irrespective of the path of other variables.
Since this applies to prices in particular, it must be paired with active monetary pol-
icy as described in Section 4.3.1 to be able to achieve determinacy. (Cf. Woodford 2001,
pp. 690-691. Cochrane 1999, p. 334 calls Ricardian policy the “fiscal analogue” to certain
monetary regimes that lead to indeterminacy under the quantity theory, cf. Section 5.1.5
on interest-rate pegs; see also Section 9.3.1.)
4.4.2. Distinguishing Fiscal-Policy Classifications
Ricardian/Non-Ricardian vs. Active/Passive Policy The distinction between Ricardian
and non-Ricardian policy is a ‘displacement to the left’ of the distinction between active
and passive fiscal policy (cf. Section 4.2.2). While the latter revolves around whether
the law of motion for surpluses 〈4.8〉 is converging or explosive, depending on whether
γTb > r or γTb < r, respectively, the former property is related to the transversality
condition 〈2.42〉/〈4.19〉 with Ricardian policy (γTb > 0) leading to its satisfaction and
non-Ricardian policy (γTb = 0) leading to its violation. (Figure 4.3b summarizes the
terminology graphically.)
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Figure 4.3a: Terminology of Monetary Policy Rules. ⋄ Source: Own illustra-
tion.
! Ricardian
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r
Figure 4.3b: Terminology of Fiscal Policy Rules. ⋄ Source: Own illustration.
Active Ricardian Policy Inbetween, active Ricardian policy with γTB ∈ (0, r] means that
the law of motion 〈4.8〉 can trigger explosions in real debt at a rate that is lower than
the inverse stochastic discount factor. Therefore, these paths are not ruled out by the
transversality condition 〈4.19〉. Such a passive-monetary/active-but-Ricardian-fiscal
regime has a multitude of viable equilibria, that is, it is undetermined (cf. Cochrane
1999, p. 340; Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 2001b, p. 1226; Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
2011, p. 956). Active monetary policy seems to be the remedy here.
Which Approach Is Better? The two classifications—active/passive and Ricardian/non-
Ricardian—appear against different backgrounds:
 Woodford (2001) presents a basic nonlinear DSGE model in which satisfaction or
violation of the transversality condition puts fiscal policy in either the Ricardian
or non-Ricardian corner. The advantage of this approach is its generality and that
it naturally corresponds to said optimality condition, but as shown just above,
active-Ricardian fiscal policy can lead to problems with determinacy.
 By contrast, Leeper (1991) introduces the active/passive classification in the con-
text of a linearized model. He explicitly acknowledges that he therefore “can-
not directly check that the transversality condition is satisfied” (p. 135). Indeed,
the resulting assertions are limited to the vicinity around steady state; very large
fluctuations are not covered by his analysis. Then again, using stability of the re-
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spective difference equations avoids the kind of indeterminacy discussed above.
Therefore, Leeper’s requirements are both weaker and stronger than Woodford’s,
in different respects (cf. Woodford 1995, fn. 30, p. 27; Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
2011, p. 956).
It could probably be guessed that there is no clear answer to the introducing question;
the suitability of approaches depends on the purpose followed. In any case, numerical
analyses (which are mostly based on linearized models) will typically rely on the ac-
tive/passive classification; the simulation of a sticky-price model in Chapter 7.3 of this
study is one example. Further, Chapter 5.2.2 similarly presents arguments that distin-
guish between local and global analysis.
4.5. Final Notes on the Baseline Model with Policy
Saddle-Path(-Like) Stability Moving the derivation of solution 〈4.13〉 toAppendix B.1.1.2
obscures that, in switching from monetary to fiscal dominance, real debt turns from a
backward-looking into a forward-looking variable. By contrast, inflation is forward-
looking under monetary and backward-looking under fiscal dominance (cf. Cochrane
1999, p. 365).12 AlthoughEquations 〈4.6〉 and 〈4.8〉 do not form a linear differencemodel
compatible to Blanchard and Kahn (1980), the deliberations above show that the present
model displays saddle-path stability: If one policy maker behaves actively—that is, sets
the coefficient of the respective difference equation above unity—the other must behave
passively in order for the economy to reach a non-explosive solution; in other words,
if one of the equations has a forward-looking (active) solution, the other one must be
backward-looking (passive).
New Debt Sales Among other things, Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 explain what happens in
both regimes if the treasury engineers a surplus policy shock. In addition, Cochrane
(1999, p. 347) also considers issuance of additional debt in period t: At first, nothing
actually happens because Bt does not appear in Equation 〈4.4〉. In t+ 1, however, either
one of the remaining variables has to adjust. Under monetary dominance, the present
value of surpluses increases accordingly so the price level is unaffected. By contrast,
under fiscal dominance, surpluses do not change (that is, at all or strongly enough) so
that the price level jumps to the value which makes Equation 〈4.4〉 hold.
12 Use of these terms as well as notation is not uniform in the literature. Compare Azariadis (1993, Ch. 2)
and Gandolfo (2010, Ch. 3), for instance: Both consider initial- as well as terminal-value problems, but
apply different labels to the respective solutions. In Azariadis (1993, pp. 20-22), the “forward-looking
solution”means starting from an initial value and going forward in time until the present date, yielding
a solution that depends on past state variables. By contrast, Gandolfo (2010, p. 28) links the “forward
solution” to a terminal-value problem and thus a sum term containing future realizations. I follow the
latter classification.
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Key Takeaways from Chapter 4
A policy is said to be active (passive) when the respective law of motion resulting from
the policy rule and an equilibrium condition is unstable (stable). Four regimes arise:
Under the conventional regime of monetary dominance, an active central bank sets
the nominal anchor while a passive treasury establishes Ricardian equivalence. Under
fiscal dominance, active fiscal policy determines the price level via wealth effects in
the present-value budget equation of the consolidated government (passive monetary
policy does not provoke explosive behavior). Doubly active regimes are considered
explosive non-equilibria; doubly passive regimes lead to multiple-solution indetermi-
nacy.

5. Extensions: What Happens When We Add…
Money is brought back into the model developed in Chapters 2 and 4. First, it is
used as the central bank’s policy instrument in three ‘case studies’ to further illustrate
the functioning of fiscal price determination; later, it is endogenized in order to show
how interest-rate pegs can overcome their reputation of leading to indeterminacy. In
the second half of the chapter, I examine the effects of putting bounds on certain
endogenous variables, namely, a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and
a ‘debt’ limit on consolidated-government liabilities.
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Derivations for this chapter can be found in Appendix C.
5.1. Money
5.1.1. Setup
The basic model specifications are those of Chapter 2. Policy design in Section 5.1 draws
especially on Woodford (1995).
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Policy Monetary policy consists of setting an exogenous money supplyM. This can be
virtually any sequence that implies nonnegative nominal interest rates (cf. Buiter 2002,
p. 466, for instance) or slightly more refined processes with constant or zero money
growth (cf. Carlstrom and Fuerst 2000, pp. 25 or 27, respectively). Money-supply rules
complicate the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive,’ which pertains to interest-rate
policy; however, Sims (1999b, p. 419) thinks of exogenous money supply as active mon-
etary policy as well (considering the implications for the now-endogenous nominal in-
terest rate described in the case studies below, this seems fitting).
Fiscal policy sets net transfers to the household tTH and keeps expenditure g constant.
Because of Equation 〈2.10〉, it thus exogenously decides on budget surpluses s.
Counting Variables and Equations The basics of equilibrium determination are laid out
in Section 2.4 (especially Tables 2.1b-2.1a). In the current policy arrangement, there re-
main three variables—the nominal interest rate i, the amount of bonds B, and the price
level P—to be determined by three open equations: the budget constraint 〈2.3〉, the first-
order condition with respect to money 〈2.14〉 (or one of the implicit money-demand
functions 〈2.22〉 and 〈2.25〉 derived from it), and the Fisher equation 〈2.5〉/〈2.7〉. Of
course, this does not entirely solve the issue of↗Infinite Recursion (p. 36) in the present
setup so the model is still indeterminate at this point (cf. also Woodford 1995, pp. 4, 14).
5.1.2. Fiscal Price Determination
Assumptions Recall that utility 〈2.1〉 is additively separable in its arguments ct and
mt and that the properties 〈2.2〉 apply to each of them individually. In addition, the
marginal utility of real money is assumed to never exceed even the smallest-possible
marginal utility of consumption (brought about by the highest-possible endowment
ymax) here:
um(mt) < uc(ymax) ∀m > 0, t 〈5.1〉
Equilibrium Determination Using money demand 〈2.22〉 and noting that ∂u(·)/∂mt =
Pt∂u(·)/∂Mt, the present-value budget equation 〈2.44〉 can be rearranged to
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
βj
uM
(
Mt+j
)
uc
(
ct+j
) Mt+j +Et ∞∑
j=0
βjst+j. 〈5.2〉
Since all other variables are already established (ct+j is constant, Mt+j as well as st+j =
−[gt+j + tTHt+j] are policy choices, and Zt−1 is predetermined), it pins down the current
price level Pt, which then enables money demand (Equation 〈2.14〉/〈2.22〉/〈2.25〉) to
determine the nominal interest rate it+1. As a side note, Woodford (2001, p. 683) keeps
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outstanding liabilities Zt−1 from turning negative by assuming the surplus process st to
ensure that the right-hand side of Equation 〈5.2〉 remains positive.
Given the nominal and (constant) real interest rate, the Fisher equation 〈2.47〉 implies
values that are consistent with equilibrium for the gross inflation rate EtΠt+1 and thus
the expected price level EtPt+1. The last variable on the list (cf.↗Counting Variables and
Equations in Section 5.1.1) is the amount of bonds Bt. While B is the pivotal element
in moving from a flow (〈2.3〉) to the present-value budget equation (〈2.44〉), the latter
only features the predetermined realization Bt−1 so that the current realization Bt can
be extracted as the residual from the former. Given that the sequences of M and s over
the entire future time horizon are known, the problem of↗Infinite Recursion is solved.
5.1.3. Three Cases from Woodford (1995)
5.1.3.1. Introduction
A Special Rule for Transfers As a special case, Woodford (1995, p. 15) introduces a tax-
collection rule which, in my notation, becomes the transfer rule
TTHt = Ptτ
TH
t + I˙t+1Mt. 〈5.3〉
Transfers TTHt are now influenced by both the treasury and the central bank. τTHt cap-
tures the treasury’s commonplace decision about how much to tax or pay as transfers
(on net). The second term on the right-hand side, by contrast, is somewhat unconven-
tional: The treasury extends a ‘seigniorage rebate,’ compensating the interest savings
that are generated by issuing money instead of debt, which clearly depends on deci-
sions made by the central bank.13 The purpose of this kind of rule is to highlight and,
at the same time, neutralize the effects of money-supply changes on treasury policy. It
might be argued that it does the exact opposite, namely, force the treasury to adjust
to decisions of the central bank when it would not have to do so with a more common
type of rule; however, the understanding here is that the net-tax position of the treasury
should be rid of windfalls (or, in the case of decreasing money supply, ‘scourges’) that
it is not in control of.
As a consequence, the transfer rule 〈5.3〉 simplifies the present-value budget equation
13 The rate τTH is introduced only now because a more conventional rule that does not depend on the
central bank’s decision about money supply Mt would simply read tTHt = τTHt , which seems superflu-
ous. Since endowment income is fixed in this model, τTH would be non-distortionary even if it were
modeled as an income-tax rate, cf. Woodford (1995, p. 15).
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〈2.44〉 to
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
βjst+j = −Et
∞
∑
j=0
βj
(
gt+j + τTHt+j
)
〈5.4〉
and the law of motion for outstanding consolidated-government liabilities 〈2.37〉 (sans
the ‘dis’ superscripts) to
Zt = (1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 + Gt + PtτTHt
)
. 〈5.5〉
Equilibrium Determination Again The present-value budget equation 〈5.4〉 reflects the
central proposition of Woodford (1995, p. 17) that, with treasury policy following rule
〈5.3〉, the current price level Pt solely depends on fiscal variables whereas the path of
money supply Mt is irrelevant. The law of motion 〈5.5〉 can then be used to track the
evolution of outstanding liabilities.
In what follows, three case studies demonstrate in more detail how the equilibrium
price level is influenced by fiscal policy (given themore specific assumptions taken from
Woodford 1995).
5.1.3.2. Changes in Money Supply
Policy In period t, the economy starts in stationary state with constant policy variables
and prices (see Appendix C.1.1). Let a dot above a variable (˙) denote its new value
after a hypothetical deviation from an initial state in the same period; put differently,
‘dot-variables’ denote states with the policy move under consideration while variables
without dots denote the initial situationwithout any policy change. Hence, a permanent
increase in money supply by the arbitrary fraction o˙ of the original amount Mt+j means
that M˙t+j ≡ (1+ o˙)Mt+j ∀j.
Current Price Level Because the right-hand side of Equation 〈5.4〉makes no reference to
money balances at all and outstanding liabilities Zt−1 on the left-hand side only contain
lagged money Mt−1, the contemporary price level Pt is unaffected by an increase in
current money supply Mt.
Nominal Interest Rate In this case of simple money-supply increases without move-
ment in the concurrent price level, it is obvious from Equation 〈2.24〉 that the nomi-
nal interest rate goes down as real money increases. The exact deviation depends on
marginal utilities and could therefore only be quantified given a specific utility function
(in a similar argument, the importance of the interest elasticity of money demand is also
demonstrated by Carlstrom and Fuerst 2000, pp. 25-28).
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Future Price Levels A misleading first intuition, possibly brought about by definition
〈2.28〉, could be that raising themoney supply increases consolidated-government nom-
inal liabilities in the next period—but this is wrong.
In general, a money-supply increase has two effects. Rearrange Equation 〈2.37〉 (in
combination with definition 〈2.28〉) for clarity:
Bt +Mt = (1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 − I˙t+1Mt − St
)
First, holding all other policy variables constant, it decreases treasury debt. Second,
at least at positive nominal interest rates, it generates seigniorage. In the present case,
that is, with transfer rule 〈5.3〉 leading to Equation 〈5.5〉, the second effect is shut off;
concurrent nominal liabilities Zt remain constant and merely shift from debt to money.
However, as already described, the↗Nominal Interest Rate declines. Inserting all of this
into the law of motion 〈5.5〉 shows that nominal liabilities actually decrease to Z˙t < ZSS.
Naturally, with the right-hand side still unchanged in the present-value budget equation
〈5.4〉, the future price level declines in reaction to a previous increase in money supply,
to P˙t+1 < PSS. The resulting real money balances are even higher and thus decrease the
nominal interest rate further which, in turn, decreases outstanding liabilities in period
t + 2, and so on. The outcome is a deflationary process in which real money grows
without bound and the nominal interest rate converges to zero.
Note that this resembles a ‘doubly active’ regime (cf. Chapter 4.3.3.1). Apart from
the initial increase, money supply remains constant. What happens to transfers, and
thus surpluses, is ambiguous because of the seigniorage rebate: Realmoney approaches
infinity while limi→0 I˙ = 0 (cf. its definition 〈2.23〉). In the best case, the rebate vanishes
over time, leaving only the constant τTH in transfer rule 〈5.3〉; in the worst case, it also
grows without bound, decreasing surpluses by Equation 〈2.10〉. Hence, since neither
fiscal normonetary policy react appropriately to the disturbance and the ensuing events,
an explosive path seems like the natural outcome.
5.1.3.3. Helicopter Money
Policy Consider now a scenario in which the central bank increases money supply by
o˙Mt as above and the treasury raises only the concurrent transfer rate by the same amount:
τ˙THt+j =

τTHSS + o˙
Mt+j
P˙t+j
j = 0
τTHSS ∀j ≥ 1
〈5.6〉
Restating the first line as P˙tτ˙THt = P˙tτTHSS + o˙Mt indicates what the consolidated govern-
ment actually does: print money and give it to the household.
88 5. Extensions: What Happens When We Add…
Current Price Level This time, the contemporary price level is affected: The difference
between two instances of the present-value budget equation 〈5.4〉—before and after the
policy innovation—is given by
Bt−1 +Mt−1
P˙t
− Bt−1 +Mt−1
Pt
= −
(
gt + τ˙THt
)
+
(
gt + τTHSS
)
= −o˙ Mt
P˙t
,
where the unaffected future terms on the right-hand side are already canceled out. Since
the comparison is between initial stationary-state money balances Mt = MSS before the
policy move and a deviation M˙t thereafter, the ‘before’ amounts do not change over
time, allowing to write Mt = MSS = Mt−1 and thus express the deviating price level P˙
in terms of the original one:
P˙t =
(
1+ o˙
Mt−1
Bt−1 +Mt−1
)
Pt 〈5.7〉
With a positive amount of outstanding bonds, the net growth rate of the price level
equals the net growth rate of money times the money share in total liabilities (both
growth rates refer to the alternative states within period t); put differently, the price
level does not rise as much as nominal money supply. Without bonds, prices increase
one-for-one with money.
Nominal Interest Rate In case outstanding consolidated-government liabilities are purely
monetary,money andprices increase proportionally according to Equation 〈5.7〉 (Bt−1 =
0; this is the case examined by Woodford 1995, p. 20) so that the interest rate stays the
same. By contrast, if there is a positive amount of outstanding bonds, the price level
does not increase as much as money supply, raising real money balances and hence
decreasing the nominal interest rate via 〈2.24〉.
Future Price Levels without Initially Outstanding Bonds In the simple casewithout bonds
outstanding initially, use two instances of the law of motion 〈5.5〉 to get
Z˙t = (1+ o˙) Zt−1, 〈5.8〉
which means that outstanding liabilities after the money-supply increase are (1 + o˙)
times higher than they would be without it (see Appendix C.1.2 for the derivation).
Since there is no rebate in period t+ 1, the right-hand side of the present-value budget
equation 〈5.4〉 is back to the level of the initial time-t stationary state, implying that the
future price level stays elevated: P˙t+1 = P˙t = (1+ o˙)PSS.
Again, real money stays constant, so the nominal interest rate does as well. The right-
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hand side of the law of motion 〈5.5〉 is equal in t+ 1 and the original state of t in real
terms. Since the latter is stationary (cf. Appendix C.1.1), the situation in t+ 1must also
be. Helicopter money with no initially outstanding treasury debt keeps the economy in
stationary state, albeit with nominal variables elevated by the factor (1+ o˙).
Future Price Levels with Initially Outstanding Bonds Unfortunately, the more realistic
case with outstanding bonds does not yield similarly clear-cut results. This is because
the nominal interest rate decreases by an unknown amount (cf.↗Nominal Interest Rate
above and in Section 5.1.3.2) while the transfer rate increases (τ˙THt > τTHSS ). The question
is whether the interest-rate effect outweighs that of the transfer rate in the law of motion
〈5.5〉:
 If so, future outstanding liabilities decrease to Z˙t < ZSS. Since there is no rebate on
the transfer rate anymore in period t+ 1, the right-hand side of the present-value
budget equation 〈5.4〉 returns to its original (higher) level, lowering the price level
in t+ 1 markedly: P˙t+1 < PSS < P˙t. Like this, real money is increased once again,
further depressing the nominal interest rate, outstanding liabilities, and the price
level. The economy is trapped in a deflationary spiral similar to that in Section
5.1.3.2.
 Otherwise, if the increase of the transfer rate has a stronger effect than the decrease
in the nominal interest rate, outstanding liabilities grow by Equation 〈5.5〉 and,
consequently, the price level rises by Equation 〈5.4〉. In t + 1, the move to Z˙t+1
via the law of motion 〈5.5〉 depends on the transfer rate (which returns to τ˙THt+1 =
τTHSS ), the actual result for outstanding liabilities Z˙t, and the nominal interest rate
it+2. The latter two require that either a specific utility function be known or that
one distinguishes even more subcases based on the size of M˙t+1/P˙t+1 relative to
MSS/PSS and M˙t/P˙t. Because it is conceivable that there are ‘intermediate’ results
which do not necessarily continue a trend commenced in the respective previous
period (as in the bullet point above), this process is possibly endless.
To put it bluntly, distinguishing analytically all possible subcases of such a specific case
study is a tedious exercise that does not seem fruitful enough to warrant further effort
at this point (which is probably why Woodford 1995 also abstains from it).
5.1.3.4. Helicopter Debt
Policy In the final case, the consolidated government keeps money supply constant
forever (Mt = MSS ∀t) and increases transfers to the household once (in period t). Since
the fraction o˙ can take any arbitrary value, we can still use Equation 〈5.6〉 to describe
transfer policy even though it is not logically bound to money anymore.
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Current Price Level As before, the increased transfer raises the price level, P˙t > Pt (cf.
↗Current Price Level and especially Equation 〈5.7〉 in Section 5.1.3.3).
Nominal Interest Rate Constant nominal money supply and an increased price level
P˙t imply lower real money balances and, therefore, a higher nominal interest rate by
Equation 〈2.24〉.
Future Price Levels Increased transfers and a higher nominal interest rate both work to
increase the amount of outstanding nominal consolidated-government liabilities Z˙t in
Equation 〈5.5〉, so the present-value budget equation 〈5.4〉 implies that P˙t+1 > P˙t > PSS.
This depresses real money and increases the nominal interest rate further. Fortunately,
the counteractive change of transfers back to their initial level τTHSS does not complicate
the analysis from t + 1 on again (like it does in Section 5.1.3.3) because the stationary
state can act as a reference point: Comparing the iteration of Equation 〈5.5〉 between
t− 1 and t (which is stationary) to that between t+ 1 and t+ 2 (with a higher interest
rate) reveals that the latter leads to an increase in outstanding liabilities, indicating that
the end result is an inflationary spiral (cf. Woodford 1995, p. 21).
5.1.4. Generalization with Money
The distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian fiscal policy refers to satisfaction
or violation of the transversality condition. However, the latter only includes treasury
debt B in Section 4.4 as money is nonexistent in that variant of the model. Therefore,
the distinction is extended here to include money: Ricardian fiscal policy satisfies the
transversality condition as implied by forward iteration of the respective flow budget
condition (cf. Section 2.3.1), non-Ricardian fiscal policy does not. Formally, this amounts
to whether the reaction coefficient γTZ in the respective surplus rule
St = γTZZt−1 − I˙t+1Mt 〈5.9〉
is zero or not. (The second term on the right-hand side is the seigniorage rebate intro-
duced in Section 5.1.3.1. Appendix C.2 shows that rule 〈5.9〉 is Ricardian and therefore
lets the present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉 hold identically.)
Reassessing his 1995 paper, which uses the narrower definition of Ricardian policy
pertaining only to treasury debt (cf. his pp. 26-27), Woodford (2001, fn. 26, p. 690) ar-
gues that the broader definition including money is “conceptually preferable” because,
given such a Ricardian policy, the entire transversality condition is rendered irrelevant
for equilibrium determination.
Adding money to debt is also supported by Cochrane 1999, p. 330, but for a differ-
ent reason: Using the example of a commodity standard, he argues that the value of
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both types of consolidated-government liabilities diminishes if its backing is insuffi-
cient. Woodford (1995, p. 12) shares this view—“even in the case of inconvertible fiat
money” (a notion he inherits from Sargent 1982b).
5.1.5. Interest-Rate Pegs
Background The traditional study of Sargent and Wallace (1975) holds that pegged in-
terest rates lead to indeterminacy. This section largely follows Woodford (1995; 2001)
in explaining how fiscal policy can lead to determinacy of the model when monetary
policy is passive like that. It does so also graphically and thus rectifies an omission from
Section 4.3.2.1.
Policy Consider again the baseline optimizing model of Chapter 2. In contrast to Sec-
tion 5.1, in which money supply M was the instrument of choice, the central bank now
controls the nominal interest rate i. In particular, it keeps it pegged at a constant rate,
which is why time indices for all affected variables are suppressed in this subsection.
This pertains not only to i and I˙, but also to liquidity preference L(c, i) = L as a measure
of real money demand (cf. Section 2.4), if one assumes endowments y as well as treasury
expenditure g to be constant.
Indeterminacy? Obviously, this pins down the right-hand side of the money-demand
equation 〈2.25〉. The two variables on the left-hand side,M and P, however, are undeter-
mined individually: While real money M/P may satisfy the equation, this can happen
with infinitely many different pairings of M and P (cf., among others, Cochrane 1999,
p. 350; Buiter 2002, p. 471).14
Fiscal Price Determination It will be guessed that the proposed solution is to resort to
the present-value budget equation 〈2.44〉 again. Substituting in money demand 〈2.25〉,
it is expressed in terms of liquidity preference L instead of real money m:
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
βj
(
I˙L+ st+j
) 〈5.10〉
14 While he admits that it never really gained traction, McCallum (1986, p. 137; 2003b, pp. 1156-1157)
points to an interesting distinction concerning indeterminacy: The one discussed here is about price-
level indeterminacy and the inability of the model to determine any nominal variable. This problem
arises if the agents it portrays are only interested in real variables and policy does not provide a nominal
anchor. By contrast, the issue discussed in Chapter 4 (in particular Section 4.2.3) is a real indeterminacy
in the sense that the model can not uniquely pin down a single equilibrium path from a multitude
of possible candidates. As already explained, this is connected to the existence of expectations about
future endogenous variables.
92 5. Extensions: What Happens When We Add…
Since all variables on the right-hand side are determined, and so are outstanding nomi-
nal liabilities of the consolidated government Zt−1, Equation 〈5.10〉 pins down the price
level Pt. Money demand (in the form of either Equation 〈2.22〉 or 〈2.25〉) then gives the
required amount ofmoney that the central bank has to supply in order to implement the
desired nominal interest rate. The present-value budget equation 〈2.44〉/〈5.10〉 is also
the reason why the central bank can not simply supply an arbitrary amount of money
M in order to determine P via money demand 〈2.22〉/〈2.25〉 directly: the two equations
would conflict unless, by chance, it chose the ‘correct’ amount of money consistent with
equilibrium.
As in the case studies of Section 5.1.3, the law of motion 〈2.37〉 can be used to infer
the future values of outstanding consolidated-government liabilities Z; in combination
with liquidity preference 〈2.25〉, it reads
Zt = (1+ i)
(
Zt−1 − I˙PtL− St
)
. 〈5.11〉
Given the processes of the policy variables i and S, Equations 〈5.10〉 and 〈5.11〉 thus
determine the development of the price level P and outstanding liabilities Z.
Link to Section 2.4 At the most basic level, Equations 〈2.3〉, 〈2.7〉, and 〈2.14〉 determine
the three remaining variables B, M, P. As already mentioned in the ↗Sequential vs.
Simultaneous Equilibrium Determination in Section 2.4, this happens simultaneously. Di-
rectly linking the determination of individual variables to specific equations is difficult
in this case because if one connects the household flow budget constraint (the origin of
the present-value budget equation 〈2.44〉/〈5.2〉) with the price level Pt and money de-
mand 〈2.25〉 (stemming from Equation 〈2.14〉) with money supply Mt, the Fisher equa-
tion 〈2.7〉 would have to determine Bt, which is of course nonsensical because it does
not feature the amount of bonds. Therefore, it must actually be the Fisher equation—
which is part of the construction of the present-value budget equation (see p. 32)—that
determines the price level while the amount of bonds is the residual in the household’s
flow budget constraint. Recall that the ‘EtPt+1 problem’ (cf. Sections 2.4, 5.1.1) is re-
solved by construction of the present-value budget equation, which incorporates the
entire sequence of future policy.
Graphical Stability Analysis Determination of the price level Pt can also be analyzed
graphically. To do so, consider a slightly rearranged version of the consolidated-gov-
ernment budget equation 〈2.40〉which also underlies the present-value budget equation
〈2.44〉/〈5.2〉/〈5.10〉:
Et
Zt
Pt+1
= β−1
Zt−1
Pt
− β−1 (I˙L+ st)
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It is shown in Figure 5.1. Finding the steady state follows the same logic as in Figure
Zt−1
Pt
Et
Zt
Pt+1
45◦
Et
Zt
Pt+1
= F
(
Zt−1
Pt
)
z∗
Figure 5.1: Dynamics of Real Outstanding Consolidated-Government Liabili-
ties Under an Interest-Rate Peg. ⋄ Source: Own illustration.
4.1: Since β−1 > 1, the phase line is steeper than the 45◦ line, so for any initial value
Z1/P0 ̸= z∗ set in t = 1 the process would explode and thus violate the transversality
condition 〈2.42〉. With all variables on the right-hand side given exogenously and Zt−1
predetermined in period t, it is the price level Pt that jumps to an appropriate value, just
as in the present-value budget equation 〈5.10〉. The exact value of the steady state z∗
can be found by setting both Z/P terms to z∗ and solving for it:
z∗ =
1
1− β
(
I˙L+ st
) 〈5.12〉
While the graphical approach might be more instructive than looking at the present-
value budget equation, one has to be wary of its drawbacks. A hint at the difficulties
associated with the graphical analysis of compound variables such as the real market
value of treasury debt b/(1+ i) is already given in Section 4.3.2.1. With the nominal
interest rate i pegged in the present setup, ‘day-to-day coordination’ with the central
bank is not necessary anymore. However, surpluses s can still vary, and this has pro-
found consequences: For one, the graphical method assumes that one can not only infer
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Ett+1 fromt via a given phase line but that one can also move Ett+1 from the ordi-
nate to the abscissa via the 45◦ line in order to subsequently infer Ett+2, Ett+3, and
so on. Arriving at a stable solution—that is, a steady or stationary state—thus requires
the corresponding phase line to not change (noting that the steady state z∗ can also be
found by assuming a constant st in Equation 〈5.10〉 underlines this)—but this is exactly
what happens when the treasury does change surpluses. Furthermore, changes that are
strong enough (ceteris paribus) to turn the intercept positive also imply that the treasury
suddenly becomes a creditor to the household because the steady state z∗ is moved into
negative territory in Figure 5.1.
Why Peg the Interest Rate? Even if this regime is stable and determinate, it begs the
question why the monetary authority should choose to peg the interest rate at a certain
value. Woodford (1995, p. 1000; 2001, pp. 681-685, 689) suggests that interest-rate pegs
are especially appealing in times of great and mostly unexpected fiscal strain, such as
wartime—“when government purchases vary for reasons largely independent of the
state of the economy or the government’s budget” (Woodford 2001, p. 681) or, put dif-
ferently, when they are truly exogenous. In particular, he argues that the situation in
the United States during and after worldwar II can be analyzed using themodel at hand
(see also Chapter 8.3).
5.2. Boundaries for Endogenous Variables
5.2.1. The Zero Lower Bound and the Perils of Taylor Rules
5.2.1.1. Falling Into Liquidity Traps
A Lower Bound for the Nominal Interest Rate In Section 4, especially within the regime
of monetary dominance in Section 4.3.2, it is assumed that the central bank actively sets
the nominal interest rate according to a linear Taylor rule with γCpi > β−1. In this, it
is not bounded from above or below. Of course, this is not very realistic because the
existence of money as a store of value puts a lower bound on the nominal interest rate
that is equal (or close) to zero. In order to take account of this limitation, the original
Taylor rule 〈4.5〉 is replaced by
it+1 = max
[
i∗ + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + εit, 0
]
〈5.13〉
in this section.
Implications for the Inflation Process Equation 〈5.13〉 can still be combined with the
Fisher equation 〈2.7〉 to form a law of motion for inflation similar to Equation 〈4.6〉;
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Figure 5.2: Inflation Dynamics in Consideration of the Zero Lower Bound on
Nominal Interest Rates. ⋄ Source: Own illustration.
however, this functions properly only within a certain domain, namely, approaching a
critical value
piZLB =
γCpi − (1+ r)
γCpi
pi∗ − r
γCpi
〈5.14〉
from above (the monetary policy shock term εit is discarded here; see Appendix C.3.1
for derivations). piZLB is the lowest inflation rate to which the central bank can react
‘normally,’ that is, linearly with γCpi > β−1 in the present specification. In the domain
[piZLB,∞), the inflation process is described by Equation 〈4.6〉 algebraically and by the
upward-sloping part of the phase line Etpit+1 = F(pit) in Figure 5.2 graphically. (For
the sake of completeness: pi∗ corresponds to pi∗ in Figure 4.1.)
The Liquidity Trap If current inflation pit falls below the critical value piZLB, the central
bank is powerless; the best it can do is leave the nominal interest rate at zero. Regarding
the lawofmotion, the Fisher equation 〈2.7〉with it+1 = 0 implies thatEtpit+1 = −r/(1+
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r). Assuming the situation is as depicted in Figure 5.2, it actually gives rise to a second
steady state
pi′SS = −
r
1+ r
〈5.15〉
(Appendix C.3.2 describes a slightly more complicated scenario). The rationale is as fol-
lows: Starting from an arbitrary pi0 < pi∗, movement until point E is straightforward
and similar to what would happen in Figure 4.1 (keeping track of time, point A corre-
sponds to Etpit+1, point C to Etpit+2, and point E to Etpit+3). As before, the expectation
one period further ahead (Etpit+4) can be found by moving the ‘current’ value Etpit+3
from the ordinate to the abscissa via the 45◦ degree line (point F). But since, at this point,
Etpit+3 < piZLB, the market expects Etit+3 = 0, which then leads to Etpit+4 = pi′SS as im-
plied by the Fisher equation. In point G, the inflation process has reached the horizontal
part of the phase line. Finally, moving from the ordinate to the abscissa via the 45◦ line
again, we arrive at point H, which confirms that pi′SS is a steady state.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002, pp. 538, 545) call the “unintended” steady
state pi′SS a liquidity trap because the central bank loses its power to stabilize the econ-
omy and achieve its targets. Similarly, to the extent that pi′SS < 0, it would also be
conceivable to speak of a deflationary trap; however, as the latter is often associated
with accelerating—that is, non-steady—dynamics (up to a collapse of the real economy),
whereas endowment-economy models such as the present one do not even allow for
output gaps, ‘liquidity trap’ might be the more appropriate term here.
Continuous vs. Discontinuous Taylor Rules The discontinuity introduced by the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates complicates algebraic treatments profoundly.
While manageable, even the graphical analysis using phase diagrams is somewhat te-
dious, as the explanations revolving around Figure 5.2 (and Figure C.1 in Appendix
C.3.2) demonstrate.
Therefore, one might be inclined to devise a continuous policy rule that respects the
zero lower bound. One way to achieve this is to employ an exponential function; note
that such a policy rule can be active or passive depending on the level of inflation as its
main argument (cf. Bullard 2010, p. 341). Still, as Figure 5.3 illustrates, active monetary
policy around the target steady state pi∗ comes with a second, unwelcome steady state
pi′SS (cf. Woodford 2003b, Ch. 2.4; Cochrane 2011, pp. 576-577).
As a side note, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, andUribe (2001, p. 42) imply that continuity
of the Taylor rule is less important than monotonicity. At the same time, of course, they
also note that non-monotonous rules are of little relevance since there is certainly no
sensible case in which the central bank has an incentive to define an interval in which
it (continuously or discontinuously) increases the nominal interest rate if the inflation
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Figure 5.3: Inflation Dynamics in Consideration of the Zero Lower Bound on
Nominal Interest Rates (Continuous Nonlinear Taylor Rule). ⋄
Source: Own illustration based on Woodford (2003b, p. 126)
and Cochrane (2011, p. 577).
rate declines.
The Perils of Taylor Rules The main results presented here emerge not only in simple
setups such as the present one but also in production economies with price rigidities
(cf. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, andUribe 2001). However, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and
Uribe (2002, fn. 7, p. 545) note that the low steady state pi′SS might actually be preferred
to the inflation target pi∗ in endowment economies because the associated higher level
of real balances raises utility (while consumption remains constant; sticky-price models,
by contrast, allow for the ‘intended’ steady state pi∗ to be welfare-superior).
Finally, it is important to emphasize the self-fulfilling nature of these liquidity traps:
In a very reduced deterministic setup, it might be arguable that pi0 ≮ pi∗ so that the
economy never slides off into the unintended steady state pi′SS (except for some blatant
policymistake). In stochastic setups, however, we can not rule out a priori that inflation is
never pushed down too much by a shock. This enables self-fulfilling prophecies in that
the mere expectation of pi0 < pi∗ suffices to implement the liquidity trap (cf. Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 2002, pp. 546-547). Therefore, naïve reliance on Taylor rules
as a panacea to stabilize the economy is perilous.
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5.2.1.2. Avoiding Liquidity Traps
Following Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002), one way to avoid deflationary
traps is through the appropriate design of fiscal policy. In this subsection, I briefly dis-
cuss three approaches.
Inflation-Sensitive Surpluses For simplicity, maintain the assumption that treasury ex-
penditure remains constant so that the real interest rate does as well (see Section 2.4).
The treasury sets tTHt such that, by Equation 〈2.10〉,
St = γ˙TZZt−1 − I˙t+1Mt, 〈5.16〉
where
γ˙TZ ≡ γ˙TZ(pi) .
In words, surpluses St are raised to redeem an inflation-dependent fraction γ˙TZ of out-
standing consolidated-government liabilities Zt−1; at this, analogously to rule 〈5.3〉 in
Section 5.1.3.1, the treasury transfers I˙t+1Mt (the interest savings it generates by issuing
money instead of debt) back to the household. An important additional assumption
about the fraction γ˙TZ is that
0 < γ˙TZ(pi
∗) ≤ 1
−1 < γ˙TZ
(
pi′SS
)
< 0
〈5.17〉
which makes fiscal policy Ricardian for pit = pi∗ and non-Ricardian for pit = pi′SS. To
avoid problems with discontinuities or non-monotonicity, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé,
and Uribe (2002, p. 547) assume that the coefficient is strictly increasing in inflation
(∂γ˙TZ/∂pi > 0).
The fact that γ˙TZ(pi′SS) < 0 is not entirely compatible with the original definition of
non-Ricardian policy in Section 4.4 and Figure 4.3b is not problematic for it merely ‘over-
states the case:’ The usual definition of non-Ricardian policy would imply γ˙TZ(pi′SS) = 0
(cf. also Section 5.1.4) because it was probably not conceivable to its originators why
the consolidated government should not only ignore outstanding liabilities but actively
make them explode in a ‘super-non-Ricardian’ fashion.
Plugging the surplus rule 〈5.16〉 into the consolidated government’s flowbudget equa-
tion 〈2.40〉 and iterating forward (cf. Equation 〈4.23〉 on p. 76) produces two different
outcomes depending on the inflation rate: For pi∗, fiscal policy is Ricardian so that the
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transversality condition 〈2.42〉 is satisfied. By contrast, for pi′SS, the treasury effectuates
an explosive real-debt path, and since the latter is ruled out by the transversality con-
dition, expectations will never coordinate on the unintended steady state pi′SS. In short,
the possibility of self-fulfilling liquidity traps is eliminated.
Liability Growth Targeting A variation on the approach laid out above is to target the
growth rate of outstanding consolidated-government liabilities
µZ ≡ Zt − Zt−1Zt−1 , 〈5.18〉
which implies the surplus rule
St =
it+1 − µZ
1+ it+1
Zt−1 − I˙t+1Mt 〈5.19〉
(see Appendix C.3.3 for derivations). In principle, nominal liabilities Zt−1 depend on
choices made by both the treasury and the central bank, but since the latter is assumed
to follow the Taylor rule 〈5.13〉 and to disregard any further concerns, the growth target
〈5.18〉 must be achieved by a surplus rule that, again, takes interest savings on money
balances into account. At this, it is important to have
i′SS < µZ < i
∗, 〈5.20〉
that is, the growth rate of outstanding liabilities µZ must be greater than the interest rate
associated with the liquidity trap i′SS and smaller than the nominal interest rate i∗ in the
target steady state pi∗.
Evidently, the effects of Equations 〈5.19〉-〈5.20〉 are very similar to those of↗Inflation-
Sensitive Surpluses (Equations 〈5.16〉-〈5.17〉): Fiscal policy becomes (‘super-’)non-Ricardian
for the unintended steady state pi′SS with i′SS, hence ruling it out and making the target
steady state pi∗ with i∗ (for which surpluses behave in a Ricardian fashion) the unique
equilibrium (cf. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 2002, p. 549). This result is con-
firmed by Woodford (2003b, Ch. 2.4.2), who also shows that whether monetary policy
uses money balances or the nominal interest rate as its instrument is almost irrelevant
(there are minor differences, cf. his p. 133) while fiscal policy is the universal solution
to avoid self-fulfilling deflationary traps.
Balanced Budgets Finally, another proposal is to require that the secondary deficit (the
primary deficit plus interest due on outstanding debt) be zero at all times. In the context
of the consolidated-government budget equation 〈2.38〉, which is more explicit about
100 5. Extensions: What Happens When We Add…
interest on outstanding debt as it uses coupon instead of discount bonds, this policy
prescription can be rearranged to the surplus rule
St = itBt−1 = I˙tZt−1 − I˙tMt−1, 〈5.21〉
where the second equality also makes use of definition 〈2.29〉. According to the defini-
tions in Sections 4.4 and 5.1.4, this type of fiscal policy is Ricardian as long as it and thus
I˙t are not equal to zero indefinitely. Consider the respective transversality condition
〈2.34〉 (combined with Equation 〈2.20〉) to see this:
lim
J→∞
EtZt+J
J
∏
j=0
1
1+ it+1+j
= 0
If the economy is on a path towards the unintended steady state pi′SS, nominal interest
rates will go to zero in finite time and remain there indefinitely. Therefore, outstanding
liabilities in the ‘final period’ Zt+J are not discounted strongly enough to yield a present
value of zero; once again, the transversality condition is violated so that the respective
path can not constitute an equilibrium. A balanced-budget rule like 〈5.21〉 averts the
liquidity trap without deficits if—and only if—the central bank indeed sets i′SS = 0 for
pi′SS. Therefore, the balanced-budget proposal is a two-edged sword: It might be more
appealing in that it does not rely on deficit creation, but it requires strong commitment
on the part of the central bank to lower interest rates all the way to zero (cf. Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 2002, pp. 549-550).
5.2.1.3. Liquidity Traps in Money-Supply Regimes
Woodford (2003b, Ch. 2.4.2) extends the analysis of Section 5.2.1.1 to regimes in which
the central bank uses money supply instead of the nominal interest rate as its instru-
ment. Assume for simplicity that it supplies nominal money balances which grow at
the constant rate
µM,t ≡ MtMt−1 = µM ∀t. 〈5.22〉
Phase Diagram As before, one can derive a phase diagram in order to visualize the
development of real money balances. In order to do so, combine the Fisher equation
〈2.47〉 with the implicit money demand function 〈2.22〉 to get:
Etmt+1 =
µM
β
[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
mt 〈5.23〉
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Figure 5.4: Dynamics of Real Money Balances under a Money-Supply Policy.
⋄ Source: Own illustration based onWoodford (2003b, p. 130).
(See Appendix C.3.4 for derivations. This is similar to the derivations of the equations
depicted in Figures 4.1 and 5.3, for which the Fisher equation is combined with the
respective policy—i.e., Taylor—rule.)
What can we infer about the shape of the respective phase line? From the properties
of the utility function 〈2.2〉 and 〈5.1〉, it can be inferred that the term in brackets lies in
the interval (0, 1]. Since um(mt) is decreasing inmt, the combination ofmt with the term
in brackets is convex in mt—at least at first: Assuming there is a satiation point in the
demand for real balances beyondwhich um(·) = 0,mt+1 becomes linear inmt afterwards
so that real balances eventually grow at the rate µM/β. Further, as mt becomes very
small, um(mt) increases, but never exceeds uc(ct); therefore, mt+1 takes a very low value
not quite equal to zero for small mt. Relaxing assumption 〈5.1〉 by making it a ‘smaller
than or equal to’ relationship would extend the above interval to [0, 1] and thus allow
for mt+1 = 0. To sum up, the function Etmt+1 starts at zero, is convex with a slope
below µM/β initially and becomes linear with slope µM/β beyond the satiation point.
Whether this graph intersects the 45◦ line only in the origin or also in a second point
therefore depends on the slope µM/β.
Deflation with Constant Nominal Money Growth Figure 5.4 sketches the law of motion
〈5.23〉 for µM/β > 1. A starting value for real balances to the right of the intended
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steady state (m0 > m∗) implies that they grow without bound forever. This steady in-
crease can not be driven by nominal money growth µM only since the growth rate of real
money µM/β is greater than that; the economy hence experiences deflation at the rate
pi′SS (setting the term in brackets in Equation 〈5.23〉 to unity and using themoney-growth
target 〈5.22〉 also leads to Equation 〈5.15〉). Whether this can constitute an equilibrium
depends on fiscal policy:
 Analyses in which money supply is the monetary instrument often assume that
treasury debt is zero at all times, which renders fiscal policy non-Ricardian and
would lead to a violation of the transversality condition 〈2.42〉 (cf.Woodford 2003b,
pp. 131-132). Therefore, the deflationary trap could be excluded as an equilibrium.
 By contrast, if fiscal policy is Ricardian, treasury debt could be adjusted so as to
guarantee satisfaction of the transversality condition; namely, the treasury would
become a creditor to the household sector because ever-increasing real money bal-
ances require it to take a negative real debt position so as tomake total consolidated-
government liabilities equal to zero. (Cf. also Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe
2002, pp. 551-552, for a rather sceptical view on such deflations.)
5.2.2. Debt Limits
Setup & Terminology Another bound that may constrain policy comes in the form of
a limit on the creation of consolidated-government liabilities. Using discount bonds, it
could be written as
0 ≤ Mt +QtBt
Pt
≤ z¯ ∀t, 〈5.24〉
where z¯ > 0 denotes the liability limit. In the literature, several expressions are often
used synonymously. Therefore, one might also encounter the terms ‘debt limit’ or ‘bor-
rowing limit’ for z¯ (cf. Woodford 2001, p. 696). In richer models, z¯ could be defined as
a function of other variables; for instance, setting z¯t = 0.6yt would capture one of the
Maastricht criteria for Euro zone members and candidates—roughly, since the Maas-
tricht treaty only makes reference to public debt B but not money M. In the present
constant-endowment setup, choosing the corresponding constant value for z¯ is equiva-
lent. (Cf. Woodford 2001, p. 716; Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 2002, p. 553.) The
zero lower bound on the left-hand side is added for simplicity. As shown in Appendix
C.4.1, fiscal policy is Ricardian because the liability limit 〈5.24〉 necessarily implies sat-
isfaction of the transversality condition 〈2.42〉.
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Figure 5.5: Dynamics of Real Outstanding Consolidated-Government Liabil-
ities Under a Liability Limit. ⋄ Source: Own illustration based
on Woodford (2001, p. 700).
Steady States The consolidated-government budget equation 〈2.40〉 is repeated here
as
Et
Zt
Pt+1
= β−1
Zt−1
Pt
− β−1 (I˙t+1mt + st)
(under the assumption of constant endowments, cf. Section 2.4) and depicted by Figure
5.5. While the latter is very similar to Figure 5.1, the liability limit 〈5.24〉 implies that
there are two additional steady states
z′SS = −β−1I˙m
z′′SS = β
−1 (z¯− I˙m) 〈5.25〉
besides the original z∗ given by Equation 〈5.12〉, where z′SS < 0 < z∗ < z′′SS (cf. Appendix
C.4.2).
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Global Indeterminacy vs. Local Determinacy Any initial value Z1/P0 ̸= z∗ eventually
leads to one of the other two steady states, z′SS or z′′SS, because of the ‘explosive’ behavior
depicted in Figure 5.5. Therefore, the transversality condition 〈2.42〉 does not serve to
rule out unstable equilibria anymore, or put differently, any trajectory starting between
z′SS and z′′SS constitutes an equilibrium, which makes the model (globally) indeterminate
again.
Woodford (2001, pp. 698-699) calls this constellation “locally unique” in the sense
that z∗ is the only equilibrium in which the state variable Z/P remains in the interior
of the effective bounds 〈5.25〉; accordingly, fiscal policy that would let Z/P run into
these bounds is “locally non-Ricardian.” He refers to the analysis of Leeper (1991) and
active fiscal policy (cf. Section 4.2.2) in particular, which is purely local in nature because
it relies on linear approximations. Interestingly, Woodford seems to assume that the
bounds 〈5.25〉 are “far from the equilibrium in question” so that local determinacy is
sufficient for a usable model. To what extent this can be reconciled with a debt limit
such as the one stipulated by the Maastricht treaty is questionable: On the one hand,
the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio is a relevant constraint even for countries that do not seem to
lie outside the ‘local domain’ in which linear approximations can be used in good faith
(Germany probably comes to mind first, but the same could be argued for Eurozone
countries which are affected much more strongly by the economic problems of the past
decade, such as Italy, Portugal, or Spain, butwithout experiencing turbulent conditions).
On the other hand, the ease with which the Maastricht treaty is violated as well as the
lack of truly severe consequences from these violations points to the fact that the 60%
debt-to-GDP criterion can not be the final frontier (or a true limit in the mathematical
sense) thatWoodford sees in z′′SS. But themore these bounds 〈5.25〉 are pushed outwards
mentally, the more they effectively align with the transversality condition itself and the
less they represent a distinct phenomenon. Therefore, as a matter of principle, local
determinacy could be seen as one of the shakier concepts in the rigorous and concise
world of modern DSGE modeling.
Key Takeaways from Chapter 5
Fiscal price determination also works with money and under money-supply policy.
Interest-rate pegs do not necessarily lead to indeterminacy. The zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates does, but again, fiscal policy can be a remedy. Debt limits can
lead to indeterminacy as well, depending on whether the analysis is local (determi-
nacy) or global (indeterminacy).
6. Monetary Unions
I extend the baseline model to a monetary union and study three cases relating to
different fiscal-policy combinations of the two member countries.
6.1 Adjustments to the Baseline Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.2 Aggregation Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.3 Case Studies of Non-Ricardian Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union . . . . . . 111
6.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.3.2 One Non-Ricardian, One Ricardian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.3.3 One Non-Ricardian, One Super-Ricardian. . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.3.4 Two Non-Ricardian Fiscal Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.4 Discussion of the Political Economy in a Monetary Union . . . . . . . . . 114
6.5 Selected References on Fiscal Price Determination in the Open Economy . . . 116
Derivations for this chapter can be found in Appendix D.
6.1. Adjustments to the Baseline Model
The basic adjustments to the single-country model are inspired by Woodford (1996).
Bergin (2000) also studies a monetary union.
Countries and Agents The present economy is assumed to consist of two countries,
Domestic (superscript D) and Foreign (F). The defining feature of a monetary union is
that all member states use the same currency, issued by a common supranational central
bank, while the respective treasuries retain the ability to make country-specific transfer
and spending decisions.
Households & Endowments Each country is populated by a mass of households whose
behavior is similar to that of the representative agent described at the beginning ofChap-
ter 2.1 (↗Utility). The endowments they receive are constant and equal in both countries
(yDt = yFt = yD = yF ∀t).
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Equality of Prices Without any trade restrictions on goodsmarkets, the law of one price
holds and both countries face a common price level PDt = PFt = Pt ∀t, implying that
inflation is also similar at all times (ΠDt = ΠFt = Πt ∀t).
Equality of Interest Rates The easiest case is that in which the central bank uses the
nominal interest rate as its policy instrument and sets it equally for all member states.
With the nominal interest rate as well as the inflation rate equal in both countries, so are
real interest rates.
In amoney supply regime, the argument, running frommoney supply to the nominal
interest rate implied by money demand 〈2.22〉, would be a bit more involved. However,
no-arbitrage on capital markets carries an implication for real interest rates: If Domestic
and Foreign treasury debt is perfectly homogeneous except for the real return, house-
holds in both countries choose to hold only the return-dominant type. If both trea-
suries try to place debt on the market, they can only do so at equal real—and, because
of equal inflation rates, nominal—interest rates. Alternatively, only the treasury offer-
ing the higher return will be able to sell bonds, but since it can sell to households in all
countries and the respective Euler equations 〈2.21〉 of the latter are uniform, real interest
rates (and nominal interest rates) have to be equal everywhere.
No Exchange Rates With only a single type of currency, a nominal exchange rate be-
tween Domestic and Foreign does not even exist. However, differing price levels in
both countries would give rise to a real exchange rate in the sense of a relative price.
While this is an often-used indicator in arguments about competitiveness in practice
(cf. Sinn 2014a; Wyplosz 2013 for opposite positions on competitiveness as a trigger of
the Eurozone crisis), the simplified setup presented here does not allow for any sensible
price-level divergence—a real exchange rate different from unity—as this would require
restrictions either on the flow of goods or the functioning of the price mechanism.
Household Budget Constraints The respective equivalents to the flow budget constraint
〈2.3〉 read
CDt +M
D
t +QtB
DD
t +QtB
DF
t = Y
D
t + T
DTH
t + B
DD
t−1 + B
DF
t−1 +M
D
t−1
CFt +M
F
t +QtB
FD
t +QtB
FF
t = Y
F
t + T
FTH
t + B
FD
t−1 + B
FF
t−1 +M
F
t−1.
〈6.1〉
Double superscripts follow the pattern ‘holder, issuer’ (or ‘creditor, debtor’) so that,
say, BDFt denotes debt issued by the foreign treasury at time t and held by the domestic
household. This is necessary because each household can hold debt of each treasury,
where the bond price Qt is also equal across borders as it depends on the nominal in-
terest rate it+1 by Equation 〈2.8〉. TDTH and TFTH denote net transfers from the treasury
to the household in Domestic and Foreign, respectively.
6.2. Aggregation Problems 107
Market Clearing Within themonetary union, there is no equivalent to the goods-market-
clearing condition 〈2.27〉 for any country individually as both populations are assumed
to have the ability to trade freely on goods and capital markets. Rather, the union-wide
goods market clears if
yDt + y
F
t = c
D
t + c
F
t + g
D
t + g
F
t 〈6.2〉
While clearing of the treasury-debt markets is implicit in Chapter 2, it is crucial to make
it explicit in the present analysis:
BDt = B
DD
t + B
FD
t
BFt = B
DF
t + B
FF
t
〈6.3〉
At this, BD (BF) denotes total outstanding debt of Domestic’s (Foreign’s) treasury and,
as mentioned above, the terms on the right-hand sides denote individual debt holdings
of the Domestic and Foreign households.
Similarly, money balances supplied by the central bank M have to equal exactly the
sum of individual money demands (denoted MD and MF, respectively):
Mt = MDt +M
F
t 〈6.4〉
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National Household Present-Value Budget Constraints As in the single-country case,
the national flow budget constraints can be rearranged into present-value budget con-
straints for the respective households:
Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
cDt+j + I˙t+j+1m
D
t+j
)
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
yDt+j + t
DTH
t+j
)
+
ZDHt−1
Pt
Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
cFt+j + I˙t+j+1m
F
t+j
)
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
yFt+j + t
FTH
t+j
)
+
ZDFt−1
Pt
,
〈6.5〉
where
ZDHt−1 ≡ BDDt−1 + BDFt−1 +MDt−1
ZFHt−1 ≡ BFDt−1 + BFFt−1 +MFt−1.
〈6.6〉
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The difficulty—and the main difference with regard to the single-country equivalent
described in Chapter 2.3.2—is that goods-market clearing can not be applied as easily:
Equation 〈6.2〉 is an aggregate condition whereas the present-value budget constraints
in Equation 〈6.5〉 only feature national variables.
Liabilities and Net Wealth A similar issue arises on capitalmarkets: Since the distinction
between Domestic and Foreign applies to both issuers and holders of treasury debt, it
is no longer possible, on a national level, to simply identify outstanding consolidated-
government liabilities with household net wealth carried over from the previous period,
not least because the central bank is a supranational institution here. In what follows,
let bond issues of the Domestic and Foreign treasuries be aggregated further into the
union-wide supply of bonds
BUt ≡ BDt + BFt 〈6.7〉
and let
ZUt ≡ BUt +Mt 〈6.8〉
denote total outstanding liabilities of all public entities in the monetary union. Whether
the latter definition is warranted or sensible from an institutional point of view is part
of the investigation in this chapter (see↗Risk Sharing and Realism in Section 6.3.3 below,
for example); in any case, is it useful with regard to notation.
Union Present-Value Budget Equation As already implied in the paragraphon↗National
Household Present-Value Budget Constraints above, the goods-market-clearing condition
〈6.2〉 has to be combinedwith an aggregate household budget constraint, which is formed
by summing up both Equations 〈6.1〉, which eventually yields
ZUt−1 = EtVt,t+1Z
U
t + S
D
t + S
F
t + I˙t+1Mt. 〈6.9〉
Equation 〈6.9〉 is of exactly the same form as the flow consolidated-government budget
equation 〈2.37〉/〈2.39〉. Therefore, the analogue to the present-value budget equation
〈2.43〉 in the monetary union is given by
ZUt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
sDt+j + s
F
t+j + I˙t+j+1mt+j
)
, 〈6.10〉
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which corresponds to the transversality condition
lim
J→∞
Et
(
vt,t+J+1
ZUt+J
Pt+J+1
)
= 0. 〈6.11〉
National Consumption Levels Adding the assumption of constant and equal treasury
expenditures (gDt = gFt = gD = gF ∀t) and applying goods-market clearing 〈6.2〉, we
have
cDt + c
F
t = 2y− 2g, 〈6.12〉
aggregate consumption is constant. While there is no union-wide version of the Euler
equation 〈2.21〉, the argument about equal real interest rates (↗Equality of Interest Rates,
p. 106) in combination with the fact that household preferences are assumed to be ho-
mogeneous leads to the same result as in Chapter 2.4 (see↗Constant Real Interest Rate,
p. 34): constant real interest rates (1+ rt = β−1) and flat consumption profiles in both
countries. Regarding the allocation of consumption, two cases can be distinguished:
 If lifetimehouseholdwealth, consisting of initial householdwealth plus the present
value of expected available income (the right-hand side of the present-value bud-
get constraint 〈6.5〉), is the same in both countries, so are the respective consump-
tion levels. Money demand 〈2.25〉 then implies that individual money demands
are identical all the time as well. (Cf. Woodford 1996, pp. 27-28.) In this singular
case, the monetary union can actually be viewed as the single economy of Chapter
2.4 ‘split in half,’ with no deviations in per-capita terms.
 If, by contrast, initial household wealth deviates—for instance, because one trea-
sury decides upon a different path for transfers in a non-Ricardian fashion and
thus (ceteris paribus) changes the present value of expected available income—
national consumption levels are not the same. They remain constant and thus
imply the same constant real interest rate, however. This scenario is explored in
more detail in Section 6.3 below.
Treasury Budget Constraints Notwithstanding the above, national treasury budget equa-
tions do exist. After all, the treasuries constitute separate entities whose liabilities have
to be described in terms of consistent time paths. Assuming equal remittances from the
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central bank (see also↗Starting Point on p. 111 below), we therefore have
BDt−1 + T
DTH
t + G
D
t = QtB
D
t +
Mt −Mt−1
2
BFt−1 + T
FTH
t + G
F
t = QtB
F
t +
Mt −Mt−1
2
.
〈6.13〉
Given that the treasuries decide on the amounts of transfers as well as spending, that
outstanding debt is predetermined, and that bond pricesQt as a function of the nominal
interest rate it+1 (see Equation 〈2.8〉) are typically not in the hands of fiscal authorities
either, Equations 〈6.13〉 determine the amount of debt each treasury has to incur in the
current period.
If there are flow budget constraints, one can of course also iterate them forward in-
finitely often and receive the respective present-value budget constraints. The following
equations are derived using the rearrangements of money-related terms described in
Appendix D.1.2:
BDt−1
Pt
= −Mt−1
2
+Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
sDt+j +
I˙t+j+1mt+j
2
)
BFt−1
Pt
= −Mt−1
2
+Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
sFt+j +
I˙t+j+1mt+j
2
) 〈6.14〉
Summing up both equations 〈6.14〉 yields the union-wide present value budget equa-
tion 〈6.10〉. There is an important difference between individual Equations 〈6.14〉 and
other present-value budget equations (including the union-wide variant 〈6.10〉), how-
ever: The latter are associated with transversality conditions that arise from the opti-
mization problem (maximization on the part of households as well as borrowing limits,
cf. Chapter 2) whereas there are no such individual equilibrium conditions for the for-
mer. Put differently, while transversality conditions have to be satisfied for individual
households, the same is not true for individual treasuries. For them, it is conceivable
that the pivotal elements of forward iteration (the terms which are equalized to zero in
transversality conditions) deviate in opposite directions, i.e., infinity andminus infinity,
but this is consistent with equilibrium as long as the transversality condition 〈6.11〉 is
satisfied. (Cf. Bergin 2000, pp. 42-43, 49.)
Counting Variables and Equations In comparison to the baselinemodel of Chapter 2, the
monetary-union variant features 11 additional variables as well as 14 additional equa-
tions (see Tables D.1a and D.1b in Appendix D.2).
In particular, six variables (y, g, c, λ, s, tTH) are duplicated to differentiate between
Domestic and Foreign and the money market is considered more explicitly, adding two
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individual money demands (MD, MF). To enable a consistent description of household
budget constraints, the bond market is described by six additional variables (BD, BF,
BDD, BDF, BFF, BFD). Variables B and Z from Chapter 2 are replaced by BU and ZU ,
respectively.
Similarly, accounting for the two-country setup yields fiveduplicate equations (house-
hold budget constraint 〈2.3〉/〈6.1〉, first-order conditions 〈2.12〉/〈2.14〉/〈2.15〉, defini-
tion of treasury surpluses 〈2.10〉) and adds six new equations (bond-market clearing
〈6.3〉, money-market clearing 〈6.4〉, treasury budget constraints 〈6.13〉, the definition of
union-wide treasury debt 〈6.7〉). The definition of Z 〈2.29〉/〈2.28〉 is replaced by the
definition of ZU 〈6.8〉.
Since there are also three additional exogenous or policy-determined variables (en-
dowments y, treasury expenditure g and transfers tTH are duplicated), the model re-
mains closed.
6.3. Case Studies of Non-Ricardian Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union
6.3.1. Introduction
Aggregate-Level Policy Regimes If the fiscal policies of both countries are studied on
aggregate (in the sense of a centralized institution responsible for all member countries
rather than just ‘summing up’ individual policy choices after the fact), the resulting
interconnections with monetary policy are the same as in the single-country model of
Sections 4-5. This directly hints at the object of interest in a monetary union: the coor-
dination of fiscal policies which remain at the national level.
Starting Point Common ground for all further discussions in this section are the fol-
lowing assumptions:
 Treasury expenditure g is constant in both countries so as to avoid changes in
the real interest rate (via goods-market clearing and consumption, which becomes
especially hard to handle in the monetary union; see Section 2.4 for the basics).
 Surpluses are therefore set by adjusting transfers tTH.
 The central bank has no authority or need for independent spending so that it can
fully remit its seigniorage earnings to the two treasuries. It does so in equal parts.
 Finally, it is helpful to assume an initial steady state for the economy to start in.
The peculiarities of themonetary union can then be pointed out by deviating from
this initial situation. It exhibits a stable real level of outstanding union-wide liabil-
ities brought about by identical fiscal policies of both countries, either because the
latter are Ricardian or because they are non-Ricardian but happen to imply this
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kind of stability irrespective of monetary policy (let the constant level of national
surpluses needed to achieve this be denoted by s′). Hence, it corresponds to the
first scenario for↗National Consumption Levels in Section 6.2.
An Obvious Case Decentralized fiscal policies coincide with a hypothetical centralized
one if both treasuries follow passive (Ricardian) surplus rules such as Equation 〈4.20〉.
This constellation results in a regime of monetary dominance as described in Chapter
4.3.2 and does therefore not need to be discussed in greater detail anymore. (Cf. Wood-
ford 1996, p. 30.)
6.3.2. One Non-Ricardian, One Ricardian
A National Ricardian Rule Sections 4.4 and 5.1.4 (including Appendix C.2) show that
a Ricardian fiscal rule makes the respective present-value budget equation hold identi-
cally for all paths of all other variables (such as price levels or interest rates, for instance).
In analogy to Equations 〈4.24〉 and 〈C.2〉 featured in these sections, the Ricardian sur-
plus rule 〈5.9〉 can be adapted for use in Foreign,
SFt = γ
FT
Z B
F
t−1 − 0.5 (Mt −Mt−1)
⇔ sFt = γFTZ
BFt−1
Pt
− 0.5
(
mt − mt−1Πt
)
,
〈6.15〉
and combined with the union-wide present-value budget equation 〈6.10〉 to yield
BDt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
[
sDt+j + 0.5
(
mt+j −
mt+j−1
Πt+j
)]
. 〈6.16〉
Irrelevance of Foreign’s Policy for Prices Equation 〈6.16〉provides a striking result: Given
active fiscal policy in Domestic, the Foreign treasury setting surpluses in a Ricardian
manner simply does not matter for price-level determination. In fact, it leads to ex-
actly the same outcome as if Foreign were to adopt the policies of Domestic (multiply-
ing Equation 〈6.16〉 by 2 makes it equivalent to Equation 〈6.10〉 with identical policies;
cf. Woodford 1996, p. 32). The reason is that Foreign, by conducting Ricardian fiscal
policy, takes prices as given instead of partaking in their determination, which is then
completely up to Domestic.
Ricardian Equivalence Another ‘irrelevance result’ obtains for consumption. Consider
the example of a transfer (TDTH) increase in Domestic which is not offset by any means
at any time because of the non-Ricardian nature of policy. The perceived gain in net
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wealth leads Domestic households to increase demand for consumption, which drives
up prices. As can be seen from the real version of rule 〈6.15〉, a higher price level leads to
lower surpluses, that is, the Foreign treasury increases transfers to local households and
thus compensates them for the initial price-driven real welfare loss. Therefore, Foreign
households consume the same amount as before, and since the aggregate supply of
goods does not change in the endowment economy, so do Domestic households.
6.3.3. One Non-Ricardian, One Super-Ricardian
A ‘Super-Ricardian’ Rule Now, replacing Equation 〈6.15〉, consider the case in which
Foreign sets surpluses according to the ‘super-Ricardian’ rule
sFt = s
′
t −
(
sDt − s′t
)
, 〈6.17〉
that is, such that they compensate deviations of Domestic surpluses from the hypo-
thetical reference value s′t. Determination of the latter is not the critical issue here; as
indicated in↗Starting Point (p. 111) above, s′ can be understood as the constant stream
of national surpluses happening to be consistent with stability in all regimes—that is,
also under active monetary policy, where it would have to support a current price level
Pt consistent with the target inflation rate Π∗. Alternatively, it could also be the result
of a Ricardian rule from which Domestic then decides to deviate.
Wealth Transfers Plugged into the union-wide present-value budget equation 〈6.10〉,
rule 〈6.17〉 alwaysmaintains the initial situation and thus completely prevents any price-
level deviation. However, such stabilization of prices possibly comes at a very high
cost in terms of real goods: Because Foreign follows a policy that exactly balances the
overall budget position, it effectively transfers wealth to Domestic every time and to the
extent that the latter chooses to run budget deficits. Non-Ricardian fiscal policy by the
Domestic treasury that hands out presents by decreasing (the present value of) taxes,
which is tantamount to increasing (the present value of) transfers tDTH , allows local
households to consumemore. At the same time, the Foreign treasury increases taxation
of its constituency, lowering its wealth and thus consumption.
Behavior of Domestic’s treasury is not modeled more explicitly here, but it is obvious
that such a “blank check” (Woodford 1996, p. 33) from another country is not an incen-
tive to greater fiscal discipline. The likely end result is higher consumption in Domestic
than in (or, put differently: paid for by by lower consumption in) Foreign.
To add a technical note, the consumption Euler equation 〈2.21〉 shows that the real
interest rate is constant if consumption is expected to be so, too, independent of its actual
level. Therefore, different consumption levels are indeed consistent with a single union-
wide real interest rate.
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Risk Sharing and Realism The political viability of this scenario rests on a critical as-
sumption: If households can perfectly insure themselves and thus ensure consumption,
as assumed by Woodford (1996, p. 5), they do not really care about the distributional
effects of the policies proposed in this subsection. Sims (1997, p. 14) and Bergin (2000,
pp. 39, 44) criticize this as an oversimplification because it effectively rids households of
their nationality. More importantly, with imperfect insurance, the realism of a model
which has Foreign households enduring arbitrary wealth transfers to Domestic comes
into question. While perfectly fine from a formal perspective, it does not seem politi-
cally feasible to maintain super-Ricardian policies to a greater extent. Case in point is
the growing and oft-reported unwillingness of certain EMUmembers’ constituencies to
extend any kind of wealth transfers to fellow member countries like Greece.
6.3.4. Two Non-Ricardian Fiscal Policies
Aggregate Regime Finally, it is also conceivable that both countries decide to set sur-
pluseswithout any concern to the level of their respective debt, not least because Foreign
might recognize the futility of Ricardian policy if Domestic is non-Ricardian. In princi-
ple, the resulting constellation then resembles the description in Chapter 4.3.2; depend-
ing on monetary policy, the monetary union is governed by a doubly active regime or
experiences fiscal dominance.
Wealth Transfers There is a non-negligible difference, however. While the situation is
unambiguous with respect to the aggregate regime, a two-country setup introduces the
possibility to redistribute wealth. If one of the countries increases transfers to house-
holds more than the respective other, its local households will gain more from higher
real transfers than they lose from a rising price level (both decisions lead to proportionate
upward pressure on the price level). Households of the more ‘hesitant’ (or less ‘gener-
ous’) country experience the opposite; their increased available income does not quite
set off the loss from higher prices. Again, the behavior of treasuries is not modeled ex-
plicitly, but the incentive to try to outdo each other with tax presents is obvious. (Cf.
Sims 1997, Section VI.)
6.4. Discussion of the Political Economy in a Monetary Union
Dilemma As the previous section makes clear, being part of a monetary union has se-
vere consequences for a country if other members are not (or can not be effectively)
prohibited from following non-Ricardian policies. In the presence of such ‘partners,’
policymakers of the country in question have to choose a position between two polar
extremes, namely, price stability at the cost of (not even self-determined) wealth trans-
fers and abandonment of the inflation target in an attempt to defend national wealth.
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Dystopia Steadfast conclusions can only be drawn from setups that include the polit-
ical process more explicitly, but indulging in a pessimistic worst-case scenario seems
particularly easy in the monetary union. Consider the following an excursus in this
direction.
A Critical View on the Institutional Setup in a Monetary Union A popular argument in
favor of monetary unions holds that a supranational central bank is especially able to
guarantee price stability because it is ‘elevated to another level’ compared to the rest
of the economic and political system. In particular, fiscal policies remain national and
numerous; furthermore, insofar as political unification lags behind, impeding supra-
national coordination, it is far more difficult for individual interested parties to attack
central-bank independence (arguments in this direction are made by Fratianni and von
Hagen 1993, for instance).
In tune with the tenor that fiscal policy matters for price-level and inflation determi-
nation, the present chapter paints a different picture: In a monetary union, fragmenta-
tion of fiscal policy increases the odds of failure from a normative point-of-view which
considers price stability important.
Because of theway budget constraints andmarket-clearing conditions are aggregated,
a single non-Ricardian fiscal policy suffices to turn an active-monetary-passive-fiscal
into a doubly active regime (cf. Chapter 4.3.3.1) and thus refutes the ill-founded notion
that activemonetary policy ‘automatically’ achievesmacroeconomic stability. While po-
tentially stable, the second option—a passive-monetary-active-fiscal regime—is proba-
bly not in the interest of countries that arewilling to followRicardian rules for the sake of
price stability either (without going into further detail, the credibility of a commitment
to price stability seems at least doubtful in case of fiscal dominance).
Attempted Freeriding This chapter assumes a monetary union consisting of only two
equally large members. A larger number of countries and differences in size potentially
introduce additional problems: It might especially be smaller nations in hopes of being
able to freeride that turn out to be non-Ricardian, operating under the assumption that
thewealth redistributions implied by their behavior are small enough to go unanswered
by relatively larger countries (or the rest of the union en bloc, respectively). The worst
thing that can happen from the perspective of such a freeriding state is that the others
switch from being super-Ricardian to ‘just Ricardian’—at least at first instance.
Race to the Bottom Since behaving in a Ricardian manner has the same implications as
exactly adopting the policies of the non-Ricardian country, initially Ricardian countries
might simply do so (fiscal policy might feel much less constrained to politicians after
all). At a minimum, Daniel (2001b, p. 304) argues that taking on foreign debt positions
by adopting super-Ricardian policy runs counter to maximization of the domestic res-
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idents’ welfare; Sims (1997, p. 16) similarly asserts that, if consolidated governments
“care about the welfare of their citizens, it will be difficult for them to maintain a com-
mitment not to cut their primary surpluses.” From there, it seems like only a question
of time until union members engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ (or ‘beggar-thy-neighbour
competition’) in which all countries try to gain from wealth redistributions by running
ever more excessive budget surpluses and hoping that some of the inflationary costs
this produces can be passed on to others (cf. Sims 1997, p. 16).
Enforcing Discipline The arguments above assume a very general kind of discretion
on the part of national treasuries. This is not to be understood in the sense of the time-
inconsistency literature à la Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro andGordon (1983) in
which a policymaker puts temporary before long-term gains but remains strictly within
the limits of its own domain otherwise. Rather, the present situation is even worse be-
cause each treasury has the incentive to try and beggar its respective neighbors. (Cf.
Sims 1997, p. 16.) While some countries, like Foreign in the examples above, might
choose to follow a Ricardian rule, they can always opt out, become non-Ricardian, and
try to receive wealth transfers as well.
Whatwould be necessary is away to prohibit this behavior. However, Sims (1997, p. 5)
argues that controls and penalties, as envisioned in the Maastricht treaty, rather have a
“perverse effect” in that they increase the incentive to exit the union and immediately
devalue the currency (this would require that outstanding liabilities be denominated in
national currency afterwards in order to be advantageous for the country in question).
In particular, this relates to the excessive deficit procedure; for a short critical overview,
see European Central Bank (2011, Box 2.1).
6.5. Selected References on Fiscal Price Determination in the Open
Economy
Repetition: Monetary Union Bergin (2000) obtains the same results as in Sections 6.3.2-
6.3.3 and presents the descriptions of consumption and treasury debt in more formal
detail. His paper is also based onWoodford (1996, cited asWoodford 1998) but criticizes
the assumption of perfect insurability of consumption (see↗Risk Sharing and Realism on
p. 114 above). So does Sims (1997) who, furthermore, seems sympathetic to imposing
national transversality conditions for reasons of plausibility (cf. p. 15).
Models with Exchange Rates Dupor (2000, especially pp. 623-625) shows that the deter-
minacy under interest-rate pegs derived for the closed economy (see Chapter 5.1.5) does
not persevere in an open-economy setup, the reason being aggregation problems simi-
lar to those discussed in Section 6.2. The price level, exchange rate, and real allocations
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are all indeterminate under interest-rate pegs with more than one currency.
Daniel (2001b) contains the model of Dupor (2000) as a special case (to be fair, her
more general case is even worse in that the “dimension of the indeterminacy” is two
instead of one, see her p. 304). She resolves the indeterminacy problem by introducing
“no-surplus” policy which places a zero upper bound on the present value of surpluses
(note that positive surplues in individual periods are fine as long as they are offset some
other time, cf. p. 305).
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001a) examine the consequences of monetary-fiscal
coordination for managed floats, exchange-rate pegs, and monetary unions. Daniel
(2001a) develops a “fiscal theory of currency crises.”
Key Takeaways from Chapter 6
Multi-country models face an additional problem in the form of aggregation. In a
monetary union with a single interest rate, three regimes can be distinguished: If one
country has non-Ricardian fiscal policy, the Ricardian policy of the other country ‘does
not matter;’ fiscal policy is active overall. If the other country turns ‘super-Ricardian,’
fiscal policy becomes Ricardian overall; however, this situation is characterized by
wealth transfers that are highly unrealistic from a political-economy perspective. If
both fiscal policies are non-Ricardian, the monetary union might end up in a spiral of
ever increasing nominal debt levels and inflation.
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The baseline model is transformed into a ‘New-Keynesian’ variant by adding monop-
olistic competition and sticky prices. It is linearized and simulated in order to graph-
ically study its behavior after technology and policy shocks.
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Derivations for this chapter can be found in Appendix F.
7.1. Adjustments to the Baseline Model15
7.1.1. Household Optimization
7.1.1.1. Preferences
Utility Instead of ‘the’ representative household invoked in Chapter 2, consider a unit-
mass continuum of identical households that share the per-period utility function
u(ct,mt, ℓt) , 〈7.1〉
where utility from consumption ct and real-money holdings mt have properties 〈2.2〉.
By contrast, working ℓt hours yields convex disutility:
u′(ℓt) < 0
u′′(ℓt) < 0
〈7.2〉
For later purposes (such as linearizing the model, cf. Section 7.2), it is necessary to as-
sume a specific utility function. It is given by
u(ct,mt, ℓt) ≡ c
1−ρ
t
1− ρ + ξm
m1−νt
1− ν − ξℓ
ℓ
1+η
t
1+ η
〈7.3〉
here and satisfies properties 〈2.2〉 and 〈7.2〉.
Variety of Consumption Goods In the present variant of the model, ct does not denote a
single multi-purpose consumption good anymore but instead the consumption bundle
ct ≡
{∫ 1
0
[ct(j)]
θ−1
θ dj
} θ
θ−1
〈7.4〉
15 The model presented here is ‘plain vanilla’ for the most part. While readers familiar with mone-
tary macroeconomics probably know it well from standard references like Woodford (2003b) and Galí
(2008; 2015) among others, the discussion of fiscal price determinationwithin a ‘New-Keynesian’ setting
would be incomplete without a brief description of the underlying assumptions.
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which consists of a variety of goods indexed over the interval j ∈ [0, 1]. Demands for
individual goods j are derived in a separate optimization problem (see Appendix F.1.1)
and given by
ct(j) =
[
Pt
Pt(j)
]θ
ct, 〈7.5〉
where
Pt ≡
{∫ 1
0
[Pt(j)]
1−θ dj
} 1
1−θ
〈7.6〉
denotes the aggregate price level.
Goods usually are imperfect substitutes. From Equation 〈7.5〉, it can be derived that
the elasticity of substitution between goods is equal to θ, which is a measure of the (uni-
form) degree of firms’ market power. As θ increases, goods become closer substitutes;
θ → ∞ then describes the limiting case of perfect competition in which firms have no
market power (cf. Walsh 2010, p. 332).
7.1.1.2. Labor and Profit Income
In New-Keynesian models, households no longer receive exogenous (and possibly con-
stant) endowments. Instead, they earn wages from supplying labor and profits from
owning firms. This has several implications that are described in what follows.
Budget Constraint In comparison to budget constraint 〈2.3〉, the nominal endowment
Yt is replaced by labor incomeWtℓt and profit income Ψt:
Ct +Mt +QtBt = Wtℓt + TTHt +Ψt + Bt−1 +Mt−1
⇔ ct +mt +Qtbt = wtℓt + tTHt + ψt +
bt−1 +mt−1
Πt
〈7.7〉
It is possible to substitute Ct ≡ Ptct =
∫ 1
0 Pt(j)ct(j)dj because of Equations 〈7.5〉-〈7.6〉,
but since it does not add anything important, I opt for the simpler notation.
The subtleties of firm-household interconnections form an extensive literature in their
own right and are left out here to save on space and time.16 Rather, I follow Galí (2015,
16 Just to give an impression: Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) introduce monopolistically competitive
goods and labor markets, Ball and Romer (1989; 1991) abolish labor markets altogether by introducing
‘yeoman farmers’ (or worker-producers), and Ball and Romer (1990) consider both options. Woodford
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p. ix) and McCandless (2008, p. 261) and assume that labor markets are perfectly com-
petitive so thatWt and wt denote the universally valid nominal and real wages per unit
of labor, respectively. Similarly to Woodford (2003b, p. 146), I further assume that all
households hold equal shares of all firms so that they earn identical incomes from nom-
inal profits Ψt (real profits ψt).
Labor Supply With hours worked ℓt entering both the utility function and the budget
constraint, the household faces an additional decision problem and the respective first-
order condition:
uℓ(ct,mt, ℓt) + λtwt
!
= 0 ⇔ −uℓ(ct,mt, ℓt) = wtuc(ct,mt, ℓt) 〈7.8〉
(This can be derived from building a Lagrangian such as 〈2.11〉 with the adjustments
discussed in the present chapter. The rearrangement uses Equation 〈2.12〉.) In optimum,
marginal disutility from work must be equal to the marginal utility from consumption
the household can afford given the real wagewt. Given the specific utility function 〈7.3〉,
the first-order condition 〈7.8〉 can be understood as a labor-supply function reading
ℓ
η
t =
wt
ξℓc
ρ
t
. 〈7.9〉
7.1.2. Firms in the Face of Price Rigidities
7.1.2.1. Preliminaries: Monopolistically Competitive Firms
Technology There is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] producing differenti-
ated goods with identical production functions
yt(j) = at [ℓt(j)]
ζ , 〈7.10〉
which exhibit constant returns to scale if the exponent of labor input ℓt(j) equals unity
(ζ = 1). The log level of economy-wide technology at is assumed to follow an autore-
gressive process
ln at = γa ln at−1 + εat , 〈7.11〉
(2003b, pp. 144-145) considers the implications (and equivalence) of assuming households that simul-
taneously supply all types j of labor as well as households that only supply one type and are equally
numbered.
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where εat is a white-noise shock and γa ∈ [0, 1) so that technology always reverts to
its steady-state level ln at = 0 ⇔ at = 1 over time (cf. Woodford 2003b, pp. 148, 152;
McCandless 2008, pp. 176-177; Galí 2015, p. 22, for instance).17 The model continues to
abstract from capital for simplicity.
Nominal Rigidity and Aggregate Price Dynamics Following Calvo (1983), only a random
share (1− α) of firms, where α ∈ (0, 1), can readjust prices optimally in a given period
while the remaining firms follow a simple rule. The optimal price in period t is denoted
Pot .
This has implications for the behavior of the aggregate price level over time. If non-
reoptimizing firms simply keep their prices constant, Equation 〈7.6〉 implies that
Pt =
[
αP1−θt−1 + (1− α) (Pot )1−θ
] 1
1−θ
describes aggregate price-level dynamics. This simple rule can have some counterintu-
itive implications (cf. McCandless 2008, p. 265), but alternative rules are conceivable. To
give an example, Benigno andNisticò (2015, p. 13) have non-reoptimizing firms increase
their prices at the target inflation rate Π∗, which makes
Pt =
[
α (Π∗Pt−1)1−θ + (1− α) (Pot )1−θ
] 1
1−θ 〈7.12〉
the respective law of motion for the aggregate price level.18
7.1.2.2. The Firm’s Profit-Maximization Problem and the Optimal Price
Profit Maximization Firms are assumed to maximize their market value, that is, the
present value of expected profits. Firm j’s profits Ψt(j) are given by total revenues less
17 Similarly to the design of labor and goodsmarkets (cf. Footnote 16), other specifications are conceivable.
For instance, Ireland (2004, p. 925) uses a logarithmic random walk with positive drift whereas Smets
and Wouters (2003, p. 1132) use an AR(1) process for the level of the technology shock.
18 There is an exhaustive literature on the implications of ‘Calvo pricing’ and, in particular, the effects
of different simple rules for non-reoptimizing firms. To give some examples: One of the first appli-
cations is by Yun (1996), who assumes that non-optimal prices remain constant. Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) let non-optimal prices be indexed to
steady-state or lagged inflation, respectively. Casares (2002)makes a threefold distinction inwhich non-
reoptimizing firms are randomly assigned to keep prices constant or index them to target inflation.
In general, positive steady-state inflation has nontrivial effects, but full indexation heals this compli-
cation (cf. Ascari 2004, pp. 664-665; Ascari and Ropele 2009; Cogley and Sbordone 2008). It hence allows
me to consider non-zero inflation targets (see Section 7.3.3.5).
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cost of production:
Ψt(j) ≡ Pt(j) yt(j)−Costt(j) 〈7.13〉
Costt(j) as a short form of Costt[yt(j)] denotes the total nominal cost of producing yt(j).
(Since costs in absolute level do not appear very often in the description of the model, I
allow myself this mannerism, including the denial to waste a symbol on them.) Aggre-
gate profits Ψ are simply the integral over all firms (see also Appendix F.1.2.2):
Ψt ≡
∫ 1
0
Ψt(j)dj = Ptyt −Wtℓt 〈7.14〉
As described in Appendix F.1.3, this leads to the optimality condition
Pot (j)
Pt
=
θ
θ − 1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tvt,TmcT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tvt,TyT
Pt
PT
(Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ , 〈7.15〉
where
ϱ ≡ θ
θ − 1 〈7.16〉
denotes the desired mark-up in absence of the Calvo friction (α = 0), which is then
driven solely by the degree of market power of the monopolistically competitive firms.
Further, nominal marginal costs are given by the product of the nominal wage and the
marginal product of labor:
MCt(j) ≡ Wt
ζat [ℓt(j)]
ζ−1 〈7.17〉
(A similar expression pertaining to the aggregate economy—eliminating the j indices
from Equation 〈7.17〉—is derived at a later stage, see Appendix F.3.1.5.)
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7.1.3. Policies of the Consolidated Government
7.1.3.1. Central Bank
In its setting of the nominal interest rate, the monetary authority follows
1+ it+1 = (1+ iSS)
(
Πt
Π∗
)γCpi ( yt
ynatt
)γCy (
1+ εit
)
, 〈7.18〉
where ynat denotes the ‘natural’ aggregate output level that would obtain in the hypo-
thetical case of perfect price flexibility (that is, with an ineffective Calvo rigidity, α = 0;
see Appendix F.1.4 and especially↗Natural vs. Steady-State Output on 246). The policy
shock εit is autoregressive of first order with γCε ∈ [0, 1) and ϵit white noise:
εit = γ
C
ε ε
i
t + ϵ
i
t 〈7.19〉
7.1.3.2. Treasury
Treasury Expenditure on Differentiated Goods Introducing goods varieties also affects
public spending. It is assumed that the treasury targets an aggregate bundle of goods g
that is formed similarly to the consumption bundle c in Equation 〈7.4〉:
gt ≡
{∫ 1
0
[gt(j)]
θ−1
θ dj
} θ
θ−1
〈7.20〉
Like households, it tries to achieve any given bundle at a minimal cost, which leads to
analogous good-specific public demand functions
gt(j) =
[
Pt
Pt(j)
]θ
gt. 〈7.21〉
As explained in Appendix F.1.2.1, treasury expenditure can be expressed in terms of
consumption via the ‘public spending ratio’ Γ:
Γt ≡ gt(j)ct(j) ∀j ⇒ gt = Γtct 〈7.22〉
Surplus Rule The actual policy decision is not about the composition of expenditure,
but about its level. To be precise, the treasury again follows a rule for budget surpluses,
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namely
St = Ptsfix + γTy
(
Yt −Ynatt
)
+ γTz Zt−1 − I˙t+1Mt + Ptεst
⇔ st = sfix + γTy
(
yt − ynatt
)
+ γTz
zt−1
Πt
− γTm I˙t+1mt + εst,
〈7.23〉
where sfix denotes the fixed component of the surplus rule and γTm is a binary operator
that allows to include the seigniorage rebate (cf. Section 5.1.3.1, γTm = 1) or not (γTm =
0).19 Again, the shock term εst is autoregressive of order one with γTε ∈ [0, 1) and ϵs
white noise:
εst = γ
T
ε ε
s
t−1 + ϵ
s
t 〈7.24〉
Expenditure Rule The combination of surplus rule 〈7.23〉 and definition 〈2.10〉 leaves
open the division between treasury expenditure g and transfers to households tTH . Let-
ting the latter be determined by Equation 〈2.10〉, two rules are considered here for public
expenditure g:20
1. With the first rule, the treasury defines some constant level of public expenditure
gfix from which gt only deviates in case (and in the amount of) a surplus shock
19 The reason for defining an additive rather than multiplicative rule for the treasury is a technical one.
In general, additive connections introduce ratios of steady-state values into the linearized equations.
This can be avoided by definingmultiplicative rules, as is done in Taylor rule 〈7.18〉, for example. There
are several arguments against doing the same for surplus rules: For one, the budget constraint 〈7.7〉 is
linear itself which automatically introduces a steady-state ratio into its linearized form 〈7.39〉. Further,
granting the seigniorage rebate I˙m (see Section 5.1.3.1) is typically an additive operation. Therefore, the
gains of avoiding steady-state ratios are minor because some of these ratios simply can not be avoided.
Themost important argument, however, is that amultiplicative rule including a term like (Zt−1/ZSS)γ
T
Z
(or an equivalent expression in real terms) does not allow for the↗The Bohn-Woodford Criterion (p. 77)
to be checked as easily: The additive case rests on exponentiating the expression (1 − γTZ) ∈ [0, 1)
infinitely and thereby demonstrating that the transversality condition is satisfied (see Sections 4.4, 5.1.4,
and Appendix C.2). By contrast, with a non-linear rule, this argument can not be made anymore in the
original model (while the linearized model is a bit, yet not drastically, easier to handle). The potential
‘middle ground’ of defining a rule with a multiplicatively inserted term like (γTZZt−1), in turn, has the
drawback of losing the policy coefficient γTZ in its linearized form.20 There certainly are more rules that could be analyzed. One is a ‘split rule’ which assigns treasury
expenditure g and transfers to households tTH specific weights (γTg ) in achieving a given surplus: gt =
−γTg st and tTHt = −(1− γTg )st. The reason for not considering this setup in more detail is that it can
lead to negative public spending (g < 0), an unusual outcome which would require some imagination
to yield a reasonable interpretation (if any). There are two obvious workarounds: First, placing limits
on the parameters and policies such that negative treasury expenditure would never occur; however,
this reduces the generality of the model. Second, simply adding a requirement that public spending
never become negative by imposing g ≥ 0. This resembles the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate, and while there are solution approaches to this problem, their application to the ‘split rule’ would
blow the present section out of proportion. (For such “occasionally binding constraints,” see Guerrieri
and Iacoviello 2015 and Holden 2017.)
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(‘shock-only rule’). Formally,
gt = gfix − εst. 〈7.25a〉
2. Alternatively, it could render the public expenditure ratio into a policy tool, setting
a fixed proportion between private and public consumption. For simplicity, it is
assumed that this relationship is constant (Γt = Γ¯ ∀t), so that
gt = Γ¯ct. 〈7.25b〉
Formally, this is (very close to) a repetition of Equation 〈7.22〉, but it follows a
different logic: The latter is part of a purely definitional process with the aim to
simplify matters (but no active part in equilibrium determination) whereas Equa-
tion 〈7.25b〉 is an integral part of closing the model if this type of treasury policy
is chosen.
7.1.4. Equilibrium
Goods-Market Clearing In equilibrium, supply of each goods variety has to equal the
sum of private and public demands,
yt(j) = ct(j) + gt(j) = (1+ Γt) ct(j) ∀j, 〈7.26〉
which, given an appropriate definition of aggregate output yt, also implies aggregate
goods-market clearing (cf. Equation 〈7.22〉 and Appendix F.1.2.1):21
yt ≡
{∫ 1
0
[yt(j)]
θ−1
θ dj
} θ
θ−1
= ct + gt = (1+ Γt) ct, 〈7.27〉
21 A further implication is that ‘total demand’ for a specific variety j follows the same pattern as private
and public demands (cf. Equation 〈F.5〉 in Appendix F.1.2.1):
yt(j) =
[
Pt
Pt(j)
]θ
yt
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Labor-Market Clearing Similarly, the sum of individual labor demands ℓt(j) arising
from the production functions 〈7.10〉 has to be equal to labor supply by households:
∫ 1
0
ℓt(j)dj = ℓt 〈7.28〉
Counting Variables and Equations Since the New-Keynesian model variant is different
from the baseline version in several respects, it is helpful to again summarize all vari-
ables and describe how they are determined.
In comparison to the baseline model of Chapter 2 as summarized by Table 2.1a, 17
variables are added to Table 7.1a (εa, a, Ψ, Ψ[j], MC, MC[j], Γ, ϱ, c[j], g[j], ℓ, ℓ[j], Po, P[j],
W, ynat, y[j]). Since the constant endowments are replaced by a production sector, the
‘quasi-exogenous’ variables c, g, r, and λmove into the main group of to-be-determined
variables.
Table 7.1b shows that seven of these additional variables are mere definitions (a, Ψ,
Ψ[j], MC[j], Γ, ϱ, MC). The technology shock εa is white noise. Natural output ynat is a
hypothetical construct denoting a flexible-price benchmark value for output. The Calvo
(1983) procedure determines whether a specific firm’s price P(j) is optimal or carried
over from the previous period (indexed to target inflation).
Therefore, seven of the additional variables still have to be determined (c[j], g[j], ℓ,
ℓ[j], Po, W, y[j]). This happens simultaneously, so a sequential description is only ad-
missible insofar as one keeps in mind that each of the following ‘modules’ is subject
to the ceteris-paribus assumption (however, the list gives a brief overview of the more
detailed derivations in Appendix F.1):
1. Given j-specific prices, theDixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework yields specific-good
demands for household consumption c(j) (Equation 〈7.5〉).
2. The same holds for the allocation of aggregate treasury expenditure on the differ-
ent varieties g(j), governed by Equation 〈7.21〉.
3. Specific-good market-clearing conditions 〈7.26〉 then determine total demand for
each variety y(j).
4. These ‘total demands,’ in turn, determine j-specific labor demands ℓ(j) via the
production functions 〈7.10〉.
5. Labor-market clearing 〈7.28〉 then determines the necessary amount of aggregate
labor ℓ.
6. Given aggregate consumption and labor, the first-order condition with respect to
labor 〈7.8〉/〈7.9〉 pins down the real and, in combination with the aggregate price
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level, nominal wage. (Aggregate consumption and the price level are determined
by the respective Dixit and Stiglitz bundlers along the way.)
7. Things come full circlewhen consideringpricingdecisions of firms: Optimal prices
Po follow first-order conditions 〈7.15〉 derived from profit-maximization, which
itself depends on good-specific demands and wages, among others.
7.2. Linearization
7.2.1. Preparations
Definitions TheNewKeynesianmodel laid out in Section 7.1 is nonlinear and complex.
Letting
ˆt ≡ lnt − lnSS 〈7.29〉
denote the logarithmic (‘log’) deviation of t from its steady-state value SS, it can be
reduced to a linear model in fewer variables. Further, the resulting model is stated in
percentage deviations, which often is more informative than levels.
There are some exceptions to the rule: First, it is common to cast the model in terms
of the output gap between actual and natural (instead of steady-state) levels
y˜t ≡ ln yt − ln ynatt 〈7.30〉
(see also↗Natural vs. Steady-State Output on p. 246). Second, interest and inflation rates
appear in levels (‘without hats,’ see also↗Gross and Net Rates on p. 231). Finally, some
of the level variables (treasury debt b, budget surpluses s, transfers to households tTH ,
and consolidated-government liabilities z) can take negative values, which does not al-
low for log-linearization but requires ‘just linearization.’ In order to obtain percentage
deviations of these variables as well, let
ˇt ≡ t −SS|SS| 〈7.31〉
(seeAppendix E.5 for the rationale behind and remaining limitations to Equation 〈7.31〉).
The necessary derivations are tedious and do not yield valuable insights into the in-
teraction of monetary and fiscal policy, which is why they are relegated to Appendices
E (a technical overview about linearization using Taylor-series approximation and log-
arithms) and F.3 (the actual log-linearization of the model).
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no. variable determination description
‘truly’ exogenous
1 εa exogenous technology shock
endogenous by definition
2 Π 〈2.6〉 inflation rate
3 s 〈2.10〉 budget surplus of the treasury
4 v 〈2.16〉 real stochastic discount factor
5 V 〈2.17〉 nominal stochastic discount factor
6 I˙ 〈2.23〉 opportunity cost of holding money
7 Z 〈2.28〉/〈2.29〉 nominal wealth (household)/liabilities (cons. gov.)
8 P 〈7.6〉 aggregate price level
9 a 〈7.11〉 technology (AR[1] process)
10 Ψ 〈7.13〉 aggregate profits
11 Ψ(j) 〈7.14〉 firm j’s profits
12 MC(j) 〈7.17〉 j-specific marginal costs
13 Γ 〈7.22〉 ratio of treasury expenditure to consumption
14 ϱ 〈7.16〉 desired markup
15 MC 〈F.31〉 aggregate marginal costs (approximation)
to be determined by equations or set exogenously by policy
16 B bonds
17 c aggregate consumption
18 c(j) j-specific consumption
19 g policy aggregate treasury expenditure
20 g(j) j-specific treasury expenditure
21 i policy nominal interest rate
22 ℓ aggregate labor supply
23 ℓ(j) j-specific labor demand
24 M money supply
25 Po optimal price
26 P(j) j-specific price
27 Q bond price
28 r real interest rate
29 tTH policy net transfers from the treasury to the household
30 W nominal wage
31 y aggregate output
32 ynat natural (aggregate) output
33 y(j) j-specific output
34 λ Lagrange parameter for the budget constraint
Table 7.1a: Overview of Variables in the New-Keynesian Model. ⋄ Explana-
tions: See↗Counting Variables and Equations on p. 128.
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no. Equation description
‘normal’ equations
1 〈2.5〉/〈2.7〉 Fisher equation
2 〈2.8〉 no-arbitrage condition for bond prices
3 〈2.12〉 first-order condition with respect to consumption
4 〈2.14〉 first-order condition with respect to money
5 〈2.15〉 first-order condition with respect to bonds
6 〈7.5〉 j-specific goods demand
7 〈7.7〉 flow budget constraint of the household
8 〈7.8〉/〈7.9〉 first-order condition with respect to labor
9 〈7.10〉 j-specific production functions
10 〈7.15〉 first-order condition with respect to the optimal price
11 〈7.21〉 j-specific treasury expenditure
12 〈7.26〉 j-specific goods-market clearing
13 〈7.27〉 aggregate output/goods-market clearing
14 〈7.28〉 labor-market clearing
‘mere definitions’
15 〈2.6〉 inflation rate
16 〈2.10〉 budget surplus of the treasury
17 〈2.16〉 real stochastic discount factor
18 〈2.17〉 nominal stochastic discount factor
19 〈2.23〉 opportunity cost of holding money
20 〈2.28〉 nominal wealth (household)/liabilities (cons. gov.)
21 〈7.6〉 aggregate price level (Dixit and Stiglitz aggregator)
22 〈7.11〉 AR(1) process for technology
23 〈7.13〉 aggregate profits
24 〈7.13〉 firm j’s profits
25 〈7.17〉 j-specific marginal costs
26 〈7.22〉 ratio of treasury expenditure to consumption
27 〈7.16〉 desired markup
28 〈F.31〉 aggregate marginal costs (approximation)
‘everything else’
29 exogenous variable
30-32 set by policy
33 Calvo pricing
34 ‘natural’ (flexible-price) model
Table 7.1b: Equations Available for Equilibrium Determination in the New-
Keynesian Model. ⋄ Explanations: See↗Counting Variables and
Equations on p. 128.
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How Far Should the Model Be Reduced? The typical procedure in (relatively) simple
models is to reduce the set of linearized equations to aminimum. Aprime example is the
basic New-Keynesian model as expounded, for instance, by Galí (2008; 2015), leading to
a system of two difference equations (the “dynamic IS curve” and the “New-Keynesian
Phillips Curve”) in two variables (the output gap y˜ and, under the usual assumption of
zero target inflation, the actual inflation rate pi). With such a limited amount of vari-
ables and only a few accompanying parameters, many questions can actually be solved
analytically; for example, the dynamic behavior of output and inflation can be described
by (relatively) straightforward stability analysis based on eigenvalues.
As the amount of state variables and parameters of interest increases, however, the
analytical approach quickly becomes intractable. The model developed here already
suffers from this problem. In principle, it could be reduced to a system of ‘size three,’
adding consolidated-government liabilities zˆ and the respective lawofmotion to the pic-
ture. Practically, however, evaluating the model and working with it analytically seems
impossible: Within the confines of conventional personal-computing equipment, it is
possible to reduce the model to a 3× 3 system in matrix notation using symbolic-math
software, but calculating the determinant of the coefficient matrix is already close to the
limit of usable computing power, and deriving and displaying symbolic forms of eigen-
values apparently are beyond it. Further, and probably more importantly, the resulting
stability conditions would turn out way too complex to be of any practical use.
In the trade-off between richness and tractability, numerical simulations constitute a
middle ground. Therefore, I reduce the model only somewhat further—making some
of the respective expressions considerably longer in the process—in the rest of Section
7.2 and then move on to the simulation in Section 7.3. Of course, the latter is a numer-
ical and, as such, quantitative procedure, but the resulting graphic impulse-response
‘functions’ should be understood as qualitative sketches rather than precise indications
of real-world events.
7.2.2. The Linearized Model
7.2.2.1. The Reduced Model
Dynamic IS Curve The demand side of the economy is represented by
y˜t = Ety˜t+1 − Ξr (it+1 −Etpit+1 − rSS) + Ξa (Et aˆt+1 − aˆt) + Ξg (Et gˆt+1 − gˆt) , 〈7.32〉
for which the following shorthands are defined:
Ξr ≡ 1
ρ
cSS
ySS
=
1
ρ (1+ ΓSS)
〈7.33〉
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Ξa ≡ 1+ ηΘζ 〈7.34〉
Ξg ≡ ρΘ
gSS
cSS
− gSS
ySS
=
ρΓSS
Θ
− ΓSS
1+ ΓSS
〈7.35〉
Θ ≡ ρySS
cSS
− ζ − 1− η
ζ
= ρ (1+ ΓSS)− ζ − 1− η
ζ
〈7.36〉
This is a rather general but otherwise standard version of the ‘dynamic IS’ equation (cf.
Galí 2008, p. 49). The deviation of actual output y from its hypothetical flexible-price
(‘natural’) level ynat is driven by four determinants: First, its own expectation about
the future. Second, the difference of the actual real interest rate from its steady state
level, which reflects private-sector demand on goods markets. Third, the development
of technology a. Fourth, the change in treasury expenditure g as a measure of public
demand on goods-markets. Derivations can be found in Appendix F.3.2.
New-Keynesian Phillips Curve The supply side of the model is described by the New-
Keynesian Phillips Curve
pit − pi∗ = β (Etpit+1 − pi∗) + κy˜t, 〈7.37〉
where
κ ≡ ΘΘ′′ =
(
ρ
ySS
gSS
− ζ − 1− η
ζ
)
(1− α) (1− αβ)
α
ζ
ζ + θ (1− ζ) 〈7.38〉
is a shorthand. It describes the supply-side relationship between marginal costs—for
which the output gap y˜ acts as a proxy—and inflation pi. It is ‘expectation-augmented’
in that expected inflation affects the current inflation rate. SeeAppendix F.3.3 for deriva-
tions.
Consolidated-Government Liabilities Finally, deviations of real consolidated-government
liabilities from their steady-state values follow
zˇt = β−1zˇt−1 +
bSS
|zSS| (it+1 − iSS)− β
−1 zSS
|zSS| (pit − pi
∗)− (1+ iSS) |sSS||zSS| sˇt −
iSSmSS
|zSS| mˆt.
〈7.39〉
They are influenced by their own lag, the stance of monetary policy in terms of the nom-
inal interest rate, inflation, the fiscal-policy stance in terms of surpluses, and a measure
of seigniorage. Derivations are given in Appendix F.3.4.
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Degree of Reduction As indicated before (see↗How Far Should the Model Be Reduced?
and the introduction to the present subsection), it is possible to reduce themodel to three
equations in three endogenous variables. Equations 〈7.32〉-〈7.39〉 do not represent the
ultimate reducedmodel, however, as they still featuremore variables. Further reduction
would greatly complicate matters because replacing all ‘non-core’ variables, especially
surpluses sˆ and real-money mˆ, is a multi-stage process leading to ever longer equations.
7.2.2.2. Closing the Model
Counting Variables and Equations The descriptions in Section 7.2.2.1 mention three
equations in eight variables (yˆ, i, pi, aˆ, gˆ, zˆ, sˆ, mˆ). Technology is given quasi-exogenously
by Equation 〈7.11〉, which reads
aˆt = γa aˆt−1 + εat 〈7.40〉
when linearized, still leaving four variables ‘too many.’ This issue is resolved by includ-
ing the description of policy in what follows.
Policy Rules The respective policy rules for interest rates 〈7.18〉 and surpluses 〈7.23〉 in
linearized form read
it+1 = iSS + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + γCy y˜t + εit 〈7.41〉
sˇt =
1
|sSS|
(
γTy ySS − γTm
mSS
1+ iSS
γCy
)
y˜t − 1|sSS|
(
γTz
zSS
Π∗
+ γTm
mSS
1+ iSS
γCpi
)
(pit − pi∗)
+ γTz
1
Π∗
|zSS|
|sSS| zˇt−1 − γ
T
m I˙SS
mSS
|sSS| mˆt − γ
T
m
1
1+ iSS
mSS
|sSS| ε
i
t +
1
|sSS| ε
s
t
〈7.42〉
(see Appendix F.3.5 for derivations).
Treasury Expenditure and Transfers While the behavior of surpluses is explained by
Equation 〈7.42〉, the underlying components, public expenditure gˆ and transfers to house-
holds tˆTH , are yet undetermined. As before (Section 7.1.3.2), transfers are determined
as the residual in the log-linear counterpart of definition 〈2.10〉,
sˇt = −
∣∣tTHSS ∣∣
|sSS| tˇ
TH
t −
gSS
|sSS| gˆt, 〈7.43〉
while the deviation of treasury expenditure from steady state depends on the type of
rule chosen for its level:
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1. If treasury expenditure only reacts to surplus shocks (Equation 〈7.25a〉), the lin-
earized version of the rule becomes
gˆt = − 1gSS ε
s
t. 〈7.44a〉
2. Alternatively, if the treasury simply sets expenditure in constant proportion to pri-
vate consumption (Γt = Γ¯∀t as a simplifying assumption about policy), Equation
〈7.25b〉 turns into
gˆt = cˆt. 〈7.44b〉
Further Reduction? As indicated before (p. 132), it is not very instructive to reduce
the model further by plugging the policy rules into the equations they relate to (the
dynamic IS curve 〈7.32〉 and the law of motion for consolidated-government liabilities
〈7.39〉, respectively) because the results would be long and unwieldy.
7.3. Simulation
7.3.1. Introduction and Procedure
Calibration Themodel utilizes two alternative baseline calibrations adopted fromworks
which performa similar exercise (simulating a linearizedNew-KeynesianDSGEmodel):
While Kim (2003) is one of the standard references on the fiscal theory of the price level
and directly compares the “passive monetary-active fiscal” to the “active monetary-
passive fiscal” regime, Galí (2008) is an even more widely regarded reference on the
‘conventional’ New Keynesian model (but leaves out the ‘fiscalist’ regime). The respec-
tive sets of parameter values are given in Table 7.2. For the rationale behind certain
parameter values, see also Appendix F.4.
Technical Specifications All simulations are executed using Matlab R2017b with the
Dynare package version 4.5.4.22 The necessary files are available upon request.
Variable Names The plot titles of the impulse-response functions in this chapter do
not use the same symbols for variables as the rest of the thesis. Instead, they consist of a
simplified descriptor of the variable as listed in Table 7.3, followed by the shock depicted
22 For Matlab, visit ↗https://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab.html. Dynare is available for free under
↗http://www.dynare.org; see also Adjemian et al. (2017).
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parameter description Kim (2003) Galí (2008) thesis
sfix constant part of the surplus rule 0.01
α Calvo parameter 0.75 0.67
β discount factor 0.99a 0.99a
γa AR(1) coefficient of the technology shock 0.8 0.5
γCy central-bank reaction parameter to the output gap 0 0
γCε AR(1) coefficient of the interest-rate shock 0.8 0.5
γTy treasury reaction parameter to the output gap 0 0
γTε AR(1) coefficient of the surplus shock 0.8 0.5
Γ public spending relative to private consumption 0.67
ζ scale parameter (production function) 0.67 1
η labor disutility coefficient 1 1
θ elasticity of substitution between goods 10 6
ν real-money utility coefficient 1b 1c
ξℓ disutility weight of labor 1
ξm utility weight of real money 0.001
pi∗ inflation target 0a 0a
ρ consumption utility coefficient 5 1
Table 7.2: Baseline Calibrations for the New-Keynesian Model. ⋄ Explana-
tions: These parameter values are used in the model simula-
tions unless indicated otherwise. ⋄ Notes: a Quarterly value. b
Originally, ν = 5 in Kim (2003), but since values above unity
tend to provoke violations of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
conditions, I set ν = 1 here. c Implicit (cf. Bergholt 2012, pp. 8-
10).
no. simulation plots normal use
1 a aˆ
2 AR1i εi
3 AR1s εs
4 b bˇ
5 c cˆ
6 g gˆ
7 i i
8 lbr ℓˆ
9 m mˆ
no. simulation plots normal use
10 pi pi
11 r r
12 s sˇ
13 t tˇTH
14 w wˆ
15 y yˆ
16 ygap y˜
17 ynat yˆnat
18 z zˇ
Table 7.3: Variable Names in the Simulation Plots and Under Normal Use.
⋄ Explanations: Plot titles feature the variable name followed
by the depicted shock. For instance, c_eps_a depicts the log-
deviation of consumption cˆ after a shock to technology a.
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in the plot (_eps_a, _eps_i, or _eps_s). In order not to load the figure too much, not all
impulse-response functions are shown.
Variables and Equations The full list of variables and equations used to simulate the
linearized model is given by Tables F.1a and F.1b in Appendix F.5.
Impulse-Response Functions Horizontal axes denote quarters. Vertical axes give per-
centage deviations from steady state, except for interest rates and inflation, which are
expressed as plain yearly rates. In the legends, “T” denotes the Taylor coefficient γCpi,
“CGL” denotes the reaction coefficient of surpluses to consolidated-government liabil-
ities γTZ, “CByg” denotes the output-gap coefficient of the central bank γCy , and “FPyg”
denotes the output-gap coefficient of the treasury γTy .
Policy Regimes Two basic regimes are considered here: The institutional setup com-
monly deemed conventional in which the central bank reacts strongly to inflation (with
γCpi = 1.5 or γCpi = 1.1 in the Galí 2008 or Kim 2003 calibration, respectively) and sur-
pluses adjust so as to contain consolidated-government liabilities (for this, γTZ = 0.1
from Kim 2003 is also applied to the Galí 2008 calibration). Conversely, in the ‘fiscal-
ist’ regime, neither policymaker reacts to ‘their’ variable of interest: γCpi = γTZ = 0. Of
course, there is a continuum of policy-parameter constellations inbetween (and, in the
case of the conventional regime, beyond) these values, but the chosen constellations al-
low me to represent two ‘polar’ regimes and compare them to standard references in
the literature.
7.3.2. Baseline Results
7.3.2.1. Technology Shocks
Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal Policy Figure 7.1a depicts the effects of a sudden and
persistent deterioration in technology (εat = −0.25 with an autoregressive coefficient
γa = 0.5). The solid lines representing the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime tell
a familiar story: Natural output declines more strongly than actual output so that the
output gap (see Figure 7.1b) becomes positive,23 which in turn puts upward pressure
on inflation. The central bank reacts by strongly increasing the nominal interest rate
23 This could be made more explicit formally. Since it is not the main concern, I only give the following
hints: Natural output moves in line with technology by Equation 〈F.36〉 (∂yˆnatt /∂aˆt > 0) whereas the
output gap depends on the difference of expected future and current technology (Et aˆt+1 − aˆt) in the
dynamic IS equation 〈7.32〉 which, given the technology process 〈7.11〉, yields a negative coefficient
([γa− 1]aˆt, i.e., ∂y˜t/∂aˆt < 0). Bringing in Equation 〈F.10〉, yˆt = y˜t + yˆnatt , then implies that the deviation
of actual output from steady state must lie between the two. With aˆt < 0 here, it is greater than the
(negative) deviation of natural output as the (positive) output gap is added to it; or vice versa, it is smaller
than the (positive) output gap as the (negative) deviation of natural output is ‘added’ to it.
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Figure 7.1a: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Galí
(2008) calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137.
and thus also the real interest rate. Given the decline in consumption as well as the
increasing nominal interest rate, real money balances decline drastically.
The remaining adjustments are more complex (which is the downside of not disman-
tling interdependencies further, see also ↗How Far Should the Model Be Reduced?, p.
132). In the setup of Figure 7.1a, surpluses are driven by changes in consolidated-gov-
ernment liabilities as well as inflation (see the additional Figure 7.1b, which features the
two non-zero summands on the right-hand side of Equation 〈7.42〉). While the reaction
to the former is as expected, one might wonder why higher inflation leads to an increase
in surpluses instead of lowering them on account of real devaluation of the outstand-
ing debt. The answer is that steady-state treasury debt and consolidated-government
liabilities are actually negative in this ‘conventional’ regime (see Table F.2 in Appendix
F.5); hence, the treasury reacts to the implicit transfer of wealth to the private sector
by increasing surpluses in order to restore its long-run creditor position (zSS < 0 in
the linearized surplus rule 〈7.42〉; see also Section 7.3.3.1 below for a brief analysis of
this phenomenon). As the influence of inflation wears off, consolidated-government
liabilities become the main driving force behind surpluses over time. With treasury ex-
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Figure 7.1b: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock (Adden-
dum). ⋄ Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: See Figure
7.1a. The variable names follow the logic of Table 7.3, where
sygap, spigap, sz, and smdenote the individual reactions of
surpluses sˇ to the output gap y˜, the inflation gap (pi − pi∗),
consolidated-government liabilities zˇ, and real money bal-
ances mˆ, respectively. Similarly, zlag, zigap, zpigap, zs, and
zm denote the summands on the right-hand side of Equa-
tion 〈7.39〉.
penditure remaining constant, surpluses have to be brought about wholly by transfers
to households.
In the explanation just above, it was taken for granted that surpluses move in line
with outstanding liabilities (i.e., fall). But why do consolidated-government liabilities
decrease in the first place? This can be explained along the summands on the right-hand
side of the respective law of motion 〈7.39〉 (and with the help of Figure 7.1b):
 Recurring to the interdependencies mentioned above, surpluses have a stake in
this, but it is rather small numerically.
 Noting that bSS and zSS are negative here, we have counteracting influences from
the nominal-interest and inflation rate gaps, increasing and decreasing the net-
creditor position of the treasury, respectively. In line with the Taylor principle, the
former effect outweighs the latter so that public-sector liabilities move deeper into
negative territory (claims on households grow larger).
 Real money declines strongly and, as indicated by the last summand, rids the trea-
sury of seigniorage earnings.
 The misconception that these falling real money balances could abruptly lower z
via their definition 〈2.28〉/〈F.42〉 is alreadydebunked in Section 5.1.3.2 (see↗Future
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Price Levels, p. 87; and it would of course contradict this very train of thought).
Rather, the first summand in Equation 〈7.39〉 embodies the logic behind consol-
idated-government liabilities: They are stocks that need to be rolled over. All
the other summands could thus be understood as ‘adjustments’ to this necessity.
(This is where the definition 〈2.28〉/〈F.42〉 has its place: With real money given
and consolidated-government liabilities just determined, it is upon treasury debt
to adjust.)
Considering the starting points of the impulse-response functions in Figures 7.1a-7.1b,
the ‘adjustments’ point to consolidated-government liabilities below their steady-state
value (coming out of steady state, the lag zlag/zˇt−1 is equal to zero), even with treasury
debt increasing to a less negative value and thus generating less interest income for the
fiscal authority.
Passive Monetary, Active Fiscal Policy The dashed lines in Figure 7.1a show some dif-
ferences in response to the technology shock if the treasury is the active policymaker
and monetary policy is passive: For one, the central bank does not raise the nominal in-
terest rate in response to increasing inflation. By consequence, the real interest rate has
a mildly attenuating influence on actual output and consumption (while natural output
behaves just as above). Surpluses, like treasury expenditure and transfers to households,
remain flat because γTZ = 0. Consolidated-government liabilities, whose steady-state
value is now positive (again, see Section 7.3.3.1), are devalued by inflation, and this ef-
fect is reinforced by the lag component zlag/zˇt−1 at first (see Figure 7.1b). Note that
the movements in treasury debt as well as money coincide with those in consolidated-
government liabilities, they are just hard to recognize because of scaling.
Evaluation Comparing the two regimes, it should be noted that output and consump-
tion recover slower in the fiscalist than in the conventional regime. Overall, the results
presented here are similar to those of Kim (2003, pp. 769-771). In particular, the model
exhibits “inflation reversal” in the passive-monetary/active-fiscal regime: Because the
central bank does not combat the arising inflation, an “inflation tax” accrues, and in the
absence of any reaction on the part of the treasury, intertemporal budget balance (i.e.,
the present-value budget equation 〈2.45〉) requires a negative inflation tax later on.
To add another reference, the impulse responses are also consistent with those in Galí
(2008, p. 55) who considers a favorable technology shock, i.e., εa > 0, but since the
models are ‘symmetric’ (because there is no zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate, for instance), the comparison is not complicated.
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Figure 7.2a: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Galí
(2008) calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137.
7.3.2.2. Interest-Rate Shocks
Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal Policy In Figure 7.2a, the central bank performs a discre-
tionary increase of the nominal interest rate of 1% that is persistent with the autoregres-
sive coefficient γCε = 0.5. Again, the events in the conventional case are familiar: The
real interest rate increases and depresses actual output as well as consumption. Natural
output, by contrast, remains unmoved so that the emerging negative output gap (de-
picted in the additional Figure 7.2b) puts downward pressure on prices. Following its
policy rule, the central bank reacts to inflation below target by lowering interest rates,
which is why the nominal rate never reaches the full value of the shock but starts at
about 0.6%.
Similar to Section 7.3.2.1, surpluses only react to inflation and consolidated-govern-
ment liabilities. In contrast to the technology shock, however, inflation also decreases
so that surpluses are below their steady-state value during the whole adjustment pro-
cess. Again, treasury expenditure has no part in achieving surpluses, this entirely falls
on transfers to households.
Consolidated-government liabilities, which are negative in steady state, decline be-
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cause higher rates award the treasury with more interest income (bonds are negative as
well again) and lower inflation transfers wealth to creditors. The decreases in surpluses
and money balances tend to push liabilities up, but are too weak numerically to coun-
teract the aforementioned effects noticeably. As before, higher treasury debt substitutes
for lower money balances.
Passive Monetary, Active Fiscal Policy With the Taylor coefficient set to zero, the interest-
rate shock can develop fully. The usual intuitionwould be that it should also pull up the
real interest rate which would in turn negatively affect the output gap. However, from
natural output (which remains flat) and actual output (which increases), we can infer
that this is not the case. Rather, the impulse-response functions resemble the events of
the flexible-price model described in Chapter 4.3.2.2: The higher rate leads to higher
interest income of the private sector, for one because it increases service on treasury
debt, but also due to lower money demand and the associated substitution into bonds.
With surpluses unchanged now and in the future, consolidated-government liabilities
increase, which is tantamount to an increase in private-sector wealth. Richer house-
holds spend more on consumption and thus drive up actual output as well as the out-
put gap. The resulting inflation is not answered by rate increases on the part of the
central bank; therefore, the real interest rate is not too far away from that of the active-
monetary/passive-fiscal regime. (It has to be noted, however, that consumption and
output start out below steady state. As Figure 7.2b shows, the reason is that the effect
of the increasing real interest rate outweighs that of the expectation term Ety˜t+1 in the
first two periods.)
Evaluation The analysis of an interest-rate shock is more interesting than a technology
shock since the former displays diverging behavior of some variables while adjustments
only differ gradually in the latter. In particular, output, consumption, and inflation di-
verge after the interest-rate shock.
Again, the results are similar to those in Kim (2003, pp. 768-769), who points out
that government liabilities increase for two reasons (substitution out of money and into
bonds as well as the higher interest rate on these bonds) in the fiscalist regime and that
output and consumption actually start below zero while inflation is elevated from the
beginning. He also offers an alternative explanation for this phenomenon: Because the
treasury does not adjust budget surpluses, increases in consolidated-government liabil-
ities have to be financed via an inflation tax so that inflation rises immediately despite
higher interest rates. Further references confirming the results obtained here are Galí
(2008; for the conventional regime only) as well as Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011;
for both regimes, but only four variables, namely consumption, output, the real interest
rate, and inflation).
Some differences arise in comparison to Kim (2003), whose impulse-response analysis
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Figure 7.2b: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock (Ad-
dendum). ⋄ Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: See Fig-
ures 7.2a and 7.1b. ISlead, ISipir, ISa, and ISg signify, re-
spectively, the lead, rate-difference, technology, and public-
spending summands on the right-hand side of the dynamic
IS equation 〈7.32〉.
ismore comprehensive than those of the other authors. For instance, the crudely defined
growth rate of consolidated-government liabilities (following from Equation 〈7.31〉),
∆zˇt ≡ zˇt − zˇt−1 = zt − zt−1|zSS| ,
deviates somewhat from the respective figure in Kim (2003). Further, transfers to house-
holds in this study and taxes (i.e., the opposite) in his both adjust from above steady state
in the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime, but this is likely due to differences in the
details about fiscal policy (expenditure rule 〈7.44〉 and his equivalent).
7.3.2.3. Surplus Shocks
Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal Policy Figure 7.3a displays the dynamic adjustment to
a discretionary reduction of surpluses by the treasury (εs = −0.01, γTε = 0.8). Fol-
lowing expenditure rule 〈7.25a〉/〈7.44a〉, public spending increases and leads to some
crowding-out of private consumption, but it is rather mild since actual output increases
as well. So does natural output, which is why the output gap opens up only a bit (see
Figure 7.3b) and inflation is not very pronounced. Still, the central bank adheres to the
Taylor principle and increases the nominal as well as the real interest rate accordingly.
Equation 〈7.42〉 lists and Figure 7.3b depicts the potential drivers of surpluses on the
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Figure 7.3a: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Kim (2003)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25a〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137.
right-hand side. Inflation plays a neglectable role numerically. Much more, surpluses
are driven strongly by the shock, at least in the beginning. As the latter dissipates slowly,
the influence of consolidated-government liabilities increases so that the deviations of
surpluses from steady state undergo a sign switch and turn positivemoving fromperiod
6 to 7, that is, after one-and-a-half years—the treasury makes good for the ‘profligacy’
of the early stages.
The effects on the remaining variables should be straightforward with the explana-
tions given in the previous subsections: Transfers to households (taxes) are a residual
and not very large quantitatively in comparison to surpluses and public spending. With
the nominal interest rate going up slightly, real money balances are in less demand. The
negative shock to surpluses increases consolidated-government liabilities initially, but
as explained just above, this feeds back into surpluses which then pull liabilities back
down towards steady state from period 7 on. In terms of model equations, treasury
debt is a residual of consolidated-government liabilities and real money; with regard to
a story behind the dynamics, the increase in it as well as the slight increase in interest
on it are an additional burden on the treasury in the ‘redemption phase.’
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Figure 7.3b: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock (Adden-
dum). ⋄ Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: See Fig-
ures 7.3a and 7.1b/7.2b.
Passive Monetary, Active Fiscal Policy When the treasury is the active policymaker, the
only influence on surpluses is its decision to implement a shock (impulse responses
that stay flat in both regimes are not shown in Figure 7.3b). Given that public spend-
ing moves inversely by Equation 〈7.25a〉/〈7.44a〉, transfers to households do not move.
Knowing that the treasurywill not balance its budget intertemporally by increasing sur-
pluses in the future, households consume more. This drives up actual output over and
above natural output so that the resulting output gap provokes inflation. With a pas-
sive monetary authority, however, the nominal interest rate does not react; rather, the
depressed real interest rate reinforces the boom.
Consolidated-government liabilities change only subtly. The (mathematically) posi-
tive influence of surpluses is overcompensated by the devaluation through inflation. All
in all, the maximal amplitude is -0.0069 in the fourth quarter, which is hardly noticeable
in the graph. Real money increasesmoderately for a transactions-demandmotive. Trea-
sury debt is also rather passive.
Evaluation With sSS = −0.001837 ≈ −0.002 (see Table F.2 in Appendix F.5) in the
active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime, a first-period shock of ϵst = −0.01 amounts to
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roughly five times the steady-state value of surpluses. In other words: It is huge. Yet,
considering the responses of other variables, its effects are moderate, if not miniscule.
By contrast, in the passive-monetary/active-fiscal regime, the same shock amounts to
‘only’ −100% given the steady state sSS = 0.01, but the consequences are way more
tangible with regard to central variables such as output, consumption, or inflation.
Further, the adjustment processes look very different in the two regimes: With mon-
etary policy active and fiscal policy passive, much of the ‘left half’ of Figure 7.3a (con-
sumption, the real interest rate, and inflation) shows only weak responses while the
‘right half’ is characterized by a long adjustment process far beyond the 20 periods de-
picted here—reversion to steady state actually occurs around period 40-50 for surpluses,
transfers to households, treasury debt, and thus also consolidated-government liabili-
ties. By comparison, the fiscalist regime offers an adjustment that could be called ‘quick
and dirty:’ 10 periods of increased consumption at the cost of high inflation, but hardly
any change in the ‘right-half’ variables.
7.3.3. Analysis of Particular Items
7.3.3.1. A Peculiarity of Surpluses in Steady State
Steady-state consolidated-government liabilities zSS are determined via Equation 〈F.19〉
in Appendix F.2.2:
zSS =
1
β−1 (1− γTz )− 1
[
(1+ iSS) sfix +
(
1− γTm
)
iSSmSS
]
In principle, this looks intuitive: β−1 is related to the gross real interest rate (consider
Equation 〈2.46〉, for instance, which states that β−1 = 1+ rt ∀t in the constant-endow-
ment economy). It is adjusted by taking into account how strongly the treasury reacts
to outstanding liabilities via the expression (1− γTZ). Next, it is turned into a net rate
by subtracting unity. Finally, the term in brackets sums terms representing the ‘fun-
damental’ part of treasury surpluses sfix and a potential seigniorage rebate (the expres-
sion [1− γTm]iSSmSS). In short, steady-state liabilities of the consolidated government are
equal to a perpetuity of a certain amount of surpluses.
The interesting part, however, is that the fraction in front of the brackets can be posi-
tive or negative depending on the fiscal regime. Trying out different calibrations reveals
that, with activemonetary policy, the Blanchard andKahn (1980) conditions are violated
for the system if γTZ < 1− β, while the other regime with passive monetary policy yields
a stable solution.24
24 To shed light on this, consider a somewhat crude line of reasoning: Combining the budget equation
〈2.37〉 (or its close relative 〈F.18〉) with surplus rule 〈7.23〉 yields a difference equation in consolidated-
7.3. Simulation 147
The peculiarity is that, in the regime with active monetary and passive fiscal policy,
a positive constant sfix leads to negative consolidated-government liabilities zSS and, by
Equation 〈7.23〉, to negative steady-state surpluses sSS. Of course, the latter two vari-
ables having the same sign is in line with the present-value budget equation (Equation
〈2.45〉, for example). Further, the ‘reversal’ between sfix and sSS does not occur with
passive monetary and active fiscal policy (γTZ = 0; see Table F.2 in Appendix F.5 for the
steady-state values).
7.3.3.2. Different Expenditure Rules
General Remarks Switching the expenditure rule from Equation 〈7.44a〉 to 〈7.44b〉 only
has unspectacular effects on the model outcomes. That there are any effects in the first
place is due to goods-market clearing (Equation 〈F.28〉 in Appendix F.3.1.4) which puts
treasury expenditure gˆ into a relationshipwith private consumption cˆ and actual output
yˆ; since transfers to households tˆTH pick up any slack by Equation 〈7.43〉, there would
be no effect otherwise. The respective impulse responses are given in Appendix F.5
(Figures F.2b-F.4h).
Technology Shocks The reactions of actual output yˆ and natural output yˆnat are a bit
stronger than under the initial rule 〈7.44a〉 used in the baseline results of Section 7.3.2.
Since the output gap does not open up just as wide, inflation and thus also the nominal
interest rate increase a little less.
Interest-Rate Shocks Results for interest-rate shocks are similar, but since the natural
output yˆnat is unaffected under rule 〈7.44a〉, the negative influence under rule 〈7.44b〉 is
more striking at first sight.
Surplus Shocks Fiscal-policy shocks to surpluses are the most interesting case because
they highlight the main features of the two policy regimes. Under rule 〈7.44a〉 (Figure
7.3a), treasury expenditure tracks the surplus shock εs and thus also affects output (pos-
itively) and consumption (negatively) in the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime. By
contrast, rule 〈7.44b〉 (depicted in Figure 7.4) makes public spending move in line with
private consumption in the same regime. However, nothing happens—and this is ex-
actly what the theory holds: Households know that passive (Ricardian) fiscal policy
government liabilities. Considering it in isolation (the original sin in this argument) reveals that it is
stable only if β−1(1− γTZ) < 1, which makes the fraction in the above equation (〈F.19〉) negative. Of
course, an isolated treatment of the equation is invalid because it is part of an equation system (which is
why I abstain from stating this ‘charlatanry’ even more explicitly). Taking it as a mere guideline for the
calibration of the linearized system (combining Equations 〈7.39〉 and 〈7.42〉 leads to the same isolated
stability condition) and trying to simulate this in Dynare, by contrast, is not forbidden.
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evens out surpluses over time, so there is no net wealth effect and therefore no reason
to adjust consumption. Results are different in the fiscalist regime: Consumption is ele-
vated under both rules (with only slight differences) because the surplus shock increases
households’ wealth perceptions and hence drives consumption, output, and inflation.
Figure 7.4: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Kim (2003)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137.
7.3.3.3. The Seigniorage Rebate
There are somemodest effects of granting the seigniorage rebate, but they are not strong
enough to change the general shape of impulse-response functions, for instance. This
might be considered a dispensable non-result, but at least the stylized fact that seignior-
age does not play a substantial role empirically (see Section 3.4.2) is reflected in the
model as well.
7.3.3.4. Admitting Reactions to the Output Gap
Another variation of the model is to let policy react to the output gap. In order to keep
regimes clear-cut, this is only done in the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime. The
reaction parameter is set uniformly to 0.125, a value used by Galí (2015, p. 68) for the
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Taylor rule and also transferred to the surplus rule here. While accounting for the out-
put gap in policy rules has some effects, they are mostly not drastic (which is in line
with a similar comparison within the model of Galí 2008; 2015; not shown). Therefore,
and in particular because the plots are barely distinguishable from each other visually,
only three examples are given in Figures F.5a-F.5c in Appendix F.5 while the remaining
figures are left out.
Some remarks are in order, though. If policymakers take the output gap into ac-
count, respective changes in impulse responses are most pronounced for surpluses and
consolidated-government liabilities. The reason for this is setting γTy = γCy , which im-
plies a stronger relative effect of the output gap on surpluses than on interest rates (cf.
the steady-state values in Table F.2). This can even lead to sign reversals, see the re-
sponse of consolidated-government liabilities to an interest-rate shock in Figure F.5b.
For the same reason, the responses to a surplus shock are so close together that they
might appear as the same line in Figure F.5c.
7.3.3.5. Target Inflation
Varying the inflation target pi∗ affects the steady-state nominal interest rate. However,
realmoney is the only variable that depends on the net rate (cf. Equation 〈F.41〉); in every
other instance, it appears as a gross rate. Therefore, only the impulse-response functions
for real money and real debt (which is calculated as the residual from real money and
consolidated-government liabilities by Equation 〈F.42〉) change notably if the inflation
target is adjusted. The respective figures are omitted for this reason.
Key Takeaways from Chapter 7
Adding the usual ‘New-Keynesian’ frictions complicates the baseline model to the
point where it can not be properly handled analytically anymore. Simulations of the
linearizedmodel confirm the previous findings, however: Aside from the conventional
regime, fiscal dominance constitutes another regime producing stable results.

8. Notes on the Monetary-Fiscal Model in
Practice: Empirics and Applications
This chapter indicates some empirical issues related to the ‘detection’ of policy regimes
by briefly covering simple as well as more advanced methodologies and referencing
possible fiscal interpretations of historical real-world episodes.
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8.1. Observational Equivalence in Simple Tests of Policy Rules
Surpluses One might be inclined to test for regimes by running a regression of sur-
pluses st on Bt−1/Pt and equate the resulting regression coefficients to γTB in rule 〈4.20〉
(St = γTBBt−1 or st = γTBBt−1/Pt, respectively). Bohn (1998) follows this approach, for
instance.
As Section 4.4.1 shows, if the coefficient associated with outstanding liabilities γTB is
positive, such a rule leads to a tautologic satisfaction of the present-value budget equa-
tion 〈4.4〉. Finding a positive regression coefficient could therefore be seen as evidence
of a active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime.
By way of contrast, consider a non-Ricardian surplus rule (γTB = 0) in the form of a
plain AR(1) process with γTs ∈ (0, 1):
st = γTs st−1 + ϵst
152 8. Notes on the Monetary-Fiscal Model in Practice: Empirics and Applications
Plugged into the present-value budget equation 〈4.4〉, this yields
Bt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
(
βγTs
)j
st =
1
1− βγTs
st ⇔ st =
(
1− βγTs
) Bt−1
Pt
.
Bringing st to the left-hand side, which is done in the equation after the equivalence
sign, demonstrates that the same regression as above (of surpluses on debt and the price
level) yields a regression coefficient in the interval (0, 1), which is likely to lead to the
fallacious conclusion that fiscal policy is Ricardian and follows surplus rule 〈4.20〉with
γTB ∈ (0, 1). A low level of outstanding debt is understood to require little surpluses.
In the true model, however, low surpluses (determined exogenously in a non-Ricardian
fashion) lead to a low real valuation of debt. The regimes are observationally equivalent,
that is, they can not be distinguished simply by ‘crunching the numbers.’ (Cf. Cochrane
1999, pp. 340-341. In making this argument, I use the setup of Chapter 4 because it
is the most parsimonious; nothing substantial changes if we switch to a richer model
including money and possibly more sophisticated policy rules.)
Leeper and Leith (2017, p. 2384) note that estimating just the policy rule (Equation
〈4.20〉 or the unnumbered equation above) suffers from simultaneity bias because the
“bond valuation equation” 〈2.43〉 is missing (cf. Wooldridge 2013, Chapter 16.2, for a
simple textbook treatment).
Interest Rates Similar objections can be made with respect to the Taylor rule. In the
context of a simple model, Cochrane (2011, pp. 573-574) shows that regressions of the
nominal interest rate i on the inflation ratepi do notmeasure the Taylor coefficient γCpi but
the serial correlation parameter of the policy disturbance, rendering empirical studies
in search of estimates for actual Taylor coefficients (such as Lubik and Schorfheide 2004)
useless. Again, the same equilibrium outcomes can be generated no matter whether
γCpi > 1 or γCpi < 1. The reason is connected to the way the New-Keynesian model works
(letting inflation jump to the only stable value for the sake of determinacy, see Sections
4.2.3 and 9.4.1).
8.2. Making Sense Of and With Vector Autoregressions
8.2.1. Introduction to a Tandem of Papers
The Tandem Canzoneri, Cumby, andDiba (2001b, pp. 1227-1231) try to tackle the ques-
tion of regimes empirically by employing and interpreting a vector autoregression with
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postwar U.S. data.25 Cochrane (1999) does the same but arrives at different conclusions.
Since both papers acknowledge and discuss the respective other, it is best to present
them jointly.
Notation The notation in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b) is different from mine
in two respects: First, they state outstanding liabilities of the consolidated government
as a beginning-of-period variable. Second, nominal variables are scaled on nominal
GDP Py in order to make the time series stationary (similarly, Cochrane 1999, p. 361,
scales on consumption c). Since I only repeat their arguments and do not carry out
empirical investigations myself, I ignore the second adjustment. With respect to the
first one, however, I define
Z′t ≡ Zt−1 ⇔ z′t ≡
Z′t
Pt
for the present chapter because it makes the analysis of leads and lags in time series data
more legible.
Theoretical Implications The underlying idea is that variables should behave differ-
ently over time in the two regimes: In the conventional case with active monetary and
passive fiscal policy, an increase in the current surplus st reduces the amount of future
outstanding consolidated-government liabilities z′t+1.
Matters are a bit more complicated in the fiscalist regime with passive monetary and
active fiscal policy. Repeating the corresponding present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉
in the current notation,
z′t = Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
I˙t+j+1mt+j + st+j
)
,
helps illustrating three distinct cases:
1. If the innovation in the current surplus st is not correlated with future surpluses
(and discount factors), there is no effect on current outstanding liabilities. This is
an implication of the above budget equation (shifted forward one period) inwhich
z′t+1 is only affected by surpluses from t+ 1 onwards.
25 Vector autoregressions have been proposed for use in macroeconomic contexts by Sims (1980). Prime
examples of applications to monetary policy are given by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)
and Stock and Watson (2001). Textbook treatments include Hamilton (1994) and Becketti (2013).
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2. Conversely, if there is a positive correlation between the innovation in surpluses
and future surpluses, the increased right-hand side of present-value budget equa-
tion 〈2.43〉 requires a similar increase on the left-hand side, that is, in z′t+1.
3. Finally, there could also be a negative correlation between the current innovation
and future surpluses.
The conventional regime and the first two cases of the fiscalist regime yield clear per-
ceived implications: If an increase in surpluses st is followed by a reduction in the real
value of outstanding liabilities z′t+1, the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime is iden-
tified. If z′t+1 does not fall, this implies the passive-monetary/active-fiscal regime.
Unfortunately, there still is the third case of the fiscalist regime. Since the innovation
is negatively correlated with future surpluses here, the right-hand side of the present-
value budget equation decreases, so the left-hand side must follow suit. In other words:
Real outstanding liabilities z′t+1 decrease in the subsequent period and thus lead to the
same result in the fiscalist as in the conventional regime. This possibly prohibits iden-
tification of the policy regime based on the sequence of surpluses and real outstanding
liabilities.
8.2.2. Empirical Findings
Vector Autoregression Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b) run a vector autoregres-
sion in st and z′t, examining reactions to exogenous shocks to the former. (I omit the
technical details because this is supposed to be an overview rather than a replication.)
Their Figure 3 is reprinted here as Figure 8.1; it shows that both orderings lead to similar
results:26 A shock to the surplus in one period leads to a negative response of liabilities
in the subsequent period (the dashed standard error bounds imply that this finding is
significant over the entire ten-year time horizon). As discussed at the end of the pre-
vious subsection, this could imply either the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime or
the third case of the passive-monetary/active-fiscal regime with a negative correlation
among surpluses.
Additional Stylized Facts As a hint as to which regime is actually in play, Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2001b, p. 1229) find significant positive autocorrelation in surpluses
26 The order of variables is a choice in the design of a vector autoregression and determines their reac-
tions to each other. If a variable is ordered first (or ‘at the top’), it is not affected by concurrent shocks to
other variables but might influence the latter. Conversely, variables ordered later (in descending order,
towards the ‘bottom’) are influenced by prior variables but do not affect these prior variables concur-
rently. Inverting the argument, variables should be ordered in ascending order of responsiveness to
changing economic conditions (sluggish ones first, highly reactive ones last). Since the ordering does
not seem to matter in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b), I leave it at this verbal description. See the
references cited in Footnote 25 if necessary.
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Figure 8.1: Vector Autoregression in Surplus/GDP and Liabilities/GDP. ⋄
Source: Reprinted from Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b,
p. 1228). ⋄ Explanations: In the top panels, the ordering places
surplus/GDP before liabilities/GDP; in the bottom panels,
the ordering is reversed (i.e., liabilities before surplus). See
also↗Vector Autoregression on p. 154.
over nine years while the impulse-response functions of the vector autoregression de-
picted in Figure 8.1 also show a positive reaction of surpluses in the first period after
the shock but nothing (significant) beyond that. In any case, it seems safe to rule out a
negative reaction of surpluses to a positive shock at least in the first ten years.
In addition, Cochrane (1999) presents several stylized facts about postwar U.S. data.
The most important of them are summarized in Table 8.1.
8.2.3. Alternative Explanations
The Conventional Regime as an Easy Explanation Explaining the impulse responses in
Figure 8.1 with the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime is straightforward: An in-
crease in the current surplus st decreases the real value of outstanding consolidated-
government liabilities in the next period z′t+1. The positive response of st+1 reinforces
this initial decrease. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b, p. 1229) argue that election
and business cycles typically span several years so shock terms such as εs in Equation
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no. variables stylized fact
1 ςi, ςm Seigniorage is an insignificant fraction of government revenue.
2 s, y There is a secular relation between surpluses and output; most
variation in the surplus is the predictable result of output
variation.
3 s, pi Surpluses and inflation are both procyclical; business-cycle move-
ments in inflation are positively correlated with the surplus.
4 s, pi Longer-term variation in the surplus and inflation are negatively
correlated.
5 s, z′ The surplus is very well negatively correlated with debt growth.
6 s, z′ The real value of debt moves much more slowly than the surplus.
7 s, z′ The level of debt is poorly correlated with the surplus.
8 z′ Real and nominal debt behave similarly over time.
Table 8.1: Stylized Facts About Postwar U.S. Data. ⋄ Source: Cochrane
(1999, pp. 361-363, 365, 368, 371). ⋄ Explanations: Replace
“debt” with “liabilities” to make the stylized facts more com-
patible with the rest of the thesis.
〈4.20〉 can be quite persistent. However, the fact that redeeming liabilities now leads to
a lower burden in the future (ceteris paribus) is not reflected in their analysis, at least not
within the first ten years they illustrate.
Solution to a Fiscalist Puzzle Following Cochrane (1999, p. 367), an AR(1) process for
surpluses can only explain a positive correlation between surpluses and debt (be re-
minded of Chapter 4.3.2 for the basic story and Section 8.1 for an actual AR[1] process
in use). However, this behavior does not match the stylized facts derived by him ear-
lier (p. 365-366) which hold that the level of real consolidated-government liabilities is
hardly and its growth rate is negatively instead of positively correlated with surpluses.
In order to explain these observations with a fiscal theory, he turns to a more com-
plicated story, arguing that this might be the more realistic case after all: In recessions,
surpluses go down because taxes plummet and public spending increases. The trea-
sury sells nominal debt to raise revenue, but “the only way extra nominal debt sales can
raise revenue is if they come with a promise to raise surpluses in the future” (p. 367).
Modeling surpluses as an AR(2) instead of an AR(1) process allows for the possibility
of lower surpluses now and higher surpluses later, where the latter increase the real
value of consolidated-government liabilities and thus implement the observed negative
correlation between current surpluses and growth in liabilities.
In terms of the analysis of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b), using the passive-
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monetary/active-fiscal regime to explain that z′t+1 falls after a positive shock to st is
only possible if the negative correlation between current and future surpluses is strong
enough to reduce their present value in spite of positive (or at least non-negative) correla-
tion during the first ten years. Importantly, they add that a policy which generates such
positive short-run and negative long-run correlations can not be related to any argu-
ment about redeeming outstanding liabilities at some rather distant ‘time of reckoning’
because it is a defining characteristic of active (non-Ricardian) fiscal policy that out-
standing liabilities do not play any important role in policy considerations (such as rule
〈4.20〉, see also↗The Bohn-Woodford Criterion, p. 77).
Artificial Statistical Model To achieve such a kind of policy, Cochrane (1999, p. 368)
splits the surplus into two parts: The short-term “business-cycle component” is driven
by output fluctuation at constant net tax rates (think of ‘automatic stabilizers’) while
the long-term component reflects tax and spending decisions that are deliberate policy
choices rather than reactions to business-cycle fluctuations (perhaps because a new gov-
ernment comes into office which implements taxation and spending levels that, ceteris
paribus, differ from those before). The short- and long-run components are negatively
correlated. This two-tiered surplus is then combinedwith a present-value budget equa-
tion into a simple model which is calibrated to match the stylized facts (see Table 8.1)
and results of a vector autoregression. Cochrane finds that his artificial model replicates
the observations well. In particular, it has surpluses and the real value of consolidated-
government liabilities, which equals the present value of the entire surplus stream in
the present-value budget equation, moving into opposite directions (see also Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba 2001b, p. 1230). The negative long-term correlation in the surplus se-
quence explains this property as well as the fact that the level of real liabilities does not
display a tight relationship with the surplus (the level is ‘getting mixed signals’ in that
the current surplus decreases while expected future realizations go up).
Inflation Smoothing Figure 8.2 is a copy of his Figure 12 and serves to illustrate his argu-
ment, summarized in what follows. The solid line depicts growth in real consolidated-
government liabilities while the dashed and solid-scored lines represent actual and sim-
ulated nominal growth, respectively. Inflation is not drawn in this figure, but can be in-
ferred as the difference between real and nominal growth (his Figure 11 plots actual and
simulated inflation and is an input in the construction of his Figure 12/my Figure 8.2).
His finding is that fluctuations in real and nominal liability growth are larger than fluc-
tuations in inflation, where the synchronization between the former explains the latter:
Growth in real liabilities is very volatile. The reason for inflation being relatively stable
in comparison is that nominal liability growth is also very volatile—in this way, fiscal
policy contributes to inflation stabilization. Consider two alternative policies for further
illustration: If nominal liabilities perfectly tracked real liability growth, there would be
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Figure 8.2: Simulated and Actual Debt Growth in Cochrane (1999). ⋄ Source:
Reprinted fromCochrane (1998 [sic!], p. 47; this figure ismore
legible than the one on p. 373 of the 1999 paper but seems to
be similar otherwise). ⋄ Explanations: See↗Artificial Statisti-
cal Model on p. 157.
no inflation; this would be an exaggeration of his view on actual policy. Conversely,
if nominal liability growth adhered to a ‘k% rule’ à la Friedman (1959) even in the face
of fluctuating real liability growth, the inflation rate would be much more volatile. (Cf.
Cochrane 1999, pp. 367, 372, 374.)
Mutual Objections In his↗Artificial Statistical Model, Cochrane (1999, pp. 369-370) de-
rives a very strong negative correlation between short- and long-run surplus innova-
tions (−0.95) from the stylized relationship between innovations in the surplus and the
real value of consolidated-government liabilities. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001b,
p. 1231) object that this high value can not be found in the available data and submit a
much lower value of 0.06 instead. Hence, while acknowledging the identification prob-
lems associatedwith testing for policy regimes, their conclusion is that the simpler story
with active monetary and passive fiscal policy is the more plausible explanation of U.S.
data.
Then again, Cochrane (1999, pp. 341-342; 2011, pp. 580-581) repeatedly insists on the
identification problems of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba’s approach to finding the fiscal
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regime, a critique he also extends to theirmonetary precursor, the study of Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler (2000).
8.3. Further Applications, Episodes, and Stories
Wartime US Woodford (2001, pp. 672-674, 684, 687-689) interprets Fed policy from the
1940s until 1951 as an interest-rate peg with the aim to stabilize the market value of trea-
sury debt and as an example of autonomous monetary policy in the sense of Section
4.2.2. In line with the fiscalist explanation of price determination, and accounting for
wage and price controls in place initially, the wartime deficits lead to accumulated infla-
tion pressure which eventually materialized in 1946-1947, whereas the postwar budget
surpluses in 1948-1950 resulted in deflation. With the Korea war putting upward pres-
sure on prices again, the ‘bond-price support regime’ was ended. During this phase,
non-existing interest-rate fluctuations can not explain price movements, and Woodford
adds that the causality between money and prices is opposite to the quantity theory in
that fiscal policy is taken to have determined prices while “growth of the monetary base
under this regime was purely a general-equilibrium phenomenon” (p. 674), that is, an
accomodation of money demand in order to maintain interest rates. (Woodford also
uses↗Long-Term Debt in his deliberations about this phase, see my p. 180 below.)
Further interpretations of postwarU.S. data also beyond 1951 can be found inCochrane
(1999) and Woodford (1999), for instance.
Brazil Loyo (1999) explains the 1980-1994 hyperinflation in Brazil27 by a change in the
macroeconomic policy regime: While fiscal policy is assumed to have been active all
along, monetary policy changed from passive to active in 1980. Like this, relatively
harmless (considering the experience of the 1970s) supply shocks suddenly induced
explosive behavior. Reconciling this analysis with the model developed so far is hard,
of course, since Chapter 4.3.3.1 tends to consider explosive paths as non-equilibria. Loyo
(1999, p. 27) seems to see the solution of the puzzle in the behavior of the central bank
which “may be the one expected to blink [i.e., give in and adjust policy] in the future,
and in the meantime inflation explodes all the same” (emphasis added).
Japan Many authors struggle with the case of Japan, which saw an increase in debt
relative to GDP from 56% in 1993 to 197% in 2014. At the same time, inflation rates av-
eraged 0.14%. The interbank rate lay at 0.44% on average (1993-2014, 0.16% on average
27 Inflation rates lay at roughly 100% in 1980, peaked at almost 3000% in 1989, and experienced a sec-
ond peak at over 2000% in 1993 according to the↗FPCPITOTLZGBRA data series from FRED (go to
↗https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
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between 1996 and 2014), indicating passive monetary policy.28 How does this match
the fiscal theory? Leeper and Leith (2017, pp. 2393-2394) call Japan a “poster child for
inconsistency in macroeconomic policies.” Policymakers failed to anchor expectations,
especially with regard to fiscal policy. Leeper and Leith suggest that this might not
even constitute fiscal dominance. After such a brief examination, two explanations are
conceivable: either fiscal dominance with monetary policy being passive and fiscal pol-
icy doing a very poor job of being active (fostering a perception of fiscal sustainability
which inhibits price-level increases via the usual wealth channel) or a system of mone-
tary dominance stuck at the zero lower bound (see Chapter 5.2.1).
The US During the ‘Great Recession’ In the United States, the Federal Funds Rate target
range has been near zero from December 2008 until December 2015, which could be
interpreted as an interest-rate peg. Analyzing this situation through fiscalist eyes, the
price level should then be determined by the present-value budget equation. Assume
for simplicity that surpluses are constant and focus on treasury debt only, at least in the
beginning. In terms of Equation 〈4.4〉, a constant right-hand side requires the same of
the left-hand side or, in the specific example, that
B2008
P2009
!
=
B2014
P2015
⇔ B2014
B2008
!
=
P2015
P2009
.
Since P2015 denotes the end-of-year-2015 price level, B2014/P2015 is used instead of B2015/P2016
in order to steer clear of rising interest rates in 2016 (i.e., of a departure from a peg).
Real-world data is also influenced by GDP growth. In order to solve this issue, we we
use logarithms to simplify the calculation (cf.↗Gross and Net Rates, p. 231) and decon-
struct growth in (lagged debt)/GDP. Further, we append the above requirement that
the ratio be constant:
ln
(
B2014
P2015Y2015
)
− ln
(
B2008
P2009Y2009
)
= ln
(
B2014
B2008
)
− ln
(
P2015
P2009
)
− ln
(
Y2015
Y2009
)
!
= 0
During the assumed interest-rate peg, federal debt in the hands of the public increased
by 91%; this corresponds to the first term in the middle. Real GDP growth, correspond-
ing to the last term, was 13%. Hence, in order for the ratio to stay constant, P2015/P2009
would have had to increase by about 69% (use exp[ln 1.91− ln 1.13] to find this), which
translates into an annual inflation rate of 9.1%. Actual inflation between 2009 and 2015
28 ↗FRED (cf. Footnote 27) data series ↗DEBTTLJPA188A, ↗FPCPITOTLZGJPN, and
↗IRSTCI01JPM156N, respectively. Leeper and Leith (2017, p. 2392) report debt-to-GDP figures
of 75% for 1993 and 230% for an unspecified ‘recent’ point in time; their average of inflation rates lies
at 0.21%.
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was 9% in total or 1.4% in average yearly rates.29 (Including monetary measures would
not ameliorate the ‘missing inflation’ result; since it increased by 132% over the same
timespan, it would rather exacerbate it.)
How should this divergence be explained? Is the fiscal theory pointless after all? Not
quite. As Leeper and Leith (2017, pp. 2392-2393) rightfully argue, the present-value
of surpluses not only depends on their sequence but also on discount factors. Kiley
(2015) and Holston, Laubach, and Williams (2017), among many others, find that the
real interest rate decreased markedly during and after the financial crisis, even moving
into negative territory, which increases the present value on the right-hand side of the
budget equation and thus allows for higher (instead of constant) Bt−1/Pt, that is, less
(potentially ‘missing’) inflation.
8.4. Concluding Remarks
Defeatism As a DSGEmodel, the fiscal theory describes—and within this world view,
observables correspond to—equilibria. Who or what (which agent, which variable) ad-
justs so as tomove from out of equilibrium into it can not be observed (Sims 1994, p. 399:
“The value of fiat money always depends on public beliefs about fiscal policy under
circumstances that are never observed in equilibrium.”). This applies to both stable
regimes within the fiscal-monetary model developed so far because the equations (inter
alia the present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉) are always the same; an empirical ‘regime
test’ is therefore not possible (cf. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 2001b, p. 1234). The sit-
uation is similar to the analysis of a market for an arbitrary product: Quantities and the
prices at which they are traded are observable, but the underlying supply and demand
curves are not. Vector autoregressions do not remedy this condition because the “se-
quence of price levels, surplus[es], and debt […] is a single equilibrium” (Cochrane 1999,
p. 338).
Pragmatism Leeper and Leith (2017, pp. 2832-2383) are less beat down about this obser-
vational equivalence for they seem to consider it a fact of life (in their words: a “truism”).
As already indicated above (↗Defeatism), observables are always considered equilib-
29 Data on the Federal Funds Rate stems from https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm
(↗link). The target range of 0.00%-0.25% announced on December 16, 2015 was in force until the first
increase to 0.25%-0.50% announced on December 17, 2015.
Data on federal debt in the hands of the public, base money, GDP, and consumer prices/inflation
stems from↗FRED (cf. Footnote 27, p. 159; time series identifiers↗FYGFDPUN,↗AMBSL,↗GDPC1,
and↗CPIAUCSL, respectively). Year-end values are represented by January 1 datapoints of the sub-
sequent years; for instance, P2015 corresponds to the 2016-01-01 datapoint in the CPIAUCSL series. Be
cautioned that most series are seasonally adjusted, only federal debt in the hands of the public (FYGFD-
PUN) is not; this is innocuous in constructing ballpark figures as the ones above, but any detailed anal-
ysis should of course be based on more carefully constructed time series.
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rium outcomes, so the underlying equilibrium conditions of themodel behave like iden-
tities in empirical work, rearrangements of which “do not impose enough structure to
distinguish between regimes.” Another way to put this is based on the ‘correlation does
not imply causation’ mantra, leading to the same conclusion that observed relationships
between surpluses and consolidated-government liabilities, for instance, can not discern
which regime is currently at play. Without additional identifying assumptions, it can only
be tested how well the model replicates factual relationships, but not which variant of
the model—conventional or fiscalist—is responsible for this.
In this respect, the fiscal is no different from the quantity theory: According to Leeper
and Leith (2017, p. 2383), Sims 1972 shows that the results of Friedman and Schwartz
(1963; for instance, that monetary policy shocks are a prime reson for volatility in nom-
inal income) are based on additional assumptions that identify “exogenous” money-
supply shocks. In short: Identifying restrictions turns the quantity equation into a quan-
tity theory; analogously, they can transform a fiscal equation (namely, the present-value
budget relation) into a fiscal theory.
Cochrane (1999, p. 325) sets out to “construct a plausible story for the time series rather
than pursue a test.” That is a constructive approach, but of course, it is questionable
whether it represents a satisfactory be-all-end-all verification strategy.
Key Takeaways from Chapter 8
Both simple as well as more advanced empirical approaches suffer from observational
equivalence. Finding regimes in real-world datamight therefore be amatter of arguing
about plausibility. A fiscalist story can be argued theoretically, but its assumptions
do not seem to be given in reality.
9. Discussion
I discuss the results obtained in the previous chapters along different criteria and
compare ‘my’ monetary-fiscal to traditional theory. Furthermore, I touch on the desir-
ability of fiscal vis-à-vis conventional price determination and list possible extensions
of the model.
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9.1. Debt Interpretations
9.1.1. Real vs. Nominal Debt
One implication of Chapter 4 not mentioned so far regards the distinction between real
and nominal debt. In principle, debt contracts are always entered in nominal terms
in the fiscal theory. The fiscal-dominance regime (see Section 4.3.2) demonstrates the
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consequence: The treasury does not adjust its surpluses to changes in real debt but
lets its budget equation (be it the flow version 〈4.3〉 or present-value version 〈4.4〉) be
satisfied through changes in the price level.
By way of contrast, monetary dominance represents an environment in which debt
can be considered real because the treasury has no way of debasing it via the price level.
In fact, its passive policy rule (Equation 〈4.7〉 with γTb > r) is what ensures that debt
does not change in present-value terms. To clear up semantics, it might not be entirely
correct to speak of ‘indexed’ debt in this context because the present model features no
indexation in the most common sense of the word: It is not Bt−1 (in the consolidated-
government budget equation 〈4.4〉) that changes in reaction to a rising price level but
the sequence of expected surpluses. In other words, households are not compensated
directly by an increase in the principal but indirectly by a expected future policy path
that recovers their wealth position.
9.1.2. The Stock-Price Analogy
A popular analogy in the fiscal-theory literature is the valuation of stocks. It is told
by Woodford (2001), Cochrane (2005b), and Sims (1997; 1999a), among others, but is
already indicated in Sargent (1982a).
The Analogy Consider the case of a firm which does not pay dividends but passes
its earnings on to investors by buying back shares. The market capitalization of the
company is given by the standard asset valuation equation
{share price}t · {amount of shares}t
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j · {earnings used for share repurchases}t+j
〈9.1〉
which is uncontroversial and, as Woodford (2001, pp. 694-696) notes, similar in form
to the present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉 (or any of its follow-up variants used else-
where in this thesis). The amount of shares in the stock-price example corresponds to
the amount of outstanding liabilities of the consolidated government in the theory of
price determination. While the analogy is often discussed in relation to a cashless econ-
omywith just debt, adding money to liabilities (as in definition 〈2.28〉) is unproblematic
because each single debt title promises payment of a single unit of currency, so both
components have the same dimension and unit of account. Without going into much
detail about the details of their generation (firms and governments have different ‘busi-
ness models’ after all: revenues minus cost versus tax volume minus public spending),
earnings used for share repurchases are likened to surpluses. Finally, stock prices are
analog to the inverse of the price level.
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Promising What? Calling the price level by its alias—purchasing power of money—
turns up a reference to the respective claim in each case. This is an important parallel
between both stories: Each entity promises to deliver a commodity that it can produce
itself. The company passes earnings on to investors by buying back its own shares.
The consolidated government, if it does not roll over or issue additional debt, can run
surpluses and redeem its debt or simply deliver money to the public. Its debt is “a
promise only to deliver more of its own liabilities” (Woodford 2001, p. 693).
Stock Splits and Currency Reforms A company doubling the amount of shares in Equa-
tion 〈9.1〉 without adjusting earnings projections is performing a stock split; the com-
monly expected only result is that the stock price halves. Assuming for simplicity that
the consolidated government only changes the monetary part of outstanding liabilities,
a similar increase ofmoney balanceswithout any other change in policy is a currency re-
form: Replacing the DeutscheMark by the Euro brings down consolidated-government
liabilities and the price level alike. (Cf. Cochrane 2005b, pp. 504/515.)
Historical Example While themechanics behind this could also be explained differently
(namely, with securitization), it is interesting to note that there is an example which not
only likens public debt to equity shares, but actually transformed the former into the
latter: the Bank of England shortly after its inception. In the beginning, it was a vehicle
to collectively hold public debt issuing shares to individual creditors of the British crown
(cf. Sims 1997, p. 2).
9.2. Budget Identities vs. Equilibrium Conditions
9.2.1. The Critique
Equilibrium Conditions To begin with a clarifying counterexample, consider the first-
order equilibrium conditions from an optimization problem: Their violation means
there is room for improvement that the respective economic agents will be eager to use,
but the mere fact that the economy is out of equilibrium is not impossible (even though
large parts of the literature, and obviously general-equilibriummodels, focus exclusively
on equilibrium). Alternatively, take goods-market clearing, the imposition of which
is often a prerequisite for equilibrium. Nonetheless, its violation is not an unrealistic
circumstance—actually, slack or tightness in many markets can be observed frequently,
if not more frequently than perfect market clearing.
Identities Budget constraints are different. Be it in or out of equilibrium, the consol-
idated government has to honor its liabilities or default has to be modeled explicitly.
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Either way, it all happens ‘within’ the budget constraint, which is always satisfied, us-
ing the variables it contains. Buiter (2002) states that fiscal price determination may
violate this identity: As argued above, equilibrium conditions can be met or not. But
if the price level as the last remaining free variable takes an off-equilibrium value, this
would be tantamount to a violation of the budget identity.
The Critics For this reason, Buiter (2002, p. 459) asserts that the fiscal theory is “fatally
flawed.” See also Marimon (1999).
9.2.2. Rebuttals
Currency Reforms Cochrane (2005b, pp. 504/515) argues that if the present-value bud-
get equation were a constraint instead of a valuation equation, the isolated currency
reform described in Section 9.1.2 would be impossible: Pulling up Equation 〈2.36〉, for
instance, holding all other policy variables (the amount of debt Bt, real surpluses st, as
well as the nominal interest rate it+1) constant as well as accepting the price level Pt and
of course all predetermined variables as given, there is no way to, say, strike three zeros
from Mt in order to bring the Italian Lira on par with the Deutsche Mark.
Admittedly, this line of reasoning is debatable since currency reforms, even more so
when announced early and performed cleanly, seem like something different than grad-
ual changes in one or several of the variables involved. Therefore, one could argue that
the described reform would actually divide the entire equation by 1.000, including the
price level Pt.
Stock-Price Analogy Taking a hint from the analogy in Section 9.1.2 also leads to the con-
clusion that the present-value budget equation is an equilibrium condition rather than
a constraint on consolidated-government behavior: If something drives up the share
price in Equation 〈9.1〉, the respective company does not automatically have to increase
its earnings used for share repurchases. Aside from price management to avoid hos-
tile takeovers, for which there is no direct analogon in the public-sector case, firms are
more or less unconcerned with their share price. Similarly, the consolidated govern-
ment does not have to increase surpluses should prices drift off the equilibrium path.
(Cf. Cochrane 2005b, p. 515.)
Derivation It can be checked in Section 2.3.2 how the present-value budget equation of
the consolidated government 〈2.43〉 is constructed: by combining the household bud-
get constraint 〈2.3〉 with (inter alia) goods-market clearing 〈2.27〉, which is an equilibrium
condition (cf. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 2001b, p. 1224). Market clearing may not be
satisfied out of equilibrium so the same is true for the consolidated-government present-
value budget equation 〈2.43〉 or its logical complement, the transversality condition
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〈2.42〉. (Cf. Cochrane 2005b, pp. 518-520. By contrast, the budget constraint of atomistic
households without market power, even when bundled into the ‘representative house-
hold’ construct, is an identity that must hold under all circumstances, but this is part of
the reason why the government is ‘special,’ see Section 9.2.3.) Leeper and Leith (2017,
p. 2316) support this derivation argument and add that “[t]he valuation equation im-
poses no restrictions on the government’s choices of future surpluses, in the same way
that the Fisher relation does not limit the central bank’s choices of the nominal interest
rate.”
EquilibriumConditions vs. Identities, Part II Extending on the above argument, Cochrane
(2005b, p. 518) further notes that “[b]udget constraints do not respect market clearing
conditions,” which can be underpinned by a simple example: If the budget constraint
reads ‘price · quantity = 200’ and the price turns out to be 100, feasible demand is two
units. If, however, there is only one unit of the good in question, satisfaction of both
market clearing and the budget constraint can only occur at a price of 200.
Kölsch Consider the following scenario: In the terminal period, outstanding nominal
consolidated-government liabilities in the amount of 100 e are institutionally backed by
100 bottles of Kölsch beer (the only good of this cheerful economy), stored in a treasury
warehouse or the central-bank vault. Obviously, the equilibrium price level is 1 e per
bottle.
If the auctioneer instead announced the off-equilibrium price of 0.50 e per bottle,
the final exchange would be 100 beers against 50 e of nominal liabilities. Households
can either passively accept that they are left with 50 e which are useless to them or
signal that they would be willing to trade these liabilities against Kölsch, possibly also
at prices less favorable to them. This is “money chasing goods” and might make the
auctioneer reconsider the announced price. Conversely, if the auctioneer announced 2
e per bottle, the final exchange would stop after 50 beers, which is when households
run out of nominal consolidated-government liabilities to trade with. The government
is left with 50 bottles which are useless to it.
Markets do not clear and households could increase utility via the appropriate trades,
so this is not an equilibrium. However, nothing forces—or constrains—the government
to engage in these beneficial exchanges. The fact that either households or the con-
solidated government keep something that is worthless to them is not impossible, it
“must be reflected in preferences, not constraints.” (The author of these quotes is a bit
more extensive in this argument, see Cochrane 1999, Section 2.3.4; 2005b, Section 3.2. A
combination of this example and the above reasoning with respect to↗Derivation also
corresponds to an explanation given by Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, p. 65.)
168 9. Discussion
9.2.3. End of Discussion
Taking Sides It may be clear from the way the previous section is written, but in my
opinion, the argument about the↗Derivation of the present-value budget equation over-
comes concerns about identities being violated. It is an equilibrium condition.
Additional Voices Critics and proponents of the fiscal theory are already named in the
respective subsections. However, there are some authors who argue in such a differen-
tiated fashion that it is hard to assign them to either group. For instance, Daniel (2001b,
p. 298) posits that the present-value budget equation “is an independent equilibrium
condition only if policy is non-Ricardian.” Given all of the above, however, this seems
like an acknowledgement that it actually is an equilibrium condition combinedwith the
oversight to realize that, just because Ricardian fiscal policy ‘willingly’ sees to its satis-
faction, it is not less of an equilibrium condition given such a fiscal policy (cf. Woodford
1996, p. 24, who writes something very similar to Daniel 2001b, but his surrounding
explanations clarify the matter).
Is the Government Special, and Why? There are several reasons why the government
could be considered special with respect to the discussion above. One is that it is a large
agent with the power to change prices instead of just taking them as given (cf.Woodford
2001, p. 693). The crucial point, however, is best made in two steps (cf. Woodford 2001,
pp. 693, 695-696; Cochrane 1999, p. 337; 2005b, pp. 516-517):
 Asmentioned before (↗PromisingWhat?, p. 165), and insofar as it does not forego
this possibility for some reason, the consolidated government in a fiat-money
economy relies entirely on liabilities it can freely create itself by issuing new to roll
over old debt or by honoring the commitment that nominal treasury debt stands
for and exchanging it for money—“[t]here is thus no possible doubt about the
government’s technical ability to deliver what it has promised; this is not an im-
plausible reason for financialmarkets to treat government debt issues in a different
way than the issuance of private debt obligations.” (Woodford 2001, p. 693) This
is why the consolidated government does not necessarily have to adjust its plans
to a constraint.
 Of course, by the stock analogy of Section 9.1.2, something similar holds for a
company that finances itself with equity, at least in principle. The difference be-
tween a firm and the consolidated government is that the ultimate liability of the
latter—money or, in a cashless economy, nominal debt—is typically also the unit
of account for the broader economy. If prices were expressed in terms of a certain
company’s stock or a certain household’s IOU, we would arrive at Buiter’s (2002,
p. 477) “[company or] household intertemporal budget constraint theory of the
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price level.” But since they are not, only the budget equation of the consolidated
government has the potential to determine the price level.
One of the reasons to deprive themselves of the convenience described in the first point
is of course connected to the ramifications of mistaking it for endless possibilities: Con-
solidated governments debasing nominal debt toomuch too oftenmight see themselves
forced to ‘go real’ by issuing debt in, or even altogether adopting, a foreign currency.
Regarding the unit of account, a somewhat circular argument can be added: If the
consolidated governments is special enough to be able to tax, it can choose to accept only
its own fiat money. This deters company shares or some random household’s liabilities
from becoming unit of account, reinforcing ‘specialness.’ (Cf. Cochrane 2005b, p. 502;
see also↗Frictions: An Argument About Form, p. 172.)
As a final note: Insofar as a (consolidated) government relying on nominal debt is
special, one has to be very careful in applying theModigliani andMiller (1958) theorem
to the macroeconomy (cf. Marimon 1999, for instance) because there is no analogue to
corporate debt.30
9.3. What Distinguishes the Fiscal from ‘Traditional’ Theory?
9.3.1. How to Achieve Determinacy
Multiple Equilibria Buiter (2002) gives a very explicit account in the context of a finite-
horizon model with money and comes to the conclusion that there are “multiple equi-
libria for the general price level sequence” (p. 470). Splitting up the money-demand
equation into two parts—one for the final period J (after which no money is held any-
more so that inflation drops out of the equation) and one for all previous periods t < J
(in which inflation is relevant)—he finds that one equilibrium first determines PJ as a
function of MJ in the final period J and then moves back through time to determine all
other Pt given the respectiveMt. Be that as it may, there are up to J additional equilibria
in which money is not valued (because of an infinite price level) in some of the final
periods.
Equilibrium Selection Although Buiter (2002) does not state this explicitly, it seems ob-
vious that the existence of a ‘meaningful’ (that is, for instance, finite) price-level se-
quence Pt depends on the characteristics and the public’s knowledge of the money-
supply process Mt. Woodford (1995) is more explicit in asserting that one can “solve
30 Since it might spring to mind immediately: Wallace’s 1981 paper titled “A Modigliani-Miller Theorem
for Open-Market Operations”, and especially its modern-day application, ‘Wallace neutrality,’ empha-
size the existence of a consolidated government sector, a notion that is taken as given here. In any case,
they do not argue whether the present-value budget equation is a constraint or an equilibrium condi-
tion.
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for Pt given the sequence Mt” (p. 15, emphasis added, variables in my notation). More
generally, he associates with quantity-theoretic works the notion to add some additional
requirement that helps select the ‘correct’ one out of a multitude of possible solutions
(pp. 14, 23). These deliberations hint at the possibility to distinguish two slightly differ-
ent approaches in quantity-theoretic literature:
 One is to equip the respective institutionwith a policy rule for the variable in ques-
tion. To give an example also referred to by Woodford, McCallum (1989, pp. 148-
155) analyzes a rational-expectations version of the Cagan (1956) hyperinflation
model and shows that Pt can be uniquely determined if themoney-supply process
Mt follows a rule that agents can include in their expectation-formation scheme
formally to eliminate the EtPt+1 component and thus obtain a closed-form solu-
tion.
 Another option is to exclude solutions in which real money either grows with-
out bound or asymptotically approaches zero (cf. Woodford 1995, p. 14). In the
rational-expectations context proposed here, it seems that this approach hinges on
the coordination of expectations towards the simplest, or ‘most convenient,’ equi-
librium. (At least this is a possible reading of Woodford 2001, who often avoids
strong assertions or adds some qualification to the proposed expectation coordina-
tion, see his pp. 701, 710, 712, 717, 719. It has to be noted that he argues in favor of
fiscal as opposed to quantity-theoretic price determination, but the ‘argument of
simplicity’ could just as well be used as a selection device only within the smaller
subset of quantity-theoretic equilibria.)
The main difference between traditional (quantity) and fiscal theory is therefore that
the former selects “the ‘correct’ solution on the basis of some criterion that does not
involve reference to the behavior of variables other than themoney supply and the price
level” (Woodford 1995, p. 23, emphasis added), i.e., which is “not derived from money
demand, optimization, or any other principle” (Cochrane 1999, p. 349), while the latter
recognizes that the ‘correct’ equilibrium can be found by also taking fiscal variables into
account.
9.3.2. Interest-Rate Pegs
Sargent andWallace (1975) provide the “familiar result” (Buiter 2002, p. 472) that interest-
rate pegs lead to indeterminacy. McCallum (1981) shows that this outcome depends on
autonomous policy; as soon as the interest rate is made to depend (even in the slightest)
on other endogenous variables, it vanishes. By contrast, the results obtained in Section
5.1.5 lead to determinacy even if the interest-rate peg is “pure” (Woodford 1995, p. 33),
that is, even if if the rate is not changed at all. (Much earlier, Begg and Haque 1984
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as well as Auernheimer and Contreras 1990 are credited with obtaining similar results;
unfortunately, their papers are hard to obtain nowadays.)
9.3.3. The Proportionality of Money and Prices
General Comparison In Sargent and Wallace (1981), there is a strong connection be-
tween money and prices. Monetary tightening is temporary at best because after some
(or even no) time, monetization takes over (potentially casting a long shadow in the form
of ‘inflation already now’, see↗Tighter Money Now, Higher Inflation Now in Section 3.5).
By contrast, the fiscal theory of price determination severs this connection. The case
studies in Section 5.1.3 demonstrate that movements of money and prices in opposite
directions (as in the ↗Tighter Money Now, Higher Inflation Now case of the unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic, Section 3.5) can be induced by one-off yet permanent changes in
money supply. What is more, the price level can change even if there is no deviation in
money supply at all, as exemplified by the ‘helicopter debt’ case study (Section 5.1.3.4).
Ultimately, all that is necessary to exert pressure on prices is a mere change in expec-
tations about the right-hand side of the present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉/〈5.4〉 (cf.
Woodford 2001, p. 684).
So, to clearly separate the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level from ‘traditional’ results,
McCallum and Nelson (2005, p. 566) suggest that “only cases in which the price-level
path veers away from the path of the money stock should be regarded as reflecting a
bona fide FTPL.” The notion of a “strong-form [fiscal theory]” (Carlstromand Fuerst 2000,
p. 23) goes in the same direction.
Hyperinflation Cochrane (1999, pp. 356-357) compares alternative explanations of hy-
perinflation, noting first that a rapid increase in money supply evokes this phenomenon
in the fiscal just as in the quantity theory. Then he goes on to a thought experiment
in search of the differences: In case the consolidated government issued (ultra-)short-
term debt instead of money (which is assumed to be kept constant) to finance its bud-
get deficits, the quantity theory predicts price stability whereas the fiscal theory still
predicts hyperinflation. Conversely, the explosive creation of inside money by private
issuers such as banks in a situation of solid public finances as well as stable base money
and debt would cause a hyperinflation in the quantity but not in the fiscal theory.
9.3.4. How Strong Is the Influence of Expectations on Current Prices?
Expanding on his examination of↗Hyperinflation, Cochrane (1999, p. 357) argues that
the influence of expectations about future budgets has different strength in the quantity
and the fiscal theory.
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Weak(er) in the Quantity Theory With transmission running through seigniorage in the
quantity theory, they mainly drive future price levels and inflation. The current price
level is only affected insofar as expected inflation curtails “Cagan-style”money demand,
which is associated with a rather low discount factor of around 0.15.
To make this clear, I borrow his money-demand equation (30)
lnMt = ln Pt + ln y−OVII (ln r+ lnEtPt+1 − ln Pt) .
(His p. 349, my notation. The reason for doing so is that replicating Cochrane’s for-
mal part of the argument with the specifications used in the corresponding part of this
thesis—Chapter 3, in particular utility function 〈3.12〉 and the resultingmoney-demand
function 〈3.13〉—is impossible because they would not yield a closed-form solution.)
Rearranging this into a difference equation in P (not shown) then leads to the solution
ln Pt =
∞
∑
j=0
(
OVII
1+OVII
)j 1
1+OVII
(
lnEtMt+j − ln y−OVII ln r
)
.
The solution is finite for typical interest elasticities of money demand OVII, which he
places at the mentioned value of 0.15. Goldfeld (1987) and Hoffman and Rasche (1991)
report values of 0.1-0.2 and 0.4-0.5, respectively. See also Lucas (1988) for, in part, higher
values.
Strong(er) in the Fiscal Theory By comparison, the stochastic discount factor v on future
budget deficits on the right-hand side of the present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉 is
rather high, usually around 0.95 or more depending on the interest rate. Future events
can therefore have a much stronger influence on current price levels in the fiscal theory.
9.3.5. Private Transactions vs. Tax Payments: The Value of Money
Frictions: An Argument About Form This remark might be denigrated as representing
the opposite of the ‘form follows function’ credo, but giving money or monetary policy
a role in the models that matches their perceived importance in real-world affairs is a
complicated thing inmodern economics. AsCochrane (2005b, p. 503) puts it: “Through-
out economics, frictionless competitivemodels are the benchmark, the foundation upon
which we add interesting frictions. Yet monetary economics has so far crucially relied
on a big friction at the short end of the yield curve in order even to start talking about
a price level.” Following his argument, the fiscal-theory literature offers a nice solution
as it is able to determine the price level even without money demand or without money
at all (cf. Cochrane 2005b, p. 506). Cochrane (1999, pp. 324, 329, 348, 354-355) deems
this a better representation of the actual (U.S.) economy than a model with very strict
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separation between money (used in transactions) and bonds (used for saving).
Taxes for Money Nonetheless, if money is to be there, he seems to favor the simple
approach of giving it value by making it a way to pay taxes (cf. Starr 1974, tracing it
back to Adam Smith later in Starr 2003, p. 470) over the quantity theory. This property
seems to make a fiscal theory of price determination especially convenient in the face
of financial innovation that threatens (or blurs) the “special demand for transactions-
facilitating assets” (i.e., money; Cochrane 2005b, p. 502). “The crucial change […] is that
an excess of cash is measured relative to tax liabilities that soak it up, not relative to a
transactions-based demand” (Cochrane 1999, p. 331).
Backing The ideal commodity standard promises a fixed parity between the means of
payment and a certain commodity ‘backing’ it (gold for instance). When a commodity
standard is dropped, the promise to exchange currency for the backing assets vanishes.
Following Cochrane (1999, pp. 332-333), the quantity theory does have an explanation
for the (surprisingly?) stable price level in the United States after the gold standard had
been dropped: The supply of money was already in line with the need for transactions-
facilitating assets of the public. The implicit question is whether this monetarist expla-
nation eventually disqualifies (if not then, maybe now or some time soon given the pace
of financial innovation).
The alternative interpretation is that the intertemporal fiscal policy stance had already
been such that the price level did not have to change dramatically. The fiscal theory
relies on the backing of government liabilities—with great resolve: It is not the stock of a
single arbitrary commodity that guarantees the (real) value of consolidated-government
liabilities but the entire (prospective) income stream of the public sector.
Using the example of exchange-rate pegs, this leads Cochrane (1999, p. 330) to assert
that they “do not fall to speculative attack when the government ‘runs out of reserves’;
they fall apart when the government becomes unable or unwilling to buy reserves.”
Solid consolidated governments can support a fixed exchange rate with very little re-
serves. By contrast, if the taxing capacity is considered too small, the consolidated gov-
ernment might not be able to acquire the foreign reserves necessary to defend the peg
anymore; this is even with a filled ‘war chest.’ Of course, this insight is not the genuine
contribution of Cochrane; following Sargent (1982b, pp. 45, 91), it goes back at least to
Keynes (1924; 1925).
The latter interpretation proposed by Cochrane (1999) leads to the conclusion that fiat
moneymust be backed by fiscal policy aswell, in the sense that its real valuewill decline
otherwise (cf. also Sims 1997, p. 4).
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9.3.6. The Fiscal Theory vs. the Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic in Particular
Real vs. Nominal Debt Sargent and Wallace (1981) assume real debt whereas the fiscal
theory considers nominal debt. The obvious qualification for the latter is that it can
behave as if it were real (in the monetary-dominance regime, cf. Section 9.1.1; cf. also
Leeper and Walker 2012, pp. 14-15).
Regime In the unpleasantmonetarist arithmetic, the fiscal authority sets budget deficits/
surpluses autonomously while the central bank conducts money-supply policy (cf. Sec-
tion 3.5). The core result is that the latter might not be able to control inflation for too
long: There is either a trade-off between less inflation now and more inflation later or
an even more unpleasant constellation in which tighter monetary policy (read: a lower
money growth rate) leads to higher inflation rates immediately. This setup aswell as the
outcome resemble the passive-monetary/active-fiscal regime laid out first in Chapter 4.
Contradicting the Grumpy Economist Cochrane (2005b, p. 523) claims that “Sargent and
Wallace’s indexed debt is equivalent to nominal debt and a Ricardian regime.” Consid-
ering the above notes about real vs. nominal debt, policy regimes, and the functioning of
themodel, it is hard to support this statement: In Sargent andWallace (1981), ‘contractu-
ally real’ (indexed) debt is financed by generating seigniorage through money creation
because the fiscal authority is behaving actively, that is, refusing to adjust surpluses.
Applying the↗The Bohn-Woodford Criterion (Section 4.4.1), this clearly constitutes non-
Ricardian fiscal policy. In contrast, the fiscal theory can only ‘simulate’ real debt by
assuming Ricardian policy, but it then has to be paired with active monetary policy—
read: no (fiscally induced) inflation—in order to yield sensible results. Producing a simi-
lar outcome as the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic (exogenous surpluses and a strong
movement in prices) is only possible through non-Ricardian fiscal and passive mone-
tary policy in the fiscal theory, and then it is achieved through a one-time wealth effect
rather than an attempt to generate seigniorage (cf. Leeper and Leith 2017, p. 2321). The
difference in transmission is also emphasized by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, pp. 1060-
1062) who call the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic a “fiscal theory of inflation” and the
modern literature (referencing Woodford 1995 and Sims 1994) a “fiscal theory of the
price level.”
Abandoning Seigniorage Picking up the above argument, Chapters 4 and 5.1.3, respec-
tively, demonstrate that the fiscal theory still works if there is no seigniorage to begin
with or if the government rebates it back to households. This is also what makes it more
appealing from a practical standpoint because, asmany commentators note, seigniorage
revenues play a miniscule role in developed countries (cf. King 1995, p. 171; Woodford
2001, pp. 670-672, 684; Leeper and Walker 2012, pp. 14-15, for instance; see also Section
9.3. What Distinguishes the Fiscal from ‘Traditional’ Theory? 175
3.4.2).
9.3.7. On Ricardian Equivalence
In Itself The notion that financing a budget deficit by issuing bonds or reducing it by
raising taxes are equivalent and, therefore, that the choice between the two options is
irrelevant for real variables (such as consumption, real rates, or wealth) of course traces
back to Ricardo (1821, Ch. 17). Barro (1974) is often credited with kicking off the dis-
cussions that are relevant nowadays, while the term ‘Ricardian equivalence’ stems from
Buchanan (1976, cf. Abel 2008).
In the ‘Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic’ With the main findings of Sargent and Wal-
lace (1981) in mind, Sargent (1982a, p. 385) calls fiscal policy Ricardian if “the issuing of
additional interest-bearing government securities is always accompanied by a planned
increase of explicit tax collections just sufficient to repay the debt,” whereas the oppo-
site regime (which is not explicitly called ‘non-Ricardian’ yet) consists of financing ad-
ditional government debt via seigniorage revenues. The same distinction is also made
by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985).
In the Fiscal Theory In the younger approach, Ricardian fiscal policy is classified by
the criterion that it ensures satisfaction of the transversality condition for all paths of
the goods and asset price levels (cf. Sections 4.4, 5.1.4, and Appendix C.2). Woodford
(1995, p. 26) effectively eliminates money from the consolidated-government budget
equation by giving seigniorage revenues back to the household via tax rebates; there-
fore, the respective transversality condition actually only applies to treasury bonds B.
However, Woodford (2001, pp. 690-691) clarifies that the ‘broader’ case in which the
transversality condition applies to total government liabilities (as in Equation 〈2.42〉) is
“conceptually preferable.” This is because, given a Ricardian fiscal policy, the present-
value budget equation 〈2.43〉 holds in any case, so the transversality condition necessar-
ily holds as well and adds nothing to equilibrium determination anymore. Naturally,
behavior of the treasury is similar to the Sargent quote above: if, for whatever reason,
real consolidated-government liabilities increase, the treasury (at some point in time)
reacts by raising taxes.
9.3.8. Precursors
The importance of fiscal policy for prices presented itself to economists not only when
Sargent andWallace (1981) did some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic or even with the
literature emerging in the 1990s (inter alia Leeper, Woodford), but much earlier. How-
ever, principles that are similar to to the ‘modern’ fiscal theory were often discarded as
special or unrealistic cases. For instance, Brunner and Meltzer (1972, pp. 953, 973) are
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said to foreshadow the fiscal theory by showing that deficits can drive up prices even (or
especially) if money is kept constant (which resembles the ‘helicopter debt’ case study
in Section 5.1.3.4) and, at the same time, do not really believe in it. Wallace (1981) is
given as a second example: Like the monetary-fiscal theory, his paper also describes
a situation in which the effects of a policy move of one agency (the monetary author-
ity in this case) depends on the policy design of the other. (Cf. Leeper and Leith 2017,
pp. 2309-2310.) Similarly, Woodford (1995, pp. 13, 30-31) already sees some of the argu-
ments about wealth effects and the (consolidated) government not being constrained by
given prices in Patinkin (1965) and Brunner and Meltzer (1976), although not in a form
as ‘pure’ as the theory presented by him (and here).
9.4. Convenience and Desirability of Fiscal Price Determination
9.4.1. Cochrane’s Fundamental Critique of the Conventional Wisdom
Focus Cochrane (2011) argues that one of the generally accepted notions about equi-
librium determinacy in the monetary DSGE universe is fatally flawed. However, pretty
much in the beginning, on pp. 569-570, he concedes that his arguments are mostly nega-
tive, and indeed, he does not lay out a clear alternative with the same confidence found
in his objections to conventional wisdom, which is why this summary of his remarks
ends up here as a note rather than in Chapter 4 as a ‘main attraction.’ Nonetheless, this
does not take away anything from the gravity of his assertions. I focus on the theoret-
ical challenges of determinacy, but his paper also puts forward some interesting and
arguable issues concerning empirical identification.
Nominal Explosions At the heart of his critique lies the fact that the Taylor principle
induces explosive behavior in inflation. Following the prevailing doctrine, it was as-
sumed in Section 4.2.3 that a diverging inflation path would lead agents to abstain from
considering it as an equilibrium, but Cochrane rightly argues that there are no economic
grounds for picking the unique stable equilibrium out of themultitude of candidate equi-
libria, all of which are valid for they completely satisfy the household optimality con-
ditions: “Transversality conditions can rule out real explosions but not nominal explo-
sions” (p. 566). Accepting this, inflation can not be determined by excluding explosive
paths of Equation 〈4.6〉 and is hence indeterminate. In particular, he contests the ‘future-
expectations-to-current-realizations’ direction of equilibrium formation promoted by
Woodford (2003b):
“The equations of the model do not specify a causal ordering. They are just
equilibrium conditions. […] If you see a small change today in an unstable dy-
namic system, your expectations of the future may well change by a large amount. If
you see the waiter trip, it is a good bet that the stack of plates he is carrying
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will crash. In new-Keynesian models, agents might well see a disturbance,
know the Fed will feed back on its past mistakes, think ‘oh no, here we go,’
and radically change their expectations of the future. They do not need to
wake up and think ‘gee, I think there will be a hyperinflation’ before reading
the morning paper.” (Cochrane 2011, p. 582, emphasis added.)
Stabilization vs. Equilibrium Selection What follows reads like a fundamental critique
of the entire New-Keynesian DSGE literature, or at least its mainstream interpretations
set out in the conventional regime with active monetary and passive fiscal policy. One
of the common threads of his paper is the distinction between inflation stabilization and
equilibrium selection. In short, the former is associated with sensible policy while the
latter amounts to ‘blowing up the economy:’ Equilibria in which unbounded inflation
can be stopped by (sensible) policy are not ruled out, so indeterminacy prevails. If this is
to be avoided, policy must prevent the respective equilibria from materializing instead
of stopping explosive processes—that is, it must threaten to create explosive processes
and thus blow up the economy.
Sensible Policy & Market Forces Cochrane argues that many of the proposals in this
regard are inconsistent or outright impossible. One such example is introducing a com-
modity standard in the face of high inflation while still trying to adhere to an active
Taylor rule. (Cf. pp. 566-568, 583-586).
At the same time, he suggests there are ways to achieve determinacy which rely on
market forces and plausible policies. In (plain) commodity standards or the fiscalist
regime of modern DSGE models, for instance, market clearing can only obtain under
the circumstances implied by consolidated-government policy, which “gives a strong
supply-demand force toward the equilibrium price” (p. 568, see also pp. 570, 578-579,
580 and↗Kölsch, my p. 167; cf. Obstfeld and Rogoff 1983, pp. 684-685; 1986, p. 354, for
the commodity standard). By contrast, no such market-forces argument can be made in
the conventional active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime (cf. pp. 567, 580).
Old- vs. New-Keynesian Logic Another distinction important to Cochrane is that be-
tween what he calls “old-Keynesian” and “new-Keynesian” models and logic (cf. pp.
566, 572). Much of this is mere repetition by now: The old-Keynesian story argues via
stabilization, that is, central banks raise nominal interest rates more than one-for-one in
response to increasing inflation so as to push up the real interest rate, depress aggregate
demand, and eventually bring inflation back to target. By contrast, in new-Keynesian
models, increasing the nominal interest rate would bring about even higher inflation
over time and lead the economy on an explosive path (cf. Section 4.2.3/Figure 4.1). Rul-
ing out such explosions (even if there are no economic grounds for doing so) only leaves
a single value that remains stable, to which the inflation rate then jumps.
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Taking the model of Taylor (1999) as an old-Keynesian example, however, Cochrane
(2011, pp. 601-604) reveals that one has to be careful in associating models with sto-
ries. In Taylor’s model, there are no forward-looking terms, which is why the dynamics
change completely: A sufficiently large Taylor coefficient (γCpi > 1) ensures stability in
a backward-looking solution procedure, whereas new-Keynesian models rely on insta-
bility of the system so as to obtain a forward-looking solution (recall the terminology
from↗Saddle-Path(-Like) Stability/Footnote 12, p. 80). The difference is that models like
that of Taylor are always determined and ‘only’ have to avoid spiraling out of balance
after shocks, whereas these shocks make new-Keynesian models jump to an entirely
new (and, following Cochrane’s argument, undetermined) equilibrium. In addition,
backward-looking solutions that solely depend on exogenous disturbances do not seem
satisfactory when “the whole point of the new-Keynesian enterprise is to microfound
behavioral relationships […] driven by expectations of the future, not memory of the
past” (p. 603). For these reasons, Cochrane cautions not to use old-Keynesian stories to
rationalize new-Keynesian models.
Ricardian Asymmetry To summarize with regard to the ‘convenience and desirability
of fiscal price determination,’ Cochrane’s (2011) paper more or less explicitly tends to
favor the fiscalist over the conventional regime. The principal cause of this “Ricardian
Asymmetry” (p. 580) is that fiscal price determination works through the transversality
condition (as a representative of the entire set of optimality conditions) whereas achiev-
ing determinacy in the active-monetary/passive-fiscal regime relies on arguable addi-
tional assumptions. In this light, one might even begin to consider the fiscal theory to
be more straightforward than the conventional rationale.
Reception In a short reply, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2017) cast doubt on Cochrane’s con-
clusions, especially with respect to the fiscal theory as a possible solution, noting that
multiple equilibria could also arise from fiscal policy rules. Whether the consolidated-
government budget equation really “depends on seigniorage revenue, which in turn is
driven by the demand for money and hence [...] by expectations” (p. 13, emphasis
added), making it prone to multiple equilibria as well, seems arguable considering the
possibility of a seigniorage rebate (cf. Chapter 5.1 and 9.3.6 in Section 9.3.6). Then again,
“given the reality of seigniorage frommoney creation” (p. 15), this argument can not be
easily discarded either. McCallum (2009a) utters critique based on an argument about
↗Learning (p. 179 in Section 9.5).
9.4.2. Further Issues
Gateway to Profligacy? Allowing for the theoretical possibility of a fiscalist regime in
modernDSGEmodels is not tantamount to having aprofligate consolidated-government
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that sends the economy into hyperinflation any minute now. Maybe this notion is best
explained by the fact that episodes of dramatical (hyper-)inflation are often tied to fiscal
roots. Be that as it may, “[b]ad economic policies can produce bad economic outcomes
in any policy regime” (Leeper and Leith 2017, p. 2391)—that is, also in the conventional
regime with active monetary and passive fiscal policy. Turning to a counterexample,
Cochrane (1999) presents an explanation of postwar U.S. data that rests on fiscal price
determination and a consolidated government which uses its liabilities to stabilize in-
flation (cf.↗Inflation Smoothing on p. 157).
Technical Similarities Both the fiscal and quantity-theoretic approaches to equilibrium
determination critically depend on a specific ‘technical’ requirement: the definition of
an entire sequence of a policy variable, either as an exogenous process or (more realis-
tically) as a policy rule. While Sections 5.1.2-5.1.3 demonstrate that the budget surplus
process can indeed exert a strong influence on the price level, the fiscal approach is
quite similar to the quantity-theoretic one in that it also requires the public to analyze
the policy process with the ensuing conclusion that it leads to a unique equilibrium.
Simply put: Just as the representative household has to know the entire money-supply
sequence in the quantity theory (cf. the first bullet point on p. 170), it has to know the
entire sequence of budget surpluses in the fiscal theory. This begs the question which
policy process is easier to understand and forecast for the general public.
9.5. Omissions and Possible Extensions
Learning There is widespread approval of the notion that rational-expectations equi-
libria are only plausible if they are learnable in the sense of Evans andHonkapohja (1999;
2001), that is, in an iterative process of adaptive expectation formation that converges
to the rational-expectations solution. However, opinions as to which of the two polar
regime satisfies this criterion (typicallywith the accompanying result that the respective
other does not) are divided and discussed intensively.
“To save the conventional wisdom,” as Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011, p. 947)
put it (hence implicitly concurring), McCallum (2009a) counters Cochrane’s (2011) ar-
guments about nominal explosions (cf. Section 9.4.1) by stating that the respective equi-
libria are not learnable and should therefore be discarded, leaving only the stable solu-
tion. This exchange goes into a second round: Cochrane (2009) argues that agents can
not obtain the information required for McCallum’s learning process (the Taylor coef-
ficient γCpi, cf. Section 8.1) and that the threat of the Fed to embark on an ‘unlearnable’
path would not “‘coordinate expectations’ on anything other than confusion” (p. 1113).
Finally, the “rejoinder” of McCallum (2009b) is not as forceful as the title might suggest,
offering a rather conciliatory tone. Still, consensus is not achieved.
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MSV & Learning A related discussion revolves around the learnability of different equi-
librium concepts. Since rational expectations on their own often lead to multiple equi-
libria, McCallum (1983; 1999) argues for a ‘minimal state variable’ solution which relies
on themethod of undetermined coefficients (Lucas 1972) and is constructed so as to lead
to a unique solution. In McCallum (2001), he describes a model with constant money
supply and fiscal policy similar to that of Chapter 5.1 and finds that the fiscalist does
not correspond to the minimal-state-variable solution; then, in McCallum (2003a,b), he
extends this analysis by showing that the fiscalist solution is not learnable in themoney-
instrument model (while the ‘monetarist’ minimal-state-variable solution is).
As Evans and Honkapohja (2007) show, however, the learnability criterion mirrors
the determinacy results presented in this thesis (see Chapter 4.3) when a setup such
as Leeper’s (1991) with the nominal interest rate replacing money supply as the cen-
tral bank’s policy instrument is adopted: If a unique rational-expectations equilibrium
exists—be it conventional or fiscalist—it is learnable; if there are multiple equilibria,
none of them are learnable. This puts the above result from McCallum (2001) into con-
text: Considering typical money-supply policy as active policy in the sense of Chapter
4.2.2 (Sims 1999b, p. 419, does so) makes the model doubly active, which is often asso-
ciated with explosions (see Section 4.3.3.1). The latter are often not learnable.
McCallum (2003b, pp. 1171-1172) also obtains these results, but chooses to believe
only in the regime with active monetary policy; in other (his own) words, he discards
the fiscal theory “[f]rom a practical perspective.” Woodford (2003a) voices strong dis-
agreement. While learnability is not the same as determinacy (cf. also Bullard andMitra
2002), he claims that it supports the latter much more than McCallum’s minimal-state-
variable solution. Another severe accusation is that McCallum (2003b) rules out learn-
able effects of public debt on the price level via his choice of a forecasting algorithm,
that is, by assumption.
Indexation Loyo (1999, p. 16) argues that, in practice, indexed bonds are not really real
bonds. Since price indices are not available in real time but only with certain lags, in-
dexed bonds should rather be seen as nominal bonds whose value is adjusted to lagged
inflation. Determination of the price level then occurs in the same way as for normal
nominal bonds.
However, this does not even seem to be the most important point. As discussed, inter
alia, in Section 5.1.4, it is the total amount of all consolidated-government liabilities that
is relevant in the present-value budget equation. Therefore, even if ‘really real’ bonds
had a share of 100% in the bond portfolio, the existence of nominal money M could still
save the fiscalist approach.
Long-Term Debt First, note that the maturity structure of debt is irrelevant for inflation
undermonetary dominance because the latter implies Ricardian equivalence (cf. Leeper
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and Leith 2017, p. 2326, see also Section 4.4).
According to Woodford (2001, p. 685), the main difficulty in including longer-term
bonds into the model (aside from greater algebraic complexity in general) is that the
level of outstandingnominal consolidated-government liabilitiesZ is not predetermined
in the familiar way anymore because it also depends on the current bond price Q. In
the context of his paper—the Fed’s bond-price support of the 1940s (see Section 8.3)—
however, the latter is constant via Equation 〈2.8〉 because the nominal interest rate i is
pegged so that fiscal price determination through the present-value budget equation
works in the usual way.
More generally, long-term debt interacts with monetary policy in determining bond
prices as well as price-level and inflation sequences. This happens via maturity and the
Taylor coefficient, respectively. In a rather verbal than formal description, the present-
value budget equation 〈4.4〉 can be reformulated to include longer-maturity debt as
{price of bond portfolio}t · {bond portfolio}t
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
βjst+j 〈9.2〉
(the choice of this specific present-value budget equation is for notational simplicity, the
argument extends to all other variants as well). In this equation, there appears another
variable on the left-hand side that can absorb exogenous changes of surpluses on the
right-hand side, namely, the bond-price expression (as a ‘price variable;’ the bond port-
folio as the ‘quantity variable’ is still predetermined even though it carries a time index
of the current period t).
How are effects from the right-hand side (such as a lower present value of surpluses)
distributed to the two adjusting variables? By a combination of two effects:
 The size of the Taylor coefficient determines expected inflation: Setting γCpi = 0
anchors inflation expectations at the target rate (Etpit+j = pi∗ ∀j in Equation 〈4.6〉
with εit = 0). Note that this also pegs bond prices. At the other end, setting the
Taylor coefficient to themaximal value forwhichmonetary policy remains passive,
γCpi = β
−1, anchors expectations at the current rate (Etpit+j = pit ̸= pi∗ ∀j, it
increases in the case of lower surpluses indicated before).
 Prices of bonds with maturity longer than one period react not only to current but
also to expected nominal rates or, equivalently, future inflation. At this, maturity
acts like an inverse discount factor so prices of portfolios with shorter maturity
react less strongly than those with higher maturity.31
31 From a technical perspective, long-term debt is often modeled in the form of perpetuities with geomet-
rically decaying coupons, which allows to vary the duration of the portfolio. Helpful explanations are
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Ceteris paribus, a given increase in current inflation Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 can lead to different
decreases in bond prices, depending on the Taylor coefficient and maturity. So for any
decrease of the right-hand side of the above equation, it is monetary policy which, by
choosing the Taylor coefficient γCpi, determines how much weight is carried by bond
prices in the numerator and the price level Pt in the denominator of the above equation,
respectively. To restate, pegging the interest rate and thus bond prices rate puts all of
the pressure on the current price level (on current inflation) whereas increasing rates in
the strongest passive way possible decreases bond prices and thus spreads out inflation
more evenly. To restate again, longer maturities and a higher Taylor coefficient lead to
lower bond prices and trade-off lower current for higher future inflation. The ‘present-
value’ effect is the same, of course, as the impulse coming from the right-hand side of the
equation is also the same in both polar extremes.32 (Cf. Leeper and Leith 2017, pp. 2326-
2328. Further references on long-term debt in the fiscal theory are Cochrane 1999; 2001;
2014.)
Regime Switching Regimes are not cast in stone. A strand of the literature that recog-
nizes this awards policies with the possibility to change (and change back) stochasti-
cally over time. The contributions of Davig and Leeper 2006; 2011; Chung, Davig, and
Leeper 2007; Bianchi 2012; Bianchi and Ilut 2014 are important, but also tend to muddle
the results. At this point, I conclude by pointing to the related argument by Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2001b) that adjusting surpluses to debt ‘every once in a while’ may
be sufficient to implement a Ricardian policy (see↗The Bohn-Woodford Criterion, p. 77);
something similar seems to hold in the case of regime switching.
Optimal Policy I only consider simple ad-hoc rules for monetary and fiscal policy, but
everything discussed here could of course also be cast within optimal-policy frame-
works. These quickly develop a larger scope both with regard to subject matters and in
their formal representation. Often, a socialwelfare (or loss) function for policy is derived
from the utility function of the representative household (Woodford 2003b, Chapter 6;
Walsh 2010, Chapter 8.6.2, for example, describe this approach using second-order ap-
proximations). The question of optimality also relates to the degree of price stability; in
particular, inflation is put into the context of other distortionary taxes. This literature on
given in Woodford (2001, p. 685), Bhattarai, Eggertsson, and Gafarov (2014, pp. 38-39), and Leeper and
Leith (2017, pp. 2325-2326), for instance.
32 These findings provide for a an interesting side note on the “Operation Twist” carried out by the Fed in
2011, which aimed at depressing long-term rates on treasury bonds by selling short-term in exchange
for long-term bonds in the hands of the public: From a fiscalist perspective, such a maturity shorten-
ing should lower price of bond portfoliot and thus require Pt to fall in order to keep the left-hand side
constant in the face of an unchanged present-value of surpluses—exactly the opposite of the intended
effect. (Cf. Leeper and Leith 2017, p. 2324.)
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the ‘optimal inflation tax’ (or ‘optimal quantity of money’) spans from Friedman (1969)
over Phelps (1973) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) to Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991),
to name only a few. More recent variants, in part with sticky prices or a greater focus
on fiscal policy, include Benigno andWoodford (2004), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011),
and Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008).
Strategic Games The present thesis is concerned with what happens given a certain
regime. But how does it arise? Answers to this question could be derived from model-
ing the coordination between monetary and fiscal policy as strategic games, that is, as
outcomes of optimal mutual reactions of two non-cooperative policymakers (which dis-
tinguishes this strand of the literature from ‘simple’ optimal policy mentioned above,
which typically considers jointly optimal, or cooperative, behavior). Work headed in this
direction is done by Bassetto (2002) and, more generally, Bassetto (2005). Dixit and Lam-
bertini extend the Barro andGordon (1983)model tomonetary and fiscal policies in gen-
eral (2000, 2003) and inmonetary unions (2000, 2001, 2003); this line of research does not
directly originate from the fiscal-theory strand, but is closely related and aware of the
latter. An important distinction, however, is that they argue mainly in terms of policy
targets (the similarity of preferences of both authorities) while most of the discussion
echoed here revolves around reaction parameters in policy rules that in most cases only
feature ‘their respective’ target variables (inflation but no liabilities for the central bank
and liabilities but not, at least not directly, inflation for the treasury).
Default Several authors criticize that typical renderings of the fiscal theory, which is
related to debt after all, do not model default (cf. Bohn 1999, p. 388; Obstfeld and Rogoff
2017, p. 13, for instance). And indeed, while it is often voiced that a devaluation of debt
through inflation is economically equivalent to partial default, many of the initial land-
mark contributions remain silent on its explicit occurrence. One exception is Cochrane
(2005b, p. 516), who briefly explains that outright default would not imply any changes.
To the same effect as↗Long-Term Debt (p. 180) in Equation 〈9.2〉, Buiter (2002) intro-
duces a “public debt revaluation factor” which has the potential to take some adjust-
ment pressure off the price level. Since non-Ricardian fiscal policy is overdetermined in
his account, this would not make the model indeterminate but only allow it to function
properly; in this way, “non-Ricardian regimes become Ricardian regimes and the fiscal
theory of the price level vanishes” (p. 478).
The issue is especially eminent in the context ofmonetary unions and fixed-exchange-
rate regimes. Uribe (2006) studies a model with active fiscal policy (and both active as
well as passive monetary policy as subcases) in which default is explicitly included.
Sokolova (2015) describes the trade-off between inflation and outright default.
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More Critique A point of criticism not mentioned so far relates to ‘time-zero’ liabili-
ties. According to Niepelt (2004), it is always simply assumed that the economy begins
with consolidated-government liabilities already outstanding, but if this assumption is
dropped, fiscal price determination fails. In a more or less direct reply, Daniel (2007)
suggests that the condition of the fiscal theory is not as bleak as purported by Niepelt.
Recently, Buiter also reiterated his critique of the fiscal theory (cf. Buiter 2017a,b; Buiter
and Sibert 2017).
More Analysis Of course, there are more sophisticated approaches to the solution of
rational-expectations DSGE models beyond the basic ‘verbally formal’ style of this the-
sis. Tan and Walker (2015) and Tan (2017) are recent papers with a focus on monetary-
fiscal policy interaction.
Whether this would necessarily be associated with less formal effort in the end is
questionable, but another alternative is to abandon the infinitely-lived representative
household and switch to Samuelson’s (1958) model of overlapping generations. It is
used by Barro (1974) and Wallace (1981), for instance, to discuss Ricardian equivalence
and what is now called Wallace neutrality, respectively. It should be noted that this
appraoch is clearly less popular nowadays (going by themere number ofworks utilizing
the respective modeling strategies).
More Applications Applications for themonetary-fiscal theory abound. As indicated in
Chapter 3, the consolidated-government budget equation offers several vantage points
for further study. Many recent discussions revolve around the central-bank balance
sheet (and sometimes even sense a “mystique” surrounding it, cf. Reis 2013): What hap-
pens if potential central-bank losses are not covered by ‘inverse remittances’ from the
treasury TTC anymore? (Cf. Benigno and Nisticò 2017.) Are terms like ‘central-bank
capital’ (or ‘equity’) meaningful in a fiat-debt world? Can a central bank ‘go bankrupt?’
(Cf. Hellwig 2014.) Does helicopter money work? Always? (Cf. Buiter 2014.)
Cut-Off Point The list of omissions and possible extensions could be continued for quite
some time. It would be interesting to studymonetary-fiscal interactions from a political-
economy perspective. Or to consider the interplay with macroprudential regulation in
a macroeconomic policy triangle. Or to go into more detail on policy mixes, that is, the
efficacy of different policy branches in achieving certain objectives (the present thesis
is mostly concerned with the influence of debt or consolidated-government liabilities
in surplus rules, but a typical treasury in a democratic country is probably just as con-
cerned with unemployment, for instance). At some point, however, one has to come to
an end and in the present thesis, the above pointers aside, this point is reached on page
179.
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Key Takeaways from Chapter 9
The present-value budget equation of the consolidated government is an equilibrium
condition, not a constraint on policy. The reason for its potential to determine the
price level in a backing-based story is that the ‘ultimate’ public liability—money—is
also the economy’s unit of account. By contrast, seigniorage does not play a major
role in modern theory. Whether a fiscal theory of the price level is desirable also
depends on an assessment of the viability of conventional theory.

10. Conclusion
Short Answers An extreme summary of the answers to the initial questions raised in
the introduction reads like this:
1. How do modern DSGE models work?—They employ forward-looking, rational
expectations and therefore have to select a unique equilibrium by ‘trimming’ all
other candidate paths.
2. What is the role of monetary and fiscal policy in this?—If chosen properly, they
generate an infinite amount of explosive paths which the selection device (the
transversality condition) rejects as equilibria and only a single candidate path
which passes.
Polar Regimes The thesis shows that the conventional way to achieve determinacy re-
quires specific circumstances. For one, the assumption of Ricardian fiscal policy is often
made only implicitly; sometimes its description is foregone altogether. More critically,
the conventional approach might not be able to establish determinacy at all, namely, if
nominal explosions are not considered sufficient to rule out the respective equilibrium
candidates. This latter position is controversial even though the transversality condi-
tion, which pertains to real variables, is the only such requirement that emerges from
within the optimization problem. The fiscal theory of the price level is a ‘new,’ alterna-
tive way to achieve uniqueness. It does not suffer from the above problem because its
pivotal point, the consolidated-government present-value budget equation, is derived
with the transversality condition already imposed.
Refusal Rather than repeat numerous other findings from the previous chapters, I
want to make some suggestions as to how they could be understood in their entirety.
One bone of contention is the stand-out role of fiscal elements, and some reactions to
fiscal price determination have a flavor of ‘that which must not, can not be.’33 Subscrib-
ing to this logic would be misguided in my opinion—it can (could) be. Fiscalist price
33 There is a consensus about the role of fiscal and monetary policy (cf. Goodfriend 2007; Bean et al. 2010
for anecdotal andKlein and Stern 2006; Fuller andGeide-Stevenson 2014 for survey-based descriptions):
The latter stabilizes the business cycle and, by a “divine coincidence” (Blanchard and Galí 2007), also
prices. Fiscal policy is considered to be mostly about real variables because it has discretion about
(re-)distribution and can be a determinant of long-term growth, but it should keep out of short- and
medium-term business-cycle management, which it would only complicate. However, it is important to
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determination is associated with the same set of equations as the workhorse model that
is considered to be the current ‘industry standard,’ the only difference being that the
former is not blind in one eye.
Appeasement But just because something can happen does not necessarily mean that
it will (or should, for that matter). The possibility of a fiscal regime does not automati-
cally imply profligacy. And fiscal price determination is not perfect either, it can also
fail to achieve determinacy if fiscal policy is misspecified. Admittedly, some authors
vividly advocate the fiscal theory as possibly the only truly viable approach to price de-
termination, but a less extreme, more nuanced position holds that it is not here to replace
conventional wisdom but to extend it.
Focus on Policy A related strategic advantage of a joint monetary-fiscal theory is that
it places more emphasis on policy than on modeling: Instead of calling certain models
flawed because they (supposedly inherently) lead to indeterminacy or explosive behav-
ior, we can describe the resulting phenomena as undesired outcomes of unfavorable
policy combinations. Of course, this comprehensiveness is not entirely new—Sargent
andWallace did the same for monetarismwith their ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,’
for example—but it is relatively new within the current vintage of monetary models.
A Case for No Change The downside of extending ‘purelymonetary’ models by amore
explicit description of fiscal policy is that it also broadens their (already extensive) for-
mal scope. Whether jointly-monetary-fiscal models can incorporate further complica-
tions (think of frictions on financial markets, for instance) and remain manageable ana-
lytically is arguable, to say the least.
Combining this argument with observational equivalence in the data could make a
strong case for choosing one approach and recognizing the respective other merely as
a valid alternative. Since empirical evidence seems slightly in favor of the conventional
‘Taylor-principle’ wisdom rather than pressing for a dogmatic overthrow, nothingmuch
could (or would have to) change in monetary economics.
Time Will Tell Then again, things do change sometimes: WhileMcCallum (1981, p. 328)
contended that “the use of an interest rate instrument is feasible, not that it is desirable,”
almost 30 years later, Bullard (2010, p. 339) notes that “[a]ctive Taylor-type rules are so
commonplace in present-day monetary policy discussions that they have ceased to be
controversial.” Maybe the fiscal (part of the) theory will some day also experience what
recognize that, while ‘true,’ these notions are separate. This is where dogma might lead to premature
conclusions: prices are seen as a short-term issue whereas the permissible forms of fiscal policy are
long-term; hence, they should not mingle.
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the nominal interest rate has gone through in the past as a tool of monetary policy and
eventually overcome ‘theory inertia.’
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A.1. Money Demand as a Determinant of Seigniorage
A.1.1. The Model of Calvo and Leiderman (1992)
Money (Super-)Neutrality In Calvo and Leiderman (1992, pp. 180-181), endowments
and thus also the real interest rate are constant (cf. Section 2.4). Consequently, gross
inflation Πt+1 adjusts to a given amount of money so as to satisfy Equation 〈2.14〉 (for
instance if the central bank constantly increases the nominal money supply at a cer-
tain rate). Neither the stock nor the growth rate of money have any effect on real vari-
ables, that is, consumption or the real interest rate. (In Walsh 2010, p. 155, this is simply
“assumed.” Indeed, using a sophisticated utility function like 〈3.12〉 complicates a for-
mal derivation profoundly, which is why I settle for the the ‘intuitive argument,’ going
through equations and determining endogenous variables.)
Money Demand Given the specific utility function 〈3.12〉
u(ct,mt) = ln ct +mt (OI −OII lnmt) ,
money demand 〈2.22〉 takes the form of Equation 〈3.13〉:
OI −OII −OII lnmt = it+11+ it+1 ·
1
ct
〈A.1〉
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⇔ mt = OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct
· it+1
1+ it+1
)
OIII ≡ exp[(OI/OII)− 1] is a shorthand.
Seigniorage Laffer Curve Combining thiswith the definition of interest-saving seignior-
age 〈3.11〉 leads to Equation 〈3.14〉 (and beyond):
ςit =
(
it
1+ pit
)
OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct−1
· it
1+ it
)
= (1+ rt)
(
it
1+ it
)
OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct−1
· it
1+ it
)
= (1+ rt) I˙tOIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct−1
· I˙t
)
At this, using the definition of I˙ 〈2.23〉makes finding the seigniorage-maximizing infla-
tion rate somewhat more convenient for it allows to write
∂ςit
∂pit
=
∂ςit
∂I˙
· ∂I˙
∂it
· ∂it
∂pit
!
= 0
⇔
[
(1+ rt)OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct−1
· I˙t
)(
1− 1
OIIct−1
I˙t
)]
·
[
1
(1+ it)
2
]
· [1+ rt] = 0.
The only way this can hold is if the last term in parentheses in the first bracket equals
zero:
1− 1
OIIct−1
I˙t = 0 ⇔ I˙t = OIIct−1
Rewinding the definition of I˙t and rearranging then yields the aspired end result 〈3.15〉:
OIIct−1 =
it
1+ it
=
(1+ rt) (1+ pit)− 1
(1+ rt) (1+ pit)
= 1− 1
(1+ rt) (1+ pit)
⇔ 1
1+ pit
= (1+ rt) (1−OIIct−1)
⇔ pimaxt =
1
(1+ rt) (1−OIIct−1) − 1
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It should be noted that this amounts to a steady-state analysis in which expected and
actual inflation rates are equal so that the expectation operator can be dropped.
A.1.2. Traditional Assumptions vs. Microfoundations for Seigniorage Laffer
Curves
Forms of Money Demand Appendix A.1.1 demonstrates the derivation of the money-
demand function 〈3.13〉. So far, neither money demand nor seigniorage have been ex-
pressed explicitly in terms of inflation but only in terms of the nominal interest rate
(Figure 3.1 implicitly used the Fisher equation to plot seigniorage as a function of infla-
tion). Catching up on this, Equation 〈3.13〉 eventually becomes Equation 〈3.17〉
mt = OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct
· it+1
1+ it+1
)
= OIII exp
[
− 1
OIIct
· (1+Etrt+1) (1+Etpit+1)− 1
(1+Etrt+1) (1+Etpit+1)
]
= OIII exp
{
− 1
OIIct
[
1− 1
(1+Etrt+1) (1+Etpit+1)
]}
= OVI exp
(
OV
1
EtΠt+1
)
,
where
OVI ≡ OIII exp
(
− 1
OIIct
)
= exp
(
OI
OII
− 1− 1
OIIct
)
〈A.2〉
and
OV ≡ 1OIIct (1+Etrt+1)
are used as shorthands.
By contrast, Cagan (1956) uses the formmC56,t = exp(−OIVEtpit+1) (OIV is yet another
coefficient, see Equation 〈3.16〉), which cannot be constructed within the present setup.
Figure 3.2 in the main text demonstrates that both forms have similar shapes in the
positive domain—at least at first sight. Several remarks on this ensue right below.
1. Sketches I have used more general forms (as stated in the figure itself) instead of
the actual money demand functions in order to abstract from the various coefficients.
While this does not take anything of importance away, it should be clear that the plots in
Figure 3.2 are sketches rather than exact representations of Equations 〈3.16〉 and 〈3.17〉.
2. Positive Limits While the dashed line representing the Cagan (1956) specification
converges to zero as inflation goes to infinity, the solid microfoundations line converges
to unity in Figure 3.2. Correspondingly, in Equation 〈3.17〉, money demand converges to
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the shorthand OVI. A closer inspection of its definition 〈A.2〉 requires taking the limits
as ct goes to zero and infinity, respectively:
lim
ct→0
OVI = exp
(
OI
OII
− 1− 1
0
)
= exp(−∞) = 0
lim
ct→∞
OVI = exp
(
OI
OII
− 1− 0
)
=

≫ 0 for OI ≫ OII
≈ 1 for OI ≈ OII
exp(−1) ≈ 0.368 for OI ≪ OII
The case in which ct increases towards infinity is a bit more complicated as it is unclear
a priori to what value the shorthandOVI converges. It depends on the two coefficientsOI
as well asOII: IfOI ≫ OII, the shorthand converges to a possibly large positive number,
decreasing the similarity between specifications. As OI and OII approach each other,
the shorthand goes towards unity. IfOI ≪ OII, takingOI/OII in the vicinity of zero, the
shorthand approaches exp{−1} ≈ 0.368.
3. Discontinuity It is also apparent from Figure 3.2 that there is a discontinuity in the
microfounded money demand function 〈3.17〉, namely atΠt+1 = 0, which corresponds
to a net inflation rate of−100%. However, the same problem always arises with seignior-
age 〈3.11〉, which features gross inflation in the denominator as well (cf. Figure A.1, to
which I also return at the end of this section). Therefore, said discontinuity can hardly
be seen as an impediment to the use of utility function 〈3.12〉.
4. Strong Deflation Finally, the behavior beyond this point (i.e., for deflation rates
greater than 100%) also differs. Consider the limit of money demand 〈3.17〉 as infla-
tion goes to minus infinity:
lim
EtΠt+1→−∞
[
OVI exp
(
OV
1
EtΠt+1
)]
= OVI exp
(
OV
1
−∞
)
= OVI
1
exp(0)
= OVI
Money demand converges to the shorthand OVI. This might be considered a peculiar-
ity brought about by the underlying mathematics, yet it also fits economic intuition: If
one is willing to consider infinite (or at least very high) deflation, any positive amount
of money yields infinite (or at least very great) purchasing power. Inflation can also
approach the discontinuity from below:
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inﬂation
money demand
seigniorage
Figure A.1:Money Demand and Seigniorage Using the Cagan (1956) Speci-
fication. ⋄ Source: Own illustration based on Cagan (1956).
⋄ Explanations: Even with a ‘well-behaved’ money demand
function, seigniorage exhibits a discontinuity and peculiar
behavior for (very) high deflation rates.
lim
EtΠt+1→0−
[
OVI exp
(
OV
1
EtΠt+1
)]
= lim
EtΠt+1→0+
[
OVI exp
(
OV
1
−EtΠt+1
)]
= OVI
1
exp(∞)
= 0
Money demand goes to zero (Figure 3.2 confirms this). Arguing this case economically
seems prohibitively more difficult.
Returning to Figure A.1, it stands out that the Cagan (1956) specification of money
demand 〈3.16〉 also leads to curious behavior of seigniorage beyond the discontinuity.
I abstain from explicitly stating the limits here and rather proceed to a solution (or a
‘quick fix,’ to be more modest).
Zero Lower Bound The arguments in Remarks 3 and 4 neglect the fact that nominal
interest rates can typically not fall below the zero lower bound, an omission that is also
embedded in the derivation of Equation 〈3.17〉 and, more generally, in many simple op-
timizing models (such as the one of Calvo and Leiderman 1992 used here). This often
seems to happen knowingly because, for one, incorporation of the zero lower bound
complicates computation and simulation (cf. Section 5.2.1 and Footnote 20 on p. 126),
but also when the focus lies on positive or hyperinflation and the associated high nom-
inal interest rates. Following this line of reasoning, Figures A.2 and A.3 reproduce Fig-
ures A.1 and 3.1, respectively, allowing the nominal interest rate it to take only positive
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Figure A.2:Money Demand, the Nominal Interest Rate and Seigniorage Us-
ing the Cagan (1956) Specification, Incorporating the Zero Lower
Bound. ⋄ Source: Own illustration based on Cagan (1956).
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Figure A.3: The Microfounded Seigniorage Laffer Curve, Incorporating the
Zero Lower Bound. ⋄ Source: Own illustration replicating and
expanding on Figure 4.1 in Walsh (2010, p. 155).
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values:
it = max [(1+ rt) (1+ pit)− 1, 0]
Note again that the actual underlying model does not make this correction (for the ar-
guments given above).
coefficient context first appearance
OI utility function of Calvo and Leiderman
(1992)
〈3.12〉 3.4.3, A.1.1
OII utility function of Calvo and Leiderman
(1992) model
〈3.12〉 3.4.3, A.1.1
OIII shorthand, money demand of Calvo and Lei-
derman (1992)
〈3.13〉 3.4.3, A.1.1
ϕ′ ‘simple’ alternative utility function 〈A.3a〉 A.1.3
ϕ′′ CES utility function 〈A.3b〉 A.1.3
ϕ′′′ CES utility function 〈A.3b〉 A.1.3
OIV money demand of Cagan (1956) 〈3.16〉 3.4.3, A.1.2
OV shorthand, money demand of Calvo and Lei-
derman (1992)
〈3.17〉 3.4.3, A.1.2
OVI shorthand, money demand of Calvo and Lei-
derman (1992)
〈3.17〉 3.4.3, A.1.2
Table A.1: Overview of Coefficients in the Context of Seigniorage Laffer
Curves.
A.1.3. Alternative Specifications without Seigniorage Laffer Curves
The result of a Laffer curve for seigniorage critically depends on the chosen utility func-
tion. Replacing 〈3.12〉 with a ‘simple’ logarithmic utility function
u(ct,mt) = ln ct + ϕ′ lnmt 〈A.3a〉
or a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function
u(ct,mt) =
[
ϕ′′c1−ϕ
′′′
t +
(
1− ϕ′′)m1−ϕ′′′t ] 11−ϕ′′′ , 〈A.3b〉
for example, yields markedly different results. Note that symbols with primes do not
signify derivatives but some variables or coefficients that are not specified in greater
detail. Furthermore, let equation numbering be a guide for the two subcases presented
here. Then, combining Equations 〈A.3a〉 and 〈A.3b〉, respectively, with 〈2.22〉 yields
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money-demand functions for both alternative cases:
ϕ′
mt
=
(
it+1
1+ it+1
)
1
ct
⇔ mt = ϕ′
(
1+ it+1
it+1
)
ct 〈A.4a〉
(Note that for the CES specification, parts of the outer derivatives can also be written as
[u(ct,mt)]
ϕ′′′ , which shortens the first line a little:)
(
1− ϕ′′) [u(ct,mt)]ϕ′′′ m−ϕ′′′t = ( it+11+ it+1
)
ϕ′′ [u(ct,mt)]ϕ
′′′
c−ϕ
′′′
t
⇔ mt =
(
ϕ′′
1− ϕ′′ ·
it+1
1+ it+1
)− 1
ϕ′′′
ct, 〈A.4b〉
Plugging 〈A.4a〉 and 〈A.4b〉, respectively, into the seigniorage expression 〈3.11〉 and
using the Fisher equation eventually yields seigniorage expressions that depend on in-
flation:
ςit =
(
it
1+ pit
)
ϕ′
(
1+ it
it
)
ct−1 = ϕ′
(
1+ it
1+ pit
)
ct−1
⇔ ςit = ϕ′ (1+ rt) ct−1 〈A.5a〉
ςit =
(
it
1+ pit
)(
ϕ′′
1− ϕ′′ ·
it
1+ it
)− 1
ϕ′′′
ct−1
⇔ ςit =
(
ϕ′′
1− ϕ′′
)− 1
ϕ′′′
(it)
ϕ′′′−1
ϕ′′′
(
1
1+ pit
) [
1
(1+ rt) (1+ pit)
]− 1
ϕ′′′
ct−1
⇔ ςit =
(
ϕ′′
1− ϕ′′
)− 1
ϕ′′′
(
it
1+ pit
) ϕ′′′−1
ϕ′′′
(1+ rt)
1
ϕ′′′ ct−1
⇔ ςit =
(
ϕ′′
1− ϕ′′
)− 1
ϕ′′′
[
(1+ rt) (1+ pit)− 1
1+ pit
] ϕ′′′−1
ϕ′′′
(1+ rt)
1
ϕ′′′ ct−1
⇔ ςit =
(
ϕ′′
1− ϕ′′
)− 1
ϕ′′′
[
(1+ rt)− 11+ pit
] ϕ′′′−1
ϕ′′′
(1+ rt)
1
ϕ′′′ ct−1 〈A.5b〉
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As shown in the left-hand panel of Figure A.4, the ‘simple’ result 〈A.5a〉 is a horizontal
line, that is, not affected by the inflation rate—at least as long as the zero lower bound
for the net nominal interest rate, which is incorporated into the figure but not explicitly
into the equations, does not bind. In the CES case 〈A.5b〉 (right-hand panel; also ad-
hering to the zero lower bound), seigniorage asymptotically approaches a certain value
determined by the coefficients. In short, none of these alternative specifications leads to
a seigniorage Laffer curve or a unique seigniorage-maximizing inflation rate (save for
border solutions).
Simple Speciﬁcation
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Figure A.4: Non-Laffer Curves for Seigniorage. ⋄ Source: Own illustration.
⋄ Explanations: The two panels’ ordinates range across dif-
ferent co-domains so that seigniorage levels from the two
specifications cannot be compared visually in this figure.
A.1.4. The Model of Bruno and Fischer (1990), Translated Into Discrete Time
A.1.4.1. Non-Negative Budget Positions with Logarithmic Form
Because of its logarithmic form, the very-right-hand side of Equation 〈3.29〉
Etpi
′
t+1 =
1
OIV
ln
(
µ′t
dt
)
=
ln µ′t
OIV
− ln dt
OIV
could be seen to imply that balanced budgets and budget surpluses are problematic
or even impossible, respectively: The logarithm of dt = 0 is minus infinity and that of
dt < 0 is not defined. However, a look at the term in themiddle reveals a solution (or yet
another ‘quick fix’) at least for the latter problem: If money growth is negativewhenever
the budget is in surplus, the fraction as a whole remains positive and can thus serve as
an argument for the logarithm.
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Figure A.5: Inflation as a Function of Money Growth, Accounting for the Pos-
sibility of Budget Surpluses. ⋄ Source: Own illustration based
on Bruno and Fischer (1990, p. 355) andWalsh (2010, p. 157).
⋄ Explanations: Plot of Equation 〈3.29〉 (the positively sloped
straight line is the equilibrium condition 〈3.27〉). As in the
basic case of Figure 3.3, the budget deficit enters as a nega-
tive intercept. In case of a budget surplus, money growth has
to be negative; similarly, in case of negative money growth,
there has to be a budget surplus.
As amatter of plotting the function (see FigureA.5), ifmoney growth turns negative, a
given value for the budget deficit is multiplied by−1 so as tomake it a budget surplus of
the same size. Similarly, given a budget surplus, onewould simplymultiply the range of
money growth rates by−1 as well. Especially the latter procedure shouldmake obvious
that the ‘original’ graphs associated with budget deficits are mirrored on the ordinate.
As shown by the figure, the result will be a unique equilibrium with negative money
growth rates in any case.
Of course, this does away with the ceteris paribus assumption because budget deficits
andmoney growth rates can not be analyzed independently of the respective other vari-
able over the whole range of values anymore (only locally, i.e., in either the positive or
negative domain).
Is it realistic that the consolidated government always and automatically coordinates
its policy stance in the way described above? Put differently, of how much use is a
model excluding these at least halfway realistic scenarios (the combination of a slightly
decreasing money supply and a budget deficit does not seem completely unthinkable)?
Again, there will probably be different opinions about whether one is willing to accept
that specific functional forms weigh on the model’s results so heavily.
Finally, bear in mind that the other, probably more severe problem has not been
solved: Even with mirroring, expected inflation still goes to minus infinity if the ab-
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solute value of the budget position approaches zero (and then normalizes again as the
budget position becomes larger). This is highly unrealistic.
A.1.4.2. Changes in Inflation Expectations Depending on Money Growth
Required ∆Etpi′t+1: Alternative Derivation The budget constraint 〈3.29〉 can be rear-
ranged such that the consolidated government’s budget deficit is ‘explained’ (see below)
by functions of money growth and expected inflation:
ln dt
OIV
=
ln µ′t
OIV
−Etpi′t+1 〈A.6〉
If the economy has been in steady state until (t− 1) and the government now decides
to increase money growth,
µ′t = µ′t−1 + ∆µ
′
t,
this also affects the above budget constraint. However, the budget deficit is not endoge-
nously determined by the other variables because the consolidated government consid-
ers it a policy choice and rather sets it exogenously. (To be precise, the consolidated
government is repeatedly set back in its pursuit of a certain real budget deficit because
of ever-increasing price levels; this is the crucial point.) To achieve this, the induced
effects of a change in money growth on both terms on the right-hand side of Equation
〈A.6〉 have to cancel out:
∆
(
ln dt
OIV
)
= ∆
(
ln µ′t
OIV
)
− ∆Etpi′t+1 != 0
⇔ ∆Etpi′t+1 = ∆
(
ln µ′t
OIV
)
=
[
ln
(
µ′t−1 + ∆µ
′
t
)
OIV
− ln µ
′
t−1
OIV
]
=
1
OIV
ln
(
µ′t−1 + ∆µ
′
t
µ′t−1
)
As a fraction of the ‘old value over new value’ kind, the argument of the logarithm
on the far right is a gross growth rate. Knowing that the logarithm of a gross growth
rate approximately equals the respective net growth rate, the last equation above can be
rewritten as
∆Etpi′t+1 ≈
1
OIV
·
(
µ′t−1 + ∆µ
′
t
)− µ′t−1
µ′t−1
=
1
OIVµ′t−1
∆µ′t,
which is the same result as Equation 〈3.33〉 in the main text.

B. Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1. The Basic FTPL Model of Leeper and Leith (2017)
B.1.1. Laws of Motion and Solutions for Inflation and Real Debt
B.1.1.1. Inflation
Law of Motion Expanding the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉 to
1+ it+1 = β−1Π∗ + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + εit
and equating it to the Fisher equation 〈2.47〉
1+ it+1 = β−1EtΠt+1
results in the difference equation in inflation 〈4.6〉:
β−1EtΠt+1 = β−1Π∗ + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + εit
⇔ Et(pit+1 − pi∗) = βγCpi (pit − pi∗) + βεit
Solution Rearranging the difference equation and iterating forward via (pi − pi∗) then
leads to the solution 〈4.9〉:
pit − pi∗ = 1
βγCpi
Et(pit+1 − pi∗)− 1
γCpi
εit
=
1
βγCpi
[
1
βγCpi
Et(pit+2 − pi∗)− 1
γCpi
Etε
i
t+1
]
− 1
γCpi
εit
...
⇔ pit = pi∗ − 1
γCpi
Et
∞
∑
j=0
(
1
βγCpi
)j
εit+j
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At this, it is implicitly assumed that
lim
T→∞
(
1
βγCpi
)T
Et(pit+T − pi∗) = 0. 〈B.1〉
Additional Derivations Plugging the solution into the Fisher equation 〈2.47〉 further
yields the equilibrium nominal interest rate 〈4.11〉:
1+ it+1 = β−1
[
Π∗ − 1
γCpi
Et
∞
∑
j=0
(
1
βγCpi
)j
εit+1+j
]
= 1+ iSS −Et
∞
∑
j=1
(
1
βγCpi
)j
εit+j
B.1.1.2. Real Debt
Law of Motion Equate the fiscal policy rule 〈4.7〉with the flow budget constraint of the
treasury 〈4.3〉 (solved for st and with Qt = 1/[1+ it+1] from Equation 〈2.8〉):
Bt−1
Pt
− bt
1+ it+1
= sSS + γTb
(
bt−1
1+ it
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
+ εst
Shifting forward one period and exchanging terms gives:
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
)
=
Bt
EtPt+1
− sSS − γTb
(
bt
1+ it+1
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
−Etεst+1 〈B.2〉
An intermediate step is to replace sSS. Rewrite the flow budget constraint of the treasury
as
st =
Bt−1
Pt
− bt
1+ it+1
=
bt−1
Πt
− bt
1+ it+1
Exchanging time-t expressionst with their steady-state equivalentsSS (orΠ∗, respec-
tively) and applying the steady-state version of the Fisher equation 〈2.47〉,
sSS =
bSS
Π∗
− bSS
1+ iSS
= bSS
(
1+ r
1+ iSS
− 1
1+ iSS
)
. 〈B.3〉
Plugging this into Equation 〈B.2〉 gives
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
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=
Bt
EtPt+1
− (1+ r) bSS
1+ iSS
− γTb
(
bt
1+ it+1
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
−Etεst+1.
Applying the Fisher equation again to find that
Bt
EtPt+1
=
bt
EtΠt+1
= (1+ r)
bt
1+ it
finally leads to Equation 〈4.8〉:
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
=
(
1+ r− γTb
)( bt
1+ it+1
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
−Etεst+1
Solution Again, rearrange the difference equation and iterate forward:
bt
1+ it+1
− bSS
1+ iSS
=
1
1+ r− γTb
Et
(
bt+1
1+ it+2
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
+
1
1+ r− γTb
Etε
s
t+1
=
1
1+ r− γTb
Et
[(
bt+2
1+ it+3
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
+Etε
s
t+2
]
+
1
1+ r− γTb
Etε
s
t+1
...
⇔ bt
1+ it+1
=
bSS
1+ iSS
+Et
∞
∑
j=1
(
1
1+ r− γTb
)j
εst+j
As before, this is also under the implicit condition that
lim
T→∞
(
1
1+ r− γTb
)T
Et
(
bt+T
1+ it+T+1
− bSS
1+ iSS
)
= 0.
Accounting for the fact that γTb = 0, the solution for real debt takes the form of Equation
〈4.13〉:
bt
1+ it+1
=
bSS
1+ iSS
+Et
∞
∑
j=1
βjεst+j
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Additional Derivations: Inflation The solution can also be plugged into the rearranged
flow budget constraint of the treasury 〈4.3〉 to extract equilibrium inflation:
bt
1+ it+1
+ st =
bt−1
Πt
⇔ Πt = bt−1
(
bt
1+ it+1
+ st
)−1
With the solution for real debt 〈4.13〉 as well as the non-Ricardian surplus rule 〈4.12〉,
this becomes
Πt = bt−1
(
bSS
1+ iSS
+Et
∞
∑
j=1
βjεst+j + sSS + ε
s
t
)−1
. 〈B.4〉
Rearranging the steady-state version of the treasury’s flow budget equation 〈B.3〉 gives
sSS =
bSS
Π∗
− bSS
1+ iSS
= bSS
(
1+ r
1+ iSS
− 1
1+ iSS
)
⇔ bSS
1+ iSS
=
sSS
r
=
β
1− β sSS.
〈B.5〉
Substituting this into Equation 〈B.4〉 then leads to Equation 〈4.14〉:
Πt = bt−1
(
sSS
1− β +Et
∞
∑
j=0
βjεst+j
)−1
Additional Derivations: Differential Equation in the Nominal Interest Rate Plugging the
inflation rate 〈4.14〉 into the Taylor rule gives
it+1 = iSS + γCpi
(
bt−1
sSS
1−β +Et∑
∞
j=0 β
jεst+j
−Π∗
)
+ εit.
Adding the assumption of i.i.d. policy shocks (εst ̸= 0, Etεst+j = 0 ∀j ≥ 1) and utilizing
the Fisher equation 〈2.47〉 turns the above equation into 〈4.15〉:
it+1 = iSS + γCpi
(
bt−1
sSS
1−β + ε
s
t
−Π∗
)
+ εit
⇔ it+1 − iSS = βγCpi
 bt−1
β
1−β sSS + βε
s
t
− (1+ iSS)
+ εit
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Shifting this forward one period, the policy shock term at t, εst, drops out:
Etit+2 − iSS = βγCpi
 bt
β
1−β sSS
− (1+ iSS)
+Etεit+1
This can be simplified further by using bt from the solution 〈4.13〉 as well as substituting
for sSS from Equation 〈B.5〉, resulting in Equation 〈4.16〉:
Etit+2 − iSS = βγCpi
 (1+ it+1)
bSS
1+ iSS
β
1− β
1− β
β
bSS
1+ iSS
− (1+ iSS)
+Etεit+1
= βγCpi (it+1 − iSS) +Etεit+1
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C.1. Legacy Models
C.1.1. Existence of Stationary State in Woodford (1995, Section 2)
The starting point for all three cases in Section 5.1.3 is a stationary state with constant
policy variables and price levels. Obviously, with zero inflation, nominal and real in-
terest rates coincide. Solving the stationary-state version of the law of motion 〈5.5〉 for
real outstanding liabilities, we have
ZSS =
1
β
[
ZSS + PSS
(
gSS − τTHSS
)]
⇔ ZSS
PSS
=
τTHSS − gSS
1− β . 〈C.1〉
Further, money demand 〈2.22〉 reads
um(·) = iSS1+ iSS uc(·) =
1+ rSS − 1
1+ rSS
uc(·) = β
−1 − 1
β−1
uc(·) = (1− β) uc(·) .
What are the arguments of um(·) and uc(·)? Starting with the latter, goods-market clear-
ing 〈2.27〉 implies c = y− g. Regarding the former, in the simple case of only monetary
liabilities (BSS = 0), MSS/PSS = ZSS/PSS. Then, with Equation 〈C.1〉,
um
(
τTHSS − gSS
1− β
)
= (1− β) uc(ySS − gSS) .
This implies that assumption 〈5.1〉 does not preclude a stationary state: (1− β) ∈ (0, 1)
and ySS − gSS is usually smaller than ymax so uc(ySS − gSS) > uc(ymax). Only the rather
hypothetical limiting case of β = gSS = 0 would lead to a violation. Finally, the same
is true in a situation with a positive amount of bonds; the argument of um would be
reduced by bSS, but this does not affect the satisfaction of assumption 〈5.1〉, which hinges
on the right-hand side of the above equation. (Cf. Woodford 1995, p. 20.)
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C.1.2. Change in Nominal Consolidated-Government Liabilities (Helicopter
Money without Bonds)
Dividing the deviating and initial variants of Equation 〈5.5〉 gives
Z˙t
Zt
=
(1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 + P˙tτ˙THt
)
(1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 + PtτTHt
) .
With the help of Equations 〈5.6〉 and 〈5.7〉 in the numerator and τTHt = τTHSS for the
initial variant in the denominator, this can be rearranged to
Z˙t
Zt
=
(1+ it+1)
[
Zt−1 + P˙t
(
τTHSS + o˙
Mt
P˙t
)]
(1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 + PtτTHSS
)
=
(1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 + P˙tτTHSS + o˙Mt
)
(1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 + PtτTHSS
)
=
(1+ it+1)
[
Zt−1 + (1+ o˙) PtτTHSS + o˙Mt
]
(1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 + PtτTHSS
) .
Since the initial situation was a stationary state, it holds that Zt−1 = Mt−1 = MSS =
Mt = Zt. Turning both Zt−1 on the right-hand side into Mt and, in the second step, the
Zt in the denominator on the left-hand side into Zt−1, we arrive at Equation 〈5.8〉:
Z˙t
Zt
=
(1+ it+1) (1+ o˙)
(
PtτTHSS +Mt
)
(1+ it+1)
(
PtτTHSS +Mt
)
⇔ Z˙t = (1+ o˙) Zt−1
C.2. Ricardian Fiscal Policy with Money
Similiarly to the procedure in Section 4.4, combine the surplus rule 〈5.9〉 with the re-
spective flow budget equation of the consolidated-government 〈2.40〉:
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
(
vt,t+1
Zt
Pt+1
)
+ I˙t+1mt + st = Et
(
vt,t+1
Zt
Pt+1
)
+ γTZ
Zt−1
Pt
⇔ Et
(
vt,t+1
Zt
Pt+1
)
=
(
1− γTZ
) Zt−1
Pt
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⇒ Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Zt+J
Pt+J+1
)
=
(
1− γTZ
)J+1 Zt−1
Pt
This is analogous to Equation 〈4.21〉 and thus implies that the respective transversality
condition
lim
J→∞
Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Zt+J
Pt+J+1
)
= 0
is always satisfied.
Also, rule 〈5.9〉makes the present-value budget equation 〈2.43〉 hold identically:
Zt−1
Pt
= Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
I˙t+j+1mt+j + st+j
)
= Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+jγTZ
Zt+j−1
Pt+j
= γTZ
Zt−1
Pt+j
J
∑
j=0
(
1− γTZ
)j
= γTZ
Zt−1
Pt+j
1
1− (1− γTZ) = Zt−1Pt+j 〈C.2〉
C.3. The Zero Lower Bound
C.3.1. The Null of the Taylor Rule
Adding unity on both sides of the Taylor rule 〈4.5〉 (or rather the respective part of
〈5.13〉),
1+ it+1 = (1+ i∗) + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + εit,
and then setting it+1 = 0 gives
1 = (1+ r) (1+ pi∗) + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + εit
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(note that we still consider a constant-endowment economy as described in Section 2.4).
This can be solved for pit with a few rearrangements:
γCpi (pit − pi∗) = 1− (1+ r) (1+ pi∗)− εit
= − (1+ r)pi∗ − r− εit
⇔ pit = pi∗ − (1+ r)pi
∗ + r+ εit
γCpi
=
γCpi − (1+ r)
γCpi
pi∗ − r
γCpi
− ε
i
t
γCpi
Since we are interested in ‘regular’ reactions to inflation instead of discretionary action,
we can discard the monetary policy shock εit here and obtain the critical value for infla-
tion piZLB as reported in Equation 〈5.14〉:
piZLB =
γCpi − (1+ r)
γCpi
pi∗ − r
γCpi
C.3.2. An Alternative Scenario for the Inflation Law of Motion
In Figure 5.2 of Section 5.2.1, the horizontal part of the phase line Etpit+1 = F(pit) and
the 45◦ line intersect, resulting in an alternative steady-state inflation rate pi′SS < 0 (a
stable deflationary trap).
This appendix describes an alternative scenario in which the phase and 45◦ lines do
not intersect. Figure C.1 provides an illustration. As in the main text, the inflation pro-
cess starts with an initial pi0 < pi∗ and progresses to point A, which corresponds to
Etpit+4, over time. Via point B, the process reaches Etpit+5 in point C on the horizontal
part of the phase line. Again, moving to the next value Etpit+6 requires to first move
the ‘current’ value Etpit+5 from the ordinate to the abscissa, that is, a horizontal move
to the 45◦ line (point D). In contrast to the scenario of the main text, however, the zero
lower bound does not bind here, so the central bank is actually expected to abide by the
Taylor rule 〈5.13〉 and set a nominal interest rate Etit+5 > 0. Consequently, the infla-
tion process does not remain at the level pi′(SS) but ‘takes another lap’ via E, F, and G. Of
course, it does not remain there now but repeats this cycle (D, E, F, G, D,…) indefinitely;
in terms of inflation rates, this shows up as infinite fluctuation between pi′(SS) and pi
′′
(SS).
(Such a limit cycle is consistent with the findings of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe
2001.)
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pi∗
pi′(SS)
pi′′(SS)
piZLBt
pi0
AB
C D
EF
G
pit
Etpit+1
45◦Etpit+1 = F(pit)
Figure C.1: Inflation Dynamics in Consideration of the Zero Lower Bound on
Nominal Interest Rates (Alternative Scenario). ⋄ Source: Own
illustration.
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C.3.3. A Surplus Rule for Liability Growth Targeting
Solving the liability growth rule 〈5.18〉 for outstanding liabilities gives
Zt = (1+ µZ) Zt−1.
Similarly, solving the consolidated-government budget equation 〈2.36〉 for outstanding
liabilities (dropping the ‘dis’ superscripts and using definition 〈2.28〉) yields
1
1+ it+1
Zt + I˙t+1Mt = Zt−1 − St
⇔ Zt = (1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 − St − I˙t+1Mt
)
.
Equating the above expressions for Zt then leads to Equation 〈5.19〉:
(1+ µZ) Zt−1 = (1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 − St − I˙t+1Mt
)
⇔ St = Zt−1 − 1+ µZ1+ it+1Zt−1 − I˙t+1Mt
=
it+1 − µZ
1+ it+1
Zt−1 − I˙t+1Mt
C.3.4. Law of Motion for Real Balances
Solve the implicit money demand function 〈2.22〉 for it+1 (under the continued assump-
tion that utility is additively separable):
it+1
1+ it+1
=
um(mt)
uc(ct)
⇔ it+1 = (1+ it+1) um(mt)uc(ct)
⇔ it+1
[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
=
um(mt)
uc(ct)
⇔ it+1 = um(mt)uc(ct)
/[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
Then solve the Fisher equation 〈2.47〉 for it+1 as well,
it+1 = β−1EtΠt+1 − 1,
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and equalize both results:
β−1EtΠt+1 − 1 = um(mt)uc(ct)
/[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
⇔ β−1EtPt+1
Pt
=
[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]−1
⇔
[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
1
Pt
= β
1
EtPt+1
Multiply throughwithMtEtMt+1 and note thatEtMt+1/Mt = µM to arrive at Equation
〈5.23〉:
[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
mtEtMt+1 = βMtmt+1
⇔
[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
mt =
β
µM
Etmt+1
⇔ Etmt+1 = µM
β
[
1− um(mt)
uc(ct)
]
mt
C.4. Debt Limits
C.4.1. Satisfaction of the Transversality Condition Under a Liability Limit
Finiteness of Planned Expenditure The following preparatory argument is a stream-
lined version of the respective deliberations presented in Woodford (2003b, pp. 64-70).
Consider again the iterated version 〈2.33〉 (J → ∞) of the present-value budget con-
straint, which is repeated here with the transversality condition 〈2.34〉 already in place
(the rearrangements in the second line also use Equation 〈2.17〉):
Zt−1 = Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j
[
Pt+jct+j + I˙t+j+1Mt+j − Pt+j
(
yt+j + tTHt+j
)]
⇔ Zt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
[
ct+j + I˙t+j+1mt+j −
(
yt+j + tTHt+j
)]
〈C.3〉
By assumption 〈2.31〉, the present value of disposable income (the term after the mi-
nus sign on the right-hand side) is finite. Rewriting it in real terms so as to make it
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compatible with Equation 〈C.3〉 gives
Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
yt+j + tTHt+j
)
< ∞
(dividing through by Pt and using Equation 〈2.17〉 does not invalidate Equation 〈2.31〉).
By implication, the difference between planned expenditure and disposable income—
i.e., the entire sum on the right-hand side of Equation 〈C.3〉—can only be infinite if
Zt−1/Pt is infinite as well. Woodford does not mention this explicitly in his treatment,
but it seems reasonable that this is not the case (to put it bluntly: why study economics
when there is infinite wealth initially?). Hence, the present value of planned expendi-
ture must also be finite:
Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
ct+j + I˙t+j+1mt+j
)
< ∞
By implication, the individual components of the sum (the present values of planned
consumption and money holdings, respectively) must be finite, too. Furthermore, to
achieve this over an infinite time horizon, individual summands must converge to zero
over time:
lim
J→∞
Et
(
vt,t+J I˙t+J+1mt+J
)
= 0 〈C.4〉
Technical Preparations Multiplying both sides of the implicit money demand equation
〈2.22〉 by −Et[βJmt+J/uc(ct+J−1)] and, in the second step, using Equation 〈2.16〉 gives
−Et
[
βJ
um(mt+J)
uc(ct+J−1)
mt+J
]
= −Et
[
βJ
uc(ct+J)
uc(ct+J−1)
it+J+1
1+ it+J+1
mt+J
]
= −Et
[
vt,t+J
it+J+1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
]
.
In order to be able tomake an argument below, it has to be shown that the far-right-hand
side is smaller than
Et
[
vt,t+J
(
1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
+
Qt+JBt+J
Pt+J
)]
,
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which can be done by writing down the respective inequality and rearranging:
−Et
(
vt,t+J
it+J+1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
)
≤ Et
[
vt,t+J
(
1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
+
Qt+JBt+J
Pt+J
)]
⇔ −Et
(
it+J+1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
)
≤ Et
(
1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
+
Qt+JBt+J
Pt+J
)
⇔ 0 ≤ Et
(
Mt+J +Qt+JBt+J
Pt+J
)
Since the last line repeats the first part of assumption 〈5.24〉, the posited inequality holds.
Automatic Satisfaction of the Transversality Condition Consider the following chain of
(in)equations:
−Et
[
βJ
um(mt+J)
uc(ct)
mt+J
]
= −Et
(
vt,t+J
it+J+1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
)
≤ Et
[
vt,t+J
(
1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
+
Qt+JBt+J
Pt+J
)]
≤ Et
(
vt,t+J
Mt+J +Qt+JBt+J
Pt+J
)
≤ Etvt,t+J z¯
The first two lines are explained above (see ↗Technical Preparations). The third line is
true if net nominal interest rates are non-negative, either because of an explicit zero
lower bound (as in Section 5.2.1) or because of the added assumption that policy simply
does not implement negative nominal interest rates. The fourth line is part of assump-
tion 〈5.24〉.
As stated by Equation 〈C.4〉, the right-hand side of the first line approaches zero as
J → ∞. Further, since z¯ is a finite value, the term in the last line also approaches zero
(assumingEtuc[ct+J ] < ∞, which is the case for positive consumption levels, cf. Footnote
2 on p. 30).
It is important to note that the term in the second line can be rearranged into the term
in the transversality condition 〈2.42〉 (using several equations from Chapter 2):
Et
[
vt,t+J
(
1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J
Pt+J
+
Qt+JBt+J
Pt+J
)]
= Et
(
vt,t+J
1
1+ it+J+1
Mt+J + Bt+J
Pt+J
)
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= Et
[
vt,t+J
(
vt+J,t+J+1
Pt+J
Pt+J+1
)
Mt+J + Bt+J
Pt+J
]
= Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Mt+J + Bt+J
Pt+J+1
)
= Et
(
vt,t+J+1
Zt+J
Pt+J+1
)
Since it is always bounded above and below by zero, and the whole chain of inequations
stems from an equilibrium condition (implicit money demand 〈2.22〉), the transversality
condition 〈2.42〉 is always satisfied.
C.4.2. Steady States with a Liability Limit
This section also assumes constant endowments (cf. Section 2.4).
The ‘Normal’ Steady State The unique steady state in the absence of a liability limit can
be found simply by settingEtZt+1/Pt = Zt/Pt−1 ≡ zSS in the consolidated-government
budget equation 〈2.40〉 (immediately substituting β for the stochastic discount factor v):
zSS = βzSS + I˙mSS + sSS ⇔ zSS = 11− β
(
I˙mSS + sSS
)
> 0
Additional Steady States Implied by the Liability Limit With the help of Equations 〈2.8〉,
〈2.23〉, and 〈2.28〉, the numerator of the central term in 〈5.24〉 can be rearranged to
Mt +QtBt = Mt +
1
1+ it+1
Bt +
(
I˙t+1 − I˙t+1
)
Bt
= Mt + Bt − I˙t+1Bt = Zt − I˙t+1 (Zt −Mt) = 11+ it+1Zt + I˙t+1Mt.
Combining it with the denominator again and substituting out it+1 by use of Equations
〈2.47〉 as well as 〈2.6〉 then yields
Mt +QtBt
Pt
=
1
1+ it+1
Zt
Pt
+ I˙t+1mt =
(
β
Pt
EtPt+1
)
Zt
Pt
+ I˙t+1mt = β
Zt
EtPt+1
+ I˙t+1mt.
〈C.5〉
The liability limit places two bounds on Equation 〈C.5〉. Starting with the lower one (in
steady-state notation):
βzSS + I˙SSmSS = 0 ⇔ z′SS = −β−1I˙SSmSS < 0
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Similarly, the higher one is given by
βzSS + I˙SSmSS = z¯ ⇔ z′′SS = β−1
(
z¯− I˙SSmSS
)
> z∗,
which lies above the ‘normal’ steady state z∗ if it is assumed that
z¯ >
1
1− β
(
βsSS + I˙SSmSS
)
> 0
(cf. Woodford 2001, p. 699).
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D.1. Present-Value Budget Constraints
D.1.1. Country-Specific Present-Value Budget Constraints
The Domestic household flow budget constraint 〈6.1〉 can be rearranged to
(
BD,Dt−1 + B
D,F
t−1
)
= Qt
(
BD,Dt + B
D,F
t
)
+ PtcDt − PtyDt − PttDTHt +MDt −MDt−1
and iterated forward via the total amount of bonds (BD,D + BD,F),
(
BD,Dt−1 + B
D,F
t−1
)
= Et
{
Vt,t+1
[
Vt+1,t+2
(
BD,Dt+1 + B
D,F
t+1
)
+ Pt+1cDt+1 − Pt+1yDt+1 − Pt+1tDTHt+1
+MDt+1 −MDt
]
+ PtcDt − PtyDt − PttDTHt +MDt −MDt−1
}
,
...
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j
(
Pt+jcDt+j − Pt+jyDt+j − Pt+jtDTHt+j +MDt+j −MDt+j−1
)
,
〈D.1〉
where the bond priceQ is replaced by the nominal stochastic discount factorV via Equa-
tion 〈2.19〉 and the transversality condition holds:
lim
J→∞
Et
[
Vt,t+J+1
(
BD,Dt+J + B
D,F
t+J
)]
= 0
Section D.1.2 just below demonstrates how the two adjacent termsMDt+j−MDt+j−1 in the
infinite sum can be rearranged such that
BD,Dt−1 + B
D,F
t−1 = Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j
(
Pt+jcDt+j − Pt+jyDt+j − Pt+jtDTHt+j + I˙t+j+1MDt+j
)
−MDt−1.
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Bringing Mt−1 to the left-hand side and applying the definition of ZDHt−1 〈6.6〉 then gives
ZDHt−1 = Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j
(
CDt+j −YDt+j − TDTHt+j + I˙t+j+1MDt+j
)
.
By utilizing the properties of↗Stochastic Discount Factors (p. 26), one arrives at Equation
〈6.5〉 (proceed analogously for Foreign):
ZDHt−1
Pt
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
cDt+j − yDt+j − tDTHt+j + I˙t+j+1mDt+j
)
⇔ Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
cDt+j + I˙t+j+1m
D
t+j
)
= Et
∞
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
yDt+j + t
DTH
t+j
)
+
ZDHt−1
Pt
D.1.2. Two Ways of Including Money in the Present-Value Budget Constraint
The (unpolished) present-value budget constraint 〈D.1〉 featuresmoney creation (MDt+j−
MDt+j−1) on the right-hand side. Limiting focus to this term, the infinite sum can be ex-
panded and rearranged:
Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j
(
Mt+j −Mt+j−1
)
= Mt −Mt−1 +Et
(
Mt+1 −Mt
1+ it+1
)
+Et
[
Mt+2 −Mt+1
(1+ it+1) (1+ it+2)
]
+ . . .
= −Mt−1 +Mt
(
it+1
1+ it+1
)
+Et
{
Mt+1
[
it+2
(1+ it+1) (1+ it+2)
]}
+ . . .
= −Mt−1 +Mt I˙t+1 +Et
(
Mt+1I˙t+2
1
1+ it+1
)
+ . . .
= −Mt−1 +Et
∞
∑
j=0
Vt,t+j I˙t+j+1Mt+j
At this, country superscripts as well as expectation operators are dropped to save on
space. Further, the above rearrangements utilize the properties of↗Stochastic Discount
Factors (p. 26).
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D.1.3. Union-Wide Present-Value Budget Constraint
Add the individual household budget constraints 〈6.1〉,
(
CDt +M
D
t +QtB
D,D
t +QtB
D,F
t
)
+
(
CFt +M
F
t +QtB
F,D
t +QtB
F,F
t
)
=
(
YDt + T
DTH
t + B
D,D
t−1 + B
D,F
t−1 +M
D
t−1
)
+
(
YFt + T
FTH
t + B
F,D
t−1 + B
F,F
t−1 +M
F
t−1
)
,
and use the goods-market-clearing condition 〈6.2〉 to substitute out Yt as well as Ct ,
leaving only Gt :
MDt +QtB
D,D
t +QtB
D,F
t +M
F
t +QtB
F,D
t +QtB
F,F
t
= GDt + T
DTH
t + B
D,D
t−1 + B
D,F
t−1 +M
D
t−1 + G
F
t + T
FTH
t + B
F,D
t−1 + B
F,F
t−1 +M
F
t−1
Then, use Equation 〈2.10〉 to substitute in surpluses St ,
(
MDt +QtB
D,D
t +QtB
D,F
t
)
+
(
MFt +QtB
F,D
t +QtB
F,F
t
)
+ SDt + S
F
t
=
(
BD,Dt−1 + B
D,F
t−1 +M
D
t−1
)
+
(
BF,Dt−1 + B
F,F
t−1 +M
F
t−1
)
,
and apply bond-market-clearing conditions 〈6.3〉 aswell asmoney-market clearing 〈6.4〉
to simplify:
Mt + SDt + S
F
t +QtB
D
t +QtB
F
t = Mt−1 + BDt−1 + B
F
t−1
⇔ BDt−1 + BFt−1 = Qt
(
BDt + B
F
t
)
+ SDt + S
F
t +Mt −Mt−1
In the next step, use Equation 〈2.19〉 to replace the bond priceQ by the nominal stochas-
tic discount factor V:
BDt−1 + B
F
t−1 = EtVt,t+1
(
BDt + B
F
t
)
+ SDt + S
F
t +Mt −Mt−1
⇔ BDt−1 + BFt−1 +Mt−1 = EtVt,t+1
(
BDt + B
F
t +Mt
)
+ SDt + S
F
t + I˙t+1Mt
Finally, use definition 〈6.8〉 to receive Equation 〈6.9〉:
ZUt−1 = EtVt,t+1Z
U
t + S
D
t + S
F
t + I˙t+1Mt
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Iterating forward in the usualway then yields the respective present-value budget equa-
tion 〈6.10〉.
D.1.4. Ricardian Policy Rules in the Union Present-Value Budget Constraint
Rewriting the union-wide present-value budget equation 〈6.10〉 as
BDt−1 + B
F
t−1
Pt
= −Mt−1
Pt
+Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
sDt+j + s
F
t+j +
I˙t+j+1Mt+j
Pt+j
)
and rearranging the money-related terms similarly to Appendix D.1.2 gives
BDt−1 + B
F
t−1
Pt
= Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
(
sDt+j + s
F
t+j +
Mt+j −Mt+j−1
Pt+j
)
= Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
[
sDt+j + s
F
t+j +
(
mt+j −
mt+j−1
Πt+j
)]
.
In combination with rule 〈6.15〉 for sFt , this turns into Equation 〈6.16〉:
BDt−1
Pt
= Et
J
∑
j=0
vt,t+j
[
sDt+j + 0.5
(
mt+j −
mt+j−1
Πt+j
)]
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D.2. Variables and Equations in the Monetary-Union Model
no. Equation description
‘normal’ equations
1-2 〈6.1〉 household flow budget constraints
3 〈2.5〉/〈2.7〉 Fisher equation
4 〈2.8〉 no-arbitrage condition for bond prices
5-6 〈2.12〉 first-order conditions with respect to consumption
7-8 〈2.14〉 first-order conditions with respect to money
9-10 〈2.15〉 first-order conditions with respect to bonds
11 〈6.2〉 goods-market clearing
12-13 〈6.3〉 bond-market clearing
14 〈6.4〉 money-market clearing
15-16 〈6.13〉 treasury flow budget constraints
‘mere definitions’
17 〈2.6〉 inflation rate
18-19 〈2.10〉 budget surplus of the treasury
20 〈2.16〉 real stochastic discount factor
21 〈2.17〉 nominal stochastic discount factor
22 〈2.23〉 opportunity cost of holding money
23 〈6.7〉 union-wide bond supply
24 〈6.8〉 outstanding liabilities of all public entities
Table D.1a: Equations Available for Equilibrium Determination in the
Monetary-Union Model. ⋄ Explanations: See↗Counting Vari-
ables and Equations on p. 110.
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no. variable determination description
D F U
‘truly’ exogenous
1-2 yD yF exogenous endowment
quasi-exogenous in the constant-endowment economy
3-4 gD gF policy treasury expenditure
5-6 cD gF 〈2.27〉 consumption
7-8 λD λF 〈2.12〉 Lagrange parameter for the budget constraint
9 r 〈2.15〉 real interest rate
endogenous by definition
10 Π 〈2.6〉 inflation rate
11-12 sD sF 〈2.10〉 budget surplus of the treasury
13 v 〈2.16〉 real stochastic discount factor
14 V 〈2.17〉 nominal stochastic discount factor
15 I˙ 〈2.23〉 opportunity cost of holding money
16 BU 〈6.7〉 union-wide bond supply
17 ZU 〈6.8〉 outstanding liabilities of all public entities
to be determined by equations or set exogenously by policy
18 M money supply
19-20 MD MF money demand
21-22 tDTH tFTH net transfers from the treasury to the household
23-24 BD BF bond supply
25-26 BDD BFF bond holdings (internal)
27-28 BDF BFD bond holdings (cross-border)
29 i nominal interest rate
30 P price level
31 Q bond price
Table D.1b: Overview of Variables in the Monetary-Union Model. ⋄ Explana-
tions: Two exogenous variables, five determined by policy;
see↗Counting Variables and Equations on p. 110.
E. Log-Linearization
This part of the appendix gives an overview about the methods used to linearize the
model of Chapter 7. It mostly resembles Zietz (2006; 2008), especially with regards
to brevity. Alternative references are Campbell (1994), Uhlig (1997; 1999), and Mc-
Candless (2008, pp. 95-100).
E.1. Taylor Series Expansion I
General Description A function F(+ ∆) can be expressed by a Jth-degree polynomial
function, or Taylor series,
F(+ ∆) ≈
J
∑
j=0
F(j)()
j!
∆j
or F(+ ∆) ≡
J
∑
j=0
F(j)()
j!
∆j + remainderJ ,
where the superscript (j) indicates the jth derivative of F(·). The difference between
the approximative Taylor series and the original function is often called the remainder,
which is increasing in ∆ and decreasing in J—in otherwords, the approximation ismore
precise closer to  and the higher the degree J (Simon and Blume 2006, pp. 827-831).
Specific Application Macroeconomic applications oftenuse first- or second-degree Taylor-
series approximations of a discrete-time variable t around its steady state value SS:
F(t) ≈
J
∑
j=0
F(j) (SS)
j!
(t −SS)j
Since 0! = 1, this becomes
F(t) ≈ F(SS) +F′(SS) (t −SS)
F(t) ≈ F(SS) +F′(SS) (t −SS) + 12 F
′′(SS) (t −SS)2 ,
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where the approximation (remainder, if itwere stated) of the second line is better (smaller)
than that of the first one.
Multivariate Functions Functions of more than one variable are approximated similarly
in principle, but the necessary additional computations typically make it more tedious.
Just to give an impression, consider the second-degree Taylor series of a function of two
variables in the general ‘notation’ (cf. Simon and Blume 2006, pp. 832-833):
F(+ ∆,©+∇) ≈ F(,©) +F(,©)∆+F©(,©)∇
+
1
2
[
F(,©)∆2 + 2F©(,©)∆∇+F©©(,©)∇2
]
In amacroeconomic context, the respective first- and second-order Taylor-series approx-
imations are of the following forms:
F(t,©t) ≈ F(SS,©SS) +F(SS,©SS) (t −SS) +F©(SS,©SS) (©t −©SS)
F(t,©t) ≈ F(SS,©SS) +F(SS,©SS) (t −SS) +F©(SS,©SS) (©t −©SS)
+
1
2
[
F(SS,©SS) (t −SS)2
+ 2F©(SS,©SS) (t −SS) (©t −©SS)
+F©©(SS,©SS) (©t −©SS)2
]
E.2. Logarithms
Simple Form Recall and rearrange the definition of log deviations 〈7.29〉:
ˆt ≡ lnt − lnSS = ln
(
t
SS
)
= ln
(
t
SS
+ 1− 1
)
= ln
(
1+
t −SS
SS
)
〈E.1〉
The first-order Taylor approximation of the far-right-hand side with respect to the ar-
gument t around the steady state SS is given by
ln
(
1+
t −SS
SS
)
≈ ln 1+
[(
1+
t −SS
SS
)−1 1
SS
]
t=SS
(t −SS) = t −SSSS .
Plugging this back into definition 〈7.29〉/Equation 〈E.1〉 yields
ˆt ≈ t −SSSS ⇔ t ≈ SS
(
1+ ˆt
)
, 〈E.2〉
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which is the first ‘replacement rule’ that can be applied to log-linearize macroeconomic
models.
Gross and Net Rates As a side note, recall that the argument of the last log function
in Equation 〈E.1〉 constitutes a gross ‘growth’ (or rather: deviation) rate. The fraction
states a percentage deviation. Recall further that, for small values of (roughly: single-
digit percentages), the natural logarithm of a gross rate is approximately equal to the
net rate:
ln(1+) ≈  〈E.3〉
This is the reason for the fact that interest and inflation rates appear in levels instead
of deviations in the model (for example, Equations 〈7.29〉 and 〈E.3〉 imply that Πˆt ≈
pit − pi∗).
Products of Log Deviations Because of this relationship between↗Gross and Net Rates,
products of log deviations are very small, which is why they are often ignored in order
to make the exposition more easily comprehensible.
Exponent Form Another approach (which is more general and thus more useful in
many situations) is to rearrange definition 〈7.29〉 to lnt = lnSS + ˆt and take ex-
ponents:
t = SSeˆt 〈E.4〉
⇔ tSS = e
ˆt
Equation 〈E.4〉 is the second replacement rule. Approximating the right-hand side of the
equation below it by forming a first-degree Taylor expansion around the steady state—
that is, at ˆt = 0—gives
eˆt ≈ e0 + eˆt
∣∣∣
ˆt=0
(
ˆt − 0
)
= 1+ ˆt. 〈E.5〉
It follows from Equation 〈E.4〉 that
t ≈ SS
(
1+ ˆt
)
,
which is equivalent to the first replacement rule 〈E.2〉.
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E.3. Taylor Series Expansion II
Simple Method The log-linerization procedure can be sped up by changing the order
of steps, or more specifically, by carrying out the Taylor-series approximation first and
only then applying the results of Section E.2. For future reference, this is called the
‘simple method.’ Explanations for univariate and multivariate expressions ensue in the
subsequent paragraphs.
Univariate Case Consider the function
t+1 = F(t)
and its first-degree Taylor-series approximation around the steady state SS
t+1 ≈ F(SS) +F′(SS) (t −SS) .
Since SS = F(SS) in steady state, the last equation can be rewritten as
t+1 ≈ SS +F′(SS) (t −SS) ⇔ t+1SS ≈ 1+
F′(SS) (t −SS)
SS
.
Applying the first replacement rule 〈E.2〉 on both the left- and right-hand sides then
gives
1+ ˆt+1 ≈ 1+F′(SS) ˆt
⇔ ˆt+1 ≈ F′(SS) ˆt.
Multivariate Case The function
t+1 = F(t,©t)
can be approximated around the steady state (SS,©SS) by a first-degree Taylor series
as follows:
t+1 ≈ F(SS,©SS) +F(SS,©SS) (t −SS) +F©(SS,©SS) (©t −©SS)
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Again, it holds in in steady state that SS = F(SS,©SS), so the above equation can be
rewritten as
t+1
SS
≈ 1+F(SS,©SS) t −SSSS +F©(SS,©SS)
©SS
SS
©t −©SS
©SS .
With replacement rule 〈E.2〉, we then get
1+ ˆt+1 ≈ 1+F(SS,©SS) ˆt +F©(SS,©SS)©SSSS ©ˆt
⇔ ˆt+1 ≈ F(SS,©SS) ˆt +F©(SS,©SS)©SSSS ©ˆt.
E.4. Specific Expressions
E.4.1. Expectation Terms
The techniques presented so far—namely, forming logs—should not be applied to ex-
pectation terms because the logarithm of an expectation formed from a probability
distribution is greater than or equal to the expectation of the respective logarithms:
lnE[·] ≥ E ln[·] (this is called “Jensen’s inequality” after Jensen 1906). Instead, the
individual elements of such an expectational equation can be substituted according to
the second replacement rule 〈E.4〉.
This issue points to another advantage of the↗Simple Method (p. 232): Executing the
Taylor approximation in the first step dissects expectational terms before log terms are
introduced.
E.4.2. Multiplicative Terms
The linear approximation of a multiplicative term t©t can be achieved most easily by
taking logs,
ln(t©t) = ln(t) + ln(©t) ,
and subtracting the respective steady-state expressions (the second line follows from
Equation 〈7.29〉):
ln(t©t)− ln(SS©SS) = ln(t)− ln(SS) + ln(©t)− ln(©SS)
⇔ ̂t©t = ˆt + ©ˆt 〈E.6〉
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E.4.3. Additive Constants
Handling expressions such as ̂(t +©), where © is a constant, is relatively simple:
From Equation 〈E.2〉, we know that
̂(t +©) ≈ (t +©)− (SS +©)
(SS +©) ⇔ t −SS ≈
̂(t +©) (SS +©)
and
̂t ≈ t −SSSS ⇔ t −SS ≈ ̂tSS.
Equating both expressions then leads to
̂(t +©) (SS +©) ≈ ̂tSS
⇔ ̂(t +©) ≈ SSSS +© ̂t. 〈E.7〉
E.5. Limitations of Log-Linearization
Positive Domain One obvious drawback of using logarithms is that they are not de-
fined for negative arguments. This is not of great concern in many models insofar as
all variables tend to be positive. However, the present one features variables that can
become negative and therefore do not lend themselves to log-linearization.
Workaround Treasury debt b, budget surpluses s, transfers from the treasury to house-
holds tTH , and consolidated-government liabilities z are therefore linearized via Equa-
tion 〈7.31〉. ˇt ≡ (t −SS)/|SS| also yields percentage deviations from steady state.
At this, using the modulus of the steady-state value can avoid possibly confusing re-
sults. To make this clear, assume a steady-state value of SS = −100 and an actual
period-t realization of t = 50. Using the ‘normal’ definition of deviations or growth
rates, (t −SS)/SS, would lead to a deviation of [50− (−100)]/(−100) = −150% in
this case. With an absolute value in the denominator, by contrast, the result is +150%.
While itmight be amatter of personal preference (and adherence tomathematical rigor),
it seems more intuitive to me to use positive numbers for values above the steady state
and negative numbers for values below, especially in the context of graphical impulse-
response functions.
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Non-Zero Steady States A further problem is that variables could also become zero. In
baseline models which feature positive variables only, this is often avoided by imposing
the ‘Inada (1963) conditions.’ Zero net interest and inflation rates do not pose a problem
because they imply unit gross factors that are approximated by net levels (so no zero
would appear in a denominator; see↗Gross and Net Rates, p. 231).
Things are different for the extended model of this thesis: The four variables listed
above can take negative just as well as positive values, and zero is just one right in the
middle of the scale. What’s more, it might even be seen as the most reasonable result:
Common sense holds that budget surpluses and deficits should compensate each other
in the long run, implying a zero steady state (sSS = 0). Unfortunately, such zero steady
states are not compatible with any technique that expresses the model in percentage
deviations and Dynare fails to simulate the model using a combination of relative- and
absolute-deviation (e.g., ˇ′t ≡ t −SS) variables. Therefore, zero steady states have to
be avoided here.
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F.1. Derivations for the Sticky-Price Model
F.1.1. The Second Half of Optimal Household Consumption Choice
Dixit and Stiglitz Maximization In theNew-Keynesianmodel variant, householdsmake
two-stage consumption decisions in each period:
 One decision is about the ‘total’ level of consumption in relation to other utility-
inducing variables (such as real-money holdings mt, for instance) as governed by
the respective first-order conditions; it is largely analogous to Chapter 2.
 Given the total amount of consumption, denoted c′t in real and C′t in nominal terms
here, households further decide on an allocation towards the different varieties
ct(j). This is what the present subsection describes.
Households are guided by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences, whichmeans theymax-
imize the consumption bundle 〈7.4〉 subject to the constraint
∫ 1
0
Pt(j) ct(j)dj = C′t. 〈F.1〉
Equation 〈F.1〉 states that nominal expenditure on all varieties must exactly equal C′t
(maximization implies that an original ‘smaller-than-or-equal-to’ inequality becomes a
strict equality). Maximization of the respective Lagrangian then takes the form
max
c(j)
L = max
c(j)
{[∫ 1
0
ct(j)
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
− λt
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j) ct(j)dj− C′t
]}
,
The respective first-order conditions for all j ∈ [0, 1] read
(
θ
θ − 1
) [∫ 1
0
ct(j)
θ−1
θ dj
]( θθ−1−1) ( θ − 1
θ
)
ct(j)(
θ−1
θ −1) − λtPt(j) != 0
⇔ ct(j)−
1
θ c
1
θ
t = λtPt(j)
⇔ ct(j) = ct
λtPt(j)
θ
.
Relating two goods j and k, we therefore have
ct(j) = ct(k)
[
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
]θ
. 〈F.2〉
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Plugging this result for ct(j) into the expenditure constraint 〈F.1〉 leads to
∫ 1
0
Pt(j) ct(k)
[
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
]θ
dj = C′t
⇔ ct(k) = C′t
Pt(k)
−θ∫ 1
0 Pt(j)
1−θ dj
. 〈F.3〉
Aggregate Price Level Inserting Equation 〈F.3〉 into the definition of the consumption
bundle 〈7.4〉 (with integration index k) gives
ct =

∫ 1
0
[
C′t
Pt(k)
−θ∫ 1
0 Pt(j)
1−θ dj
] θ−1
θ
dk

θ
θ−1
=
C′t
∫ 1
0 Pt(k)
1−θ dk[∫ 1
0 Pt(j)
1−θ dj
] θ−1
θ

θ
θ−1
= C′t
[∫ 1
0 Pt(k)
1−θ dk
] θ
θ−1∫ 1
0 Pt(j)
1−θ dj
= C′t
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θ dj
] 1
θ−1
, 〈F.4〉
where the last rearrangement recognizes that integration over the entire interval always
yields the same result, no matter whether the integration index is j or k. Noting further
that c′t ≡ ct, which is tautological, and that nominal and real total expenditure on con-
sumption goodsmust be linked by the aggregate price level Pt in a similarly tautological
relationship C′t ≡ Ptc′t, Equation 〈F.4〉 can be rearranged into an expression for the latter
(this is Equation 〈7.6〉 in the main text):
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θ dj
] 1
1−θ
Good-Specific Demand Functions Using Equations 〈F.2〉 and then (at the equivalence
sign) 〈7.6〉 in the expenditure constraint 〈F.1〉 gives
C′t =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j) ct(k)
[
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
]θ
dj = ct(k) Pt(k)θ
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θ dj = ct(k) Pt(k)θ P1−θt
⇔ ct(k) = C′tPt(k)−θ Pθ−1t = c′tPt(k)−θ Pθt
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Noting again that c′t ≡ ct (and switching the integration index from k back to j) then
produces the good-specific demand functions 〈7.5〉
ct(j) =
[
Pt
Pt(j)
]θ
ct.
Elasticity of Substitution Between Goods Bringing ct over to the left-hand side in Equa-
tion 〈7.5〉 and forming the ratio between two goods j and k, we have
ct(j)
ct(k)
=
[
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
]θ
.
Thus the elasticity of substitution between j and k with respect to the relative price
Pt(k)/Pt(j) reads as follows (this follows the usual form ‘argument times first derivative
over function’):
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
·
∂
[
ct(j)
ct(k)
]
∂
[
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
] · [Pt(k)
Pt(j)
]−θ
=
[
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
]1−θ
θ
[
Pt(k)
Pt(j)
]θ−1
= θ
Taking the inverse of the relative price (that is, writing Pt[j]/Pt[k] instead of Pt[k]/Pt[j])
yields a substitution elasticity of −θ, which is equal to θ in absolute value.
F.1.2. Aggregation
F.1.2.1. Goods-Market Clearing with Treasury Expenditure
Aggregate Goods-Market Clearing Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences like those in
Equation 〈7.4〉 exhibit ‘constant returns to scale’ (i.e., are homogeneous of degree one,
cf. Chen 2011, p. 3), which is why reducing consumption of every goods variety by,
say, half also reduces the aggregate consumption bundle to half its original size. By
implication—since the treasury and households share the same aggregator—the ratio
of public and private demand for each goods variety j is the same as the ratio of aggre-
gate public and private demands. Formally (repeating Equation 〈7.22〉),
gt(j) = Γtct(j) ∀j ⇒ gt = Γtct
in the treasury-expenditure bundle 〈7.20〉. This property greatly facilitates the handling
of goods-market clearing. Defining a third Dixit and Stiglitz bundler for aggregate pro-
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duction,
yt ≡
{∫ 1
0
[yt(j)]
θ−1
θ dj
} θ
θ−1
,
and plugging in the good-specific market-clearing conditions 〈7.26〉 then yields aggre-
gate market clearing 〈7.27〉:
yt =
{∫ 1
0
[ct(j) + gt(j)]
θ−1
θ dj
} θ
θ−1
=
{∫ 1
0
[(1+ Γt) ct(j)]
θ−1
θ dj
} θ
θ−1
= (1+ Γt)
{∫ 1
0
[ct(j)]
θ−1
θ dj
} θ
θ−1
= (1+ Γt) ct = ct + gt
This approach is indicated more or (rather) less explicitly in Benigno and Woodford
(2004, p. 274) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005, p. 17), for instance. Another option
would be to introduce treasury expenditure as a multiplicative ‘shifter’ or shock term
directly (cf. Woodford 2003b, pp. 147-149; Mankiw and Reis 2006, p. 10), which would
place a (differently defined) gt, instead of (1+ Γt), in front of ct. I choose the former
option as it represents the more commonly used notation. Note that the ratio Γ carries
a time index because it varies with different levels of g relative to c (but it could also
be understood as the policy instrument itself, which exposes the equivalence of both
approaches to capturing treasury expenditure).
Total Demand for Good j Another implication is that the specific goods-demand func-
tions 〈7.5〉 and 〈7.21〉 can be transferred to yt(j) as well: Combining said equations with
goods-market clearing 〈7.26〉 yields
yt(j) = ct(j) + gt(j) =
[
Pt
Pt(j)
]θ
(ct + gt) =
[
Pt
Pt(j)
]θ
yt, 〈F.5〉
which is stated in Footnote 21 on p. 127.
Intuition The introduction of the public-expenditure share Γmight be somewhat unin-
tuitive: Usually, one thinks of public expenditure g (G) as an exogenous decision made
by the fiscal authority about a real quantity (or nominal expenditure volume in the sense
of ‘spending an additional 20 bn.e on infrastructure’), but not as being determined rel-
ative to consumption. The former interpretation would set g exogenous and Γ endoge-
nous whereas the latter one tends towards targeting a constant Γ and matching g to c in
order to achieve this target.
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As shown above, however, having Γ available facilitates certain derivations because it
turns goods-market clearing from an additive into amultiplicative relationship. Finding
↗Labor-Market Equilibrium in steady state (p. 247, Appendix F.2.2) is another instance in
which this is helpful.
F.1.2.2. Aggregate Profits
Aggregate profits have the same form as firm-specific profits, which is useful for some
derivations ensuing below (see Sections F.2.2 and F.3.4). To see this, plug total demand
for good j 〈F.5〉 into the respective profit function 〈7.13〉 and note that the cost of pro-
duction is determined by the nominal wageW and the amount of labor ℓ(j). Integrating
over j and using Equations 〈7.6〉 and 〈7.28〉 then establishes Equation 〈7.14〉:
Ψt ≡
∫ 1
0
Ψt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j) yt(j)−Costt(j)dj
=
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
[
Pt
Pt(j)
]θ
yt −Wtℓt(j)dj
= Pθt yt
∫ 1
0
[Pt(j)]
1−θ dj−Wtℓt = Ptyt −Wtℓt
F.1.3. Firms’ Maximization Problem with Staggered Price Setting
Maximization Problem Firms able to reset prices in t will do so with the aim of maxi-
mizing the present value of expected profits,34
Et
∞
∑
T=t
Vt,TΨT(j) = Et
∞
∑
T=t
Vt,T [PT(j) yT(j)−CostT(j)] 〈F.6〉
where the linear production function 〈7.10〉 is already substituted. Owing to the Calvo
(1983) rigidity, firm j’s time-t expectation of its price in a future period T > t has in-
creasingly many parts:
EtPt+1(j) = α (Π∗) Pot (j) + (1− α)EtPot+1(j)
EtPt+2(j) = α2 (Π∗)2 Pot (j) + α (1− α)EtEtPot+2 + (1− α) αΠ∗EtPot+1 + (1− α)2EtPot+2
...
34 This can be done either in real terms (e.g., Galí 2015, pp. 56-57, 84-85) or in nominal terms (e.g., Walsh
2010, p. 241; Benigno and Nisticò 2015). As Equation 〈F.6〉 shows, I take the nominal route.
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Figure F.1 sketches this problem for periods t through t+ 2. Many paths can be either
in t: in t+ 1: in t+ 2:
Pot (j)
Pot (j)Π
∗
EtPot+1(j)
(Π∗)2 Pot (j)
EtPot+2
Π∗EtPot+1
EtPot+2
α
(1−
α)
α
(1− α)
α
(1− α)
Figure F.1: Firms’ Expectations about Their Future Price Setting with the
Calvo (1983) Rigidity. ⋄ Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Expla-
nations: Upward-sloping arrows (probability α) indicate no
possibility to reset prices optimally, so the previous price is
increased at the target inflation rate Π∗. Downward-sloping
arrows (probability 1 − α) indicate the possibility to set an
optimal price in the respective period.
cut off at some point or excluded entirely as they do not contain the choice variable Pot (j)
(anymore). To be precise, this happens every time the respective firm is allotted to the
‘(1− α) group’ which is allowed to reset prices optimally; in this instance, Pot (j) does
not play a role anymore. Therefore, the maximization problem 〈F.6〉 simplifies to
max
Pot (j)
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,T
[
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j) yT(j)−CostT(j)
]
.
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Combining this with ‘total demand’ 〈F.5〉 then allows to restate the maximization prob-
lem as
max
Pot (j)
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,T
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j) yT
[
PT
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j)
]θ
−CostT
〈
yT
[
PT
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j)
]θ〉
= max
Pot (j)
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,T
PTyT
[
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j)
PT
]1−θ
−CostT
〈
yT
[
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j)
PT
]−θ〉
First-Order Condition In equilibrium, it holds that
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,T
PTyT (1− θ)
[
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j)
PT
]−θ [
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]
−MCT(j) yT (−θ)
[
(Π∗)T−t Pot (j)
PT
]−(1+θ) [
(Π∗)T−t
PT
] != 0.
Since the inner derivative of the cost term is now explicit in the above equation, we can
return to the more parsimonious notation and write EtMCT(j) instead of EtMCT[yT(j)]
(or even more complicated substitutes) for the marginal cost of producing EtyT(j). Re-
arranging further finally gives the optimality condition 〈7.15〉:
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,T (1− θ) PTyT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ [
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]
= − 1
Pot (j)
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TθMCT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−(1+θ) [
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]
⇔ Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,T (θ − 1) yT (Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
=
1
Pot (j)
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TθMCT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
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⇔ Pot (j)Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TyT (Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
=
θ
θ − 1Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TMCT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
⇔ Pot (j) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TMCT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TyT (Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ 〈F.7〉
⇔ P
o
t (j)
Pt
=
θ
θ − 1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TMCT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tVt,TyTPt (Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
⇔ P
o
t (j)
Pt
=
θ
θ − 1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tvt,TmcT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tvt,TyT
Pt
PT
(Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
F.1.4. Shutting Down the Frictions
Actual outcomes for the economy are often compared to certain (rather hypothetical or
limiting) ‘benchmark cases’ that arise when the two important frictions of the present
model variant—price stickiness andmonopolistic competition—are shut down. I briefly
consider the implications without giving all the formal details that could possibly be
expounded here (cf. Galí 2015, Chapters 2 and 3, for instance).
Desired Markup With flexible prices (α = 0), the optimal-pricing condition of firm j
〈F.7〉 reduces to
Pot (j) =
θ
θ − 1MCt(j) , 〈F.8〉
whichdemonstratesmore tangibly that firms typically demand aprice above theirmarginal
cost of production or, put differently, that they conduct markup pricing. In the follow-
ing, the (gross) desired markup over marginal costs MCt(j) is denoted by
ϱ ≡ θ
θ − 1
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as defined in Equation 〈7.16〉 in the main text. It is also called ‘frictionless markup’
because the Calvo (1983) mechanism does not distort outcomes anymore (cf. Galí 2008,
p. 45). However, this can be misleading because firms’ market power as the second
supply-side friction is still active and indeed the only driver of positive (net) markups.
Importantly, the same is true in steady state, in which re-optimized and non-re-opti-
mized (indexed) prices move in line and none of the firms has to accept a lower-than-
desired mark-up. Rewriting Equation 〈F.8〉 accordingly shows that natural and steady-
state marginal costs (both expressed by mc here) are equal to the inverse of the desired
markup:
mc(j) =
MC(j)
Pt
=
θ − 1
θ
Pot (j)
Pt
= ϱ−1 〈F.9〉
Natural vs. Steady-State Output The concept of defining a flexible-price benchmark also
applies to output, where actual output y (with Calvo pricing) is compared to natural
output ynat. The latter comes aboutwhen all firms can set prices optimally (α = 0); in this
case, the ‘total demand’ equation 〈F.5〉 implies that all specific outputs are produced in
equal amount (y[j] = y ∀j), which maximizes the Dixit and Stiglitz bundler in Equation
〈7.27〉 (given the degree of monopoly power of firms expressed by the price elasticity of
substitution θ). Given the definition of the preferred output-gap measure y˜ (Equation
〈7.30〉) and noting that ynatSS = ySS, we can write
yˆt = (ln yt − ln ySS) +
(
ln ynatt − ln ynatt
)
=
(
ln yt − ln ynatt
)
+
(
ln ynatt − ln ynatSS
)
= y˜t + yˆnatt .
〈F.10〉
The second term in the last line, yˆnatt , depends only on shocks to technology a (see Section
F.3.2 of the appendix below and cf. Walsh 2010, p. 340).
Efficient Output For the sake of completeness, consider the move to perfectly compet-
itive goods markets. Goods become ever closer substitutes (θ → ∞), which decreases
and eventually abolishes mark-ups altogether (in Equation 〈7.16〉, ϱ = 1 in the limit).
Compared to the natural level, a complete removal of market power further increases
output to its maximal or efficient level. As long as market power is present, however,
actual output will not reach the efficient level.
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F.2. Steady State
F.2.1. Preparatory Observations
Prices If the target inflation rate is positive (Π∗ > 0), prices are not constant in steady
state. Hence, for the sake of clarity, let PSS(j, t) and PSS(t) denote the steady-state values
of the price of the specific good j and the aggregate price level, respectively, both as
functions of time t. By implication from Equation 〈7.12〉,
PoSS(j, t) = PSS(t) = Π
∗PSS(t− 1) ∀j, 〈F.11〉
or in other words: If non-re-optimizing firms index at the target inflation rate Π∗, the
achievement of this rate as a defining feature of steady state is only possible if re-opti-
mizing also choose prices consistent with Π∗.
Output Given equal prices, the good-specific demand equation 〈7.5〉 as well as the
goods-market-clearing conditions 〈7.26〉-〈7.27〉 imply constant values for ct(j) = ct =
cSS and yt(j) = yt = ySS = ynatSS (see also↗Natural vs. Steady-State Output on p. 246).
Technology Since shock terms equal zero in steady state, the autoregressive process
for technology 〈7.11〉 (with γa ̸= 0) implies that ln aSS = 0⇔ aSS = 1.
F.2.2. The Whole Model in Steady State
Interest Rates In steady state, consumption is constant, so the Euler equation 〈2.21〉
(derived from the first-order conditions with respect to consumption c 〈2.12〉 and bonds
b 〈2.15〉) implies that (1 + rSS) = β−1. The Fisher equation 〈2.5〉/〈2.7〉 implies that
(1+ iSS) = (1+ rSS)Π∗ = β−1Π∗. The bond price, defined in Equation 〈2.8〉, therefore
is QSS = (1+ iSS)−1 = β(Π∗)−1.
Labor-Market Equilibrium The Calvo rigidity has no effect in steady state insofar as all
prices are the same and increase at the target inflation rate. In this environment, the
shortest path to (aggregate) labor demand is profit maximization via aggregate output
y (as an alternative to the procedure described in Appendix F.1.3):
max
ySS
ψSS = maxySS
(ySS − wSSℓSS) = maxySS
[
ySS − wSS
(
ySS
aSS
) 1
ζ
]
On the far right-hand side, the production function 〈7.10〉 is used to substitute for labor
ℓ, where the j-specific and aggregate versions are equivalent since ySS(j) = ySS ∀j in
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steady state (see Appendix F.2.1). Noting that aSS = 1, the respective first-order condi-
tion then gives steady-state labor demand:
∂ψSS
∂ySS
= 1− wSS 1
ζ
y
1−ζ
ζ
SS
!
= 0 ⇔ wSS = ζy
ζ−1
ζ
SS 〈F.12〉
After equating labor supply 〈7.9〉 and demand 〈F.12〉, cSS is replaced via goods-market
clearing 〈7.27〉, ySS via the production function 〈7.10〉, and gSS via Equation 〈7.22〉,
which yields the labor-market equilibrium ℓSS:
ℓ
η
SSξℓ
[
1
1+ ΓSS
ℓζSS
]ρ
= ζ
(
ℓζSS
) ζ−1
ζ ⇔ ℓ1+η−(1−ρ)ζSS =
ζ
ξℓ
(1+ ΓSS)
ρ
⇔ ℓSS =
[
ζ
ξℓ
(1+ ΓSS)
ρ
] 1
1+η−(1−ρ)ζ 〈F.13〉
Output, Consumption, and the Role of Treasury Expenditure Plugging ℓ from Equation
〈F.13〉 into the production function gives aggregate output in steady state:
ySS = (ℓ∗SS)
ζ =
[
ζ
ξℓ
(1+ ΓSS)
ρ
] ζ
1+η−(1−ρ)ζ 〈F.14〉
Unwinding Equation 〈7.22〉 and Appendix F.1.2.1, we find that
cSS =
1
1+ ΓSS
ySS =
1
1+ ΓSS
[
ζ
ξℓ
(1+ ΓSS)
ρ
] ζ
1+η−(1−ρ)ζ 〈F.15〉
⇒ gSS = ΓSScSS = ΓSS1+ ΓSS ySS =
ΓSS
1+ ΓSS
[
ζ
ξℓ
(1+ ΓSS)
ρ
] ζ
1+η−(1−ρ)ζ
. 〈F.16〉
Fiscal policy plays a part in the determination of labor-market equilibrium and thus
also on aggregate output. As indicated by Equations 〈F.13〉 and 〈F.14〉, an increase in
ΓSS raises labor input and thus also aggregate output; however, for typical parameteri-
zations (see Table 7.2), ℓSS and ySS increase less than one-for-one because the respective
exponents are smaller than unity.
Money Demand Given steady-state consumption andnominal interest rates, the respec-
tive money demand can be obtained from Equations 〈2.22〉 and 〈7.3〉:
mSS = ξ
1
ν
m I˙
− 1ν
SS c
ρ
ν
SS 〈F.17〉
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Budget Constraint Section F.1.2.2 shows that Ψt = Yt −Wtℓt. Therefore, the household
budget constraint 〈7.7〉 can be written as
Ct +Mt +QtBt = TTHt +Yt + Bt−1 +Mt−1,
which is equivalent to budget constraint 〈2.36〉 and can therefore be transformed into
Zt = (1+ it+1)
(
Zt−1 − St − I˙t+1Mt
)
⇔ zt = (1+ it+1)
(
zt−1
Πt
− st − I˙t+1mt
)
〈F.18〉
(see Equation 〈2.37〉 and recall the definition of I˙ 〈2.23〉). In steady state, this reads
zSS = (1+ iSS)
( zSS
Π∗
− sSS − I˙SSmSS
)
= β−1zSS − (1+ iSS) sSS − iSSmSS
⇔ zSS = (1+ iSS) sSS + iSSmSS
β−1 − 1 ;
including the surplus rule 〈7.23〉 (with ySS = ynatSS and εsSS = 0 already incorporated), it
becomes
zSS = β−1zSS − (1+ iSS)
(
sfix + γTz
zSS
Π∗
− γTm I˙SSmSS
)
− iSSmSS
= β−1
(
1− γTz
)
zSS − (1+ iSS) sfix −
(
1− γTm
)
iSSmSS
⇔ zSS = 1
β−1 (1− γTz )− 1
[
(1+ iSS) sfix +
(
1− γTm
)
iSSmSS
]
. 〈F.19〉
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F.3.1. Piecemeal Linearization and Preparations
F.3.1.1. Fisher Equation
Rewriting the Fisher equation 〈2.5〉 in terms of gross rates (denoted by capital letters),
Rt =
It
Πt
,
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linearizing (cf. Appendix E.4.2) and recalling the relationship between↗Gross and Net
Rates gives
Rˆt = Iˆt − Πˆt ⇔ rt = it − pit + rSS − (iSS − pi∗) .
For small values (i.e., single-digit percentages), it follows from the original version 〈2.5〉
that r ≈ i− pi, so that the last equation can be simplified to
rt = it − pit. 〈F.20〉
F.3.1.2. Labor Supply
Rearrange labor supply 〈7.9〉 to
ξℓc
ρ
t ℓ
η
t = wt
and linearize using the↗Simple Method:
ξℓρc
ρ−1
SS ℓ
η
SS (ct − cSS) + ξℓcρSSηℓη−1t (ℓt − ℓSS) = (wt − wSS)
⇔ ρcˆt + ηℓˆt = wˆt 〈F.21〉
F.3.1.3. Aggregate Production Function
Approximation of the Aggregate Price-Level Index Rearrange the definition of the ag-
gregate price level 〈7.6〉 to
1 =
{∫ 1
0
[
Pt(j)
Pt
]1−θ
dj
} 1
1−θ
=
〈∫ 1
0
exp{(1− θ) [ln Pt(j)− ln Pt]}dj
〉 1
1−θ
⇔ 1 =
∫ 1
0
exp{(1− θ) [ln Pt(j)− ln Pt]}dj
and approximate the second line via a first-order Taylor-series expansion (cf. Appendix
E.1; note that the argument is ln Pt[j], not Pt[j]) around the steady state inwhich PSS(j, t) =
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PSS(t) ∀j by Equation 〈F.11〉:
1 ≈
∫ 1
0
exp{(1− θ) [ln PSS(j, t)− ln PSS(t)]}dj
+
∫ 1
0
exp{(1− θ) [ln PSS(j, t)− ln PSS(t)]} (1− θ) [ln Pt(j)− ln PSS(t)]dj
=
∫ 1
0
e0dj+
∫ 1
0
e0 (1− θ) [ln Pt(j)− ln PSS(t)]dj
= 1− (1− θ) ln PSS(t) + (1− θ)
∫ 1
0
ln Pt(j)dj
⇔ ln PSS(t) ≈
∫ 1
0
ln Pt(j)dj 〈F.22〉
Aggregate Production Function Combining labor-market clearing 〈7.28〉 and the pro-
duction function 〈7.10〉 with the j-specific total-demand function 〈F.5〉 gives
ℓt =
∫ 1
0
[
yt(j)
at
] 1
ζ
dj =
(
yt
at
) 1
ζ
∫ 1
0
[
Pt
Pt(j)
] θ
ζ
dj.
Taking logarithms, this becomes
ln ℓt =
1
ζ
(ln yt − ln at) + ln
{∫ 1
0
[
Pt
Pt(j)
] θ
ζ
dj
}
⇔ ln yt = ln at + ζ ln ℓt − ζ ln
{∫ 1
0
[
Pt
Pt(j)
] θ
ζ
dj
}
. 〈F.23〉
Approximate Aggregate Production Function Start by rearranging the argument of the
logarithm in the last term on the right-hand side of Equation 〈F.23〉:
∫ 1
0
[
Pt
Pt(j)
] θ
ζ
dj =
∫ 1
0
exp
{
θ
ζ
[ln Pt − ln Pt(j)]
}
dj 〈F.24〉
The next step is a first-order Taylor-series approximation of Equation 〈F.24〉:
∫ 1
0
exp
{
θ
ζ
[ln PSS(t)− ln PSS(t)]
}
dj
+
∫ 1
0
exp
{
θ
ζ
[ln PSS(t)− ln PSS(t)]
}(
− θ
ζ
)
[Pt(j)− PSS(t)]dj
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=
∫ 1
0
e0dj−
∫ 1
0
θ
ζ
e0 [ln Pt(j)− ln PSS(t)]dj
= 1+
θ
ζ
ln PSS(t)− θ
ζ
∫ 1
0
ln Pt(j)dj
Equation 〈F.22〉 implies that the second and third term in the last line cancel out so that
the above expression is approximately equal to unity. Therefore (and because because
ln 1 = 0), Equation 〈F.23〉 is equivalent to
ln yt = ln at + ζ ln ℓt 〈F.25〉
up to a first-order approximation, which can also be written in levels as an approximate
aggregate production function:
yt = atℓ
ζ
t 〈F.26〉
Log Deviations Use the simplemethod to find that the linear version of Equation 〈F.26〉
is
(yt − ySS) = ℓζSS (at − aSS) + aSSζℓζ−1SS (ℓt − ℓSS)
⇔ yˆt = aˆt + ζ ℓˆt. 〈F.27〉
F.3.1.4. Goods-Market Clearing
The aggregate goods-market-clearing condition 〈7.27〉 can be linearized by the simple
procedure consisting of a Taylor approximation and replacement rule 〈E.2〉:
(yt − ySS) = (ct − cSS) + (gt − gSS)
⇔ yˆt = cSSySS cˆt +
gSS
ySS
gˆt 〈F.28〉
F.3.1.5. Marginal Costs
Good-Specific and Aggregate Marginal Costs The marginal cost of increasing the pro-
duction of good j is given by Equation 〈7.17〉. Taking logs,
lnmct(j) = lnWt − ln Pt − ln ζ − ln at + (1− ζ) ln ℓt(j) , 〈F.29〉
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and substituting out the labor term via the production function 〈7.10〉 (in logs: ln yt[j] =
ln at + ζℓt[j]) gives
lnmct(j) = lnWt − ln Pt − ln ζ − ln at + 1− ζ
ζ
[ln yt(j)− ln at]
= lnWt − ln Pt − ln ζ + (1− ζ) ln yt(j) + ln at
ζ
. 〈F.30〉
Given the approximated aggregateproduction function 〈F.25〉/〈F.26〉, the respectivemarginal-
cost expressions can be derived analogously:
MCt =
Wt
ζatℓ
ζ−1
t
⇔ mct = wt
ζatℓ
ζ−1
t
〈F.31〉
⇒ lnmct = lnWt − ln Pt − ln ζ + (1− ζ) ln yt + ln at
ζ
〈F.32〉
The difference between the j-specific and average expressions (Equations 〈F.30〉 and
〈F.32〉, respectively) is therefore given by
lnmct(j)− lnmct = 1− ζ
ζ
[ln yt(j)− ln yt] ,
in which a logarithmic version of the j-specific total-demand function 〈F.5〉,
ln yt(j) = θ [ln Pt − ln Pt(j)] + ln yt,
can be used to finally arrive at
lnmct(j) = lnmct +
θ (1− ζ)
ζ
[ln Pt − ln Pt(j)] . 〈F.33〉
Marginal Costs and the Output Gap Log-linearize the marginal-cost expression 〈F.31〉
using the↗Simple Method:
(mct −mcSS) = 1
ζaSSℓ
ζ−1
SS
(wt − wSS)− wSS
ζa2SSℓ
ζ−1
SS
(at − aSS)
− (ζ − 1) wSS
ζaSSℓ
ζ−1+1
SS
(ℓt − ℓSS)
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⇔ m̂ct = wˆt − aˆt − (ζ − 1) ℓˆt 〈F.34〉
Solving for wˆ in this as well as in labor supply 〈F.21〉 and equalizing gives
ρcˆt + ηℓˆt = m̂ct + aˆt + (ζ − 1) ℓˆt
⇔ m̂ct = ρcˆt − aˆt − (ζ − 1− η) ℓˆt.
Substituting out ℓˆt via the aggregate production function 〈F.27〉 and cˆt via goods-market
clearing 〈F.28〉, we have
m̂ct = ρ
(
ySS
cSS
yˆt − gSScSS gˆt
)
− aˆt − ζ − 1− η
ζ
(yˆt − aˆt)
=
(
ρ
ySS
cSS
− ζ − 1− η
ζ
)
yˆt − 1+ η
ζ
aˆt − ρ gSScSS gˆt. 〈F.35〉
In case prices are flexible (α = 0), the ↗Desired Markup (p. 245) is constant and the
appropriate measure of aggregate production is natural output. Therefore, the flexible-
price analogue to Equation 〈F.35〉 comes about by setting m̂ct = 0 and replacing yˆt by
yˆnatt :
0 =
(
ρ
ySS
cSS
− ζ − 1− η
ζ
)
yˆnatt −
1+ η
ζ
aˆt − ρ gSScSS gˆt 〈F.36〉
After repeating the shorthand 〈7.36〉 for convenience,
Θ ≡ ρySS
cSS
− ζ − 1− η
ζ
,
we subtract Equation 〈F.36〉 from Equation 〈F.35〉 and thereby get
m̂ct = Θ
(
yˆt − yˆnatt
)
= Θy˜t. 〈F.37〉
(The derivations linking marginal costs to the output gap are closer to Walsh 2010,
pp. 336-340 than to Galí 2008; 2015 because the former handles the distinction between
output levels more clearly.)
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F.3.1.6. Linearized Aggregate Price Dynamics
Slightly rearrange the law of motion of the aggregate price level 〈7.12〉 to
P1−θt = α (Π
∗Pt−1)1−θ + (1− α) (Pot )1−θ
and linearize it around steady state: For the left-hand side, we have
P1−θt ≈ [PSS(t)]1−θ + (1− θ) [PSS(t)]−θ [Pt − PSS(t)]
= [PSS(t)]
1−θ + (1− θ) [PSS(t)]1−θ Pˆt. 〈F.38〉
Similarly, for the right hand side,
α (Π∗Pt−1)1−θ + (1− α) (Pot )1−θ
≈ α (Π∗)1−θ [PSS(t− 1)]1−θ + (1− α) [PoSS(t)]1−θ
+ α (Π∗)1−θ (1− θ) [PSS(t− 1)]−θ [Pt−1 − PSS(t− 1)]
+ (1− α) (1− θ) [PoSS(t)]−θ [Pot − PoSS(t)]
= α (Π∗)1−θ [PSS(t− 1)]1−θ + (1− α) [PoSS(t)]1−θ
+ α (Π∗)1−θ (1− θ) [PSS(t− 1)]1−θ Pˆt−1 + (1− α) (1− θ) [PoSS(t)]1−θ Pˆot .
= α [PSS(t)]
1−θ + (1− α) [PoSS(t)]1−θ
+ α (1− θ) [PSS(t)]1−θ Pˆt−1 + (1− α) (1− θ) [PoSS(t)]1−θ Pˆot ,
〈F.39〉
where the last rearrangement uses Equation 〈F.11〉. (Note that, as also stated by Equa-
tion 〈F.11〉, the o notation in some of the steady-state terms is not necessary; it is just
carried over until the respective terms with and without the ‘optimality superscript’o
cancel out later.) Reuniting both sides (already simplified versions of Equations 〈F.38〉
and 〈F.39〉) yields
1+ (1− θ) Pˆt = α+ (1− α) + α (1− θ) Pˆt−1 + (1− α) (1− θ) Pˆot
⇔ ln Pt − ln PSS(t) = α [ln Pt−1 − ln PSS(t− 1)] + (1− α) [ln Pot − ln PoSS(t)] .
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Using Equation 〈F.11〉 again and adding (ln Pt−1 − ln Pt−1) = 0, this finally becomes
ln Pt − ln PSS(t) = [α ln Pt−1 − α ln PSS(t) + α lnΠ∗]
+ [ln Pot − ln PoSS(t)]− [α ln Pot − α ln PoSS(t)]
+ (ln Pt−1 − ln Pt−1)
⇔ ln Pt − ln Pt−1 = (1− α) (ln Pot − ln Pt−1) + α lnΠ∗
⇔ pit = (1− α) (ln Pot − ln Pt−1) + αpi∗. 〈F.40〉
F.3.1.7. Money Demand
Given the specific utility function 〈7.3〉, money demand 〈2.22〉 becomes
ξmm−νt = I˙t+1c
−ρ
t .
Log-linearization via the↗Simple Method turns this into
−ξmνm−ν−1SS (mt −mSS) =
1
(1+ iSS)
2 (it+1 − iSS) c
−ρ
SS − I˙SSρc−ρ−1SS (ct − cSS)
⇔ −νξmm−νSS mˆt =
1
1+ iSS
c−ρSS ̂(1+ it+1)− I˙SSρc−ρSS cˆt;
dividing through by the steady-state version ξmm−νSS = I˙SSc
−ρ
SS (Equation 〈F.17〉) then
leads to
−νmˆt = 1iSS
̂(1+ it+1)− ρcˆt
⇔ mˆt = ρ
ν
cˆt − 1
ν
1
iSS
(it+1 − iSS) . 〈F.41〉
F.3.1.8. Consolidated-Government Liabilities
Linearizing consolidated-government liabilities 〈2.28〉 yields
zˇt =
|bSS|
|zSS| bˇt +
mSS
|zSS| mˆt. 〈F.42〉
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F.3.2. Dynamic IS Curve
Specific Functional Form Rearrange the consumption Euler equation 〈2.21〉 to
1 = β (1+ rt+1)
Etuc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
,
where the assumption of additively separable utility allows to drop real money balances
m from the marginal-utility terms, and insert the specific utility function 〈7.3〉 to get
1 = β (1+ rt+1)
cρt
Etc
ρ
t+1
.
Log-Linearization Starting to log-linearize using the second replacement rule 〈E.4〉 and,
in the subsequent step, noting that the Euler equation 〈2.21〉 also implies (1+ rSS) =
β−1, the above equation can be rewritten as
1 = β (1+ rSS) exp
(
̂1+ rt+1
) cρSS exp(ρcˆt)
cρSS exp(ρEt cˆt+1)
= exp
(
̂1+ rt+1
)
exp(ρcˆt) exp(−ρEt cˆt+1) .
By Equation 〈E.5〉, each of the exponential functions can be substituted out, giving
1 =
[
1+ ̂(1+ rt+1)
]
(1+ ρcˆt) (1− ρEt cˆt+1)
=
[
1− ρEt cˆt+1 + ρcˆt − ρ2cˆtEt cˆt+1 + ̂(1+ rt+1)− ̂(1+ rt+1)ρEt cˆt+1
+ ̂(1+ rt+1)ρcˆt − ̂(1+ rt+1)ρ2cˆtEt cˆt+1
]
.
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↗Products of Log Deviations (p. 231) can be ignored because they are very small, simpli-
fying the above equation to
1 =
[
1− ρEt cˆt+1 + ρcˆt + ̂(1+ rt+1)
]
⇔ cˆt = Et cˆt+1 − 1
ρ
̂(1+ rt+1)
= Et cˆt+1 − 1
ρ
[ln(1+ rt+1)− ln(1+ rSS)]
≈ Et cˆt+1 − 1
ρ
(rt+1 − rSS) .
Combining this with linearized goods-market clearing 〈F.28〉 gives
ySS
cSS
yˆt − gSScSS gˆt = Et
(
ySS
cSS
yˆt+1 − gSScSS gˆt+1
)
− 1
ρ
(rt+1 − rSS)
⇔ yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − cSSySS
1
ρ
(rt+1 − rSS)− gSSySS (Et gˆt+1 − gˆt)
= Etyˆt+1 − cSSySS
1
ρ
(it+1 −Etpit+1 − rSS)− gSSySS (Et gˆt+1 − gˆt) ,
where the last rearrangement uses an approximate version of the Fisher equation 〈2.7〉
(rt+1 = it+1 − Etpit+1). Use Equation 〈F.10〉 to express the equation in terms of the
output gap y˜:
y˜t = Ety˜t+1 − cSSySS
1
ρ
(it+1 −Etpit+1 − rSS)− gSSySS (Et gˆt+1 − gˆt) +
(
Etyˆnatt+1 − yˆnatt
)
Equation 〈F.36〉 implies that deviations of natural output from its steady-state level de-
pend on shocks to technology a and to fiscal policy (Equation 〈7.36〉 defines the short-
hand Θ that is also used in the following). Using it to eliminate yˆnat finally gives the
dynamic IS equation in terms of deviations of actual from natural output 〈7.32〉:
y˜t = Ety˜t+1 − cSSySS
1
ρ
(it+1 −Etpit+1 − rSS)
+
1
Θ
[
1+ η
ζ
(Et aˆt+1 − aˆt) + ρ gSScSS (Et gˆt+1 − gˆt)
]
− gSS
ySS
(Et gˆt+1 − gˆt) .
= Ety˜t+1 − Ξr (it+1 −Etpit+1 − rSS) + Ξa (Et aˆt+1 − aˆt) + Ξg (Et gˆt+1 − gˆt) .
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The steady-state ratios in the shorthands 〈7.33〉-〈7.36〉 can be eliminated via Equations
〈7.22〉 and 〈F.15〉-〈F.16〉.
F.3.3. New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
F.3.3.1. Groundwork
To make linearization easier, rearrange Equation 〈F.7〉 as follows: Divide by Pt−1 and
substitute in the desiredmark-up ϱ from Equation 〈7.16〉. Substitute out the↗Stochastic
Discount Factors (cf. p. 26), using the specific utility function 〈7.3〉 as well as aggregate
goods-market clearing 〈7.27〉 in the process. Simplify. Formally:
Pot (j)
Pt−1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−t
(
βT−t
c−ρT
c−ρt
Pt
PT
)
yT (Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
=
ϱ
Pt−1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−t
(
βT−t
c−ρT
c−ρt
Pt
PT
)
MCT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
⇔ P
o
t (j)
Pt−1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−t
(
βT−t
c−ρT
PT
)
yT (Π∗)T−t
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
=
ϱ
Pt−1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−t
(
βT−t
c−ρT
PT
)
MCT(j) yT
[
(Π∗)T−t
PT
]−θ
⇔ P
o
t (j)
Pt−1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρT P
θ−1
T
[
(Π∗)T−t
]1−θ
=
ϱ
Pt−1
Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρT P
θ
TmcT(j)
[
(Π∗)T−t
]−θ
〈F.43〉
F.3.3.2. Step-By-Step Linearization
To make the exposition more comprehensible, log-linearization of Equation 〈F.43〉 is
carried out in several steps:
1. Taylor expansion of the left-hand side of Equation 〈F.43〉 (p. 260)
2. Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of Equation 〈F.43〉 (p. 260)
3. Merging the results for both sides (p. 261)
4. Relating the resulting expression to marginal costs (p. 262)
5. Producing a difference equation in inflation (p. 263)
6. Relating inflation to the output gap (p. 265)
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Step 1 First is a Taylor expansion of the left-hand side of Equation 〈F.43〉 around steady
state. The expression is divided into the steady state as well as four derivative terms
pertaining to Pot (j), Pt−1, EtPT and EtyT, respectively:
Π∗Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1
+
1
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 [Pot (j)− PoSS(j, t)]
− P
o
SS(j)
[PSS(t− 1)]2
Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 [Pt−1 − PSS(t− 1)]
+Π∗
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS (θ − 1) [PSS(T)]θ−2
[
(Π∗)T−t
]1−θ
[PT − PSS(T)]
+Π∗Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (1− ρ) y−ρSS [Π∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 (yT − ySS)
The following step of rearrangements uses the steady-state relationship between prices
〈F.11〉 to build terms of the form (t − SS)/SS at the end of the lines containing
derivative parts (not shown), which are approximately equivalent to log deviations be-
cause of Equations 〈7.29〉 (the definition of log differences) and 〈E.2〉 (the first replace-
ment rule):
Π∗Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1
+Π∗Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 [ln Pot (j)− ln PoSS(j, t)]
−Π∗Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 [ln Pt−1 − ln PSS(t− 1)]
+Π∗
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS (θ − 1) [Π∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 [ln PT − ln PSS(T)]
+Π∗Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (1− ρ) y1−ρSS [Π∗PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 (ln yT − ln ySS)
= (Π∗)θ [PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 y1−ρSS
×Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t {1+ [ln Pot (j)− ln PoSS(j, t)]− [ln Pt−1 − ln PSS(t− 1)]
+ (θ − 1) [ln PT − ln PSS(T)] + (1− ρ) (ln yT − ln ySS)}
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Step 2 The next step is a similar approximation of the right-hand side of Equation
〈F.43〉:
ϱ
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ mcSS(j)
− ϱ
[PSS(t− 1)]2
Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ mcSS(j) [Pt−1 − PSS(t− 1)]
+
ϱ
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS θ [Π
∗PSS(T)]
θ−1mcSS(j) [PT − PSS(T)]
+
ϱ
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (1− ρ) y−ρSS [Π∗PSS(t− 1)]θ mcSS(j) (yT − ySS)
+
ϱ
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ [mcT(j)−mcSS(j)]
Rearrangements include utilization of the relationship betweenmarginal costs in steady
state mcSS(j) and the frictionless markup ϱ 〈F.9〉 as well as generating log deviations
similarly to↗Step 1 (p. 260):
1
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ
− 1
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ [ln Pt−1 − ln PSS(t− 1)]
+
1
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS θ [Π
∗PSS(T)]
θ [ln PT − ln PSS(T)]
+
1
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (1− ρ) y1−ρSS [Π∗PSS(t− 1)]θ (ln yT − ln ySS)
+
1
PSS(t− 1)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t y1−ρSS [Π
∗PSS(t− 1)]θ [lnmcT(j)− lnmcSS(j)]
= (Π∗)θ [PSS(t− 1)]θ−1 y1−ρSS
×Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t {1− [ln Pt−1 − ln PSS(t− 1)] + θ [ln PT − ln PSS(T)]
+ (1− ρ) (ln yT − ln ySS) + [lnmcT(j)− lnmcSS(j)]}
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Step 3 Finally, both parts are reunited. With some simplifications (terms cancelling
out) already incorporated in the first line, we have:
Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t {[ln Pot (j)− ln PoSS(j, t)]− [ln PT − ln PSS(T)]}
= Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t [lnmcT(j)− lnmcSS(j)]
⇔ 1
1− αβ [ln P
o
t (j)− lnΠ∗ − ln Pt−1]
= Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
{
lnmcT(j)− ln
(
ϱ−1
)
+ ln PT − ln
[
Pt−1 (Π∗)T−t+1
]}
⇔ ln Pot (j) = ln ϱ+ (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t [lnmcT(j) + ln PT]
+ lnΠ∗ − (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (T − t+ 1) lnΠ∗
〈F.44〉
At this point, it is important that the last term on the right-hand side is finite (the deriva-
tion is relegated to Section F.3.3.3 in order to not clutter this section any further), so the
equation can be simplified further to
ln Pot (j) = ln ϱ+ (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t [lnmcT(j) + ln PT]− αβ1− αβ lnΠ
∗. 〈F.45〉
Step 4 Combine the log expressions 〈F.45〉 (from directly above) and 〈F.33〉 (the loga-
rithm of marginal costs) to
ln Pot (j) = (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
{
lnmcT +
θ (1− ζ)
ζ
[ln PT − ln PT(j)]
+ ln ϱ+ ln PT
}
− αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗.
Let it be noted again that Equation 〈F.45〉 stems from the firm’s↗Maximization Problem
(p. 242) so PT(j) can be expressed in terms of Pot (j) and target inflation Π∗. Further,
F.3. Log-Linearization of the Sticky-Price Model 263
Equation 〈F.9〉 is applied to ln ϱ:
ln Pot (j) = (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
{
m̂cT +
[
1+
θ (1− ζ)
ζ
]
ln PT
− θ (1− ζ)
ζ
[ln Pot (j) + (T − t) lnΠ∗]
}
− αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗
⇔
[
1+
θ (1− ζ)
ζ
]
ln Pot (j) = (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
{
m̂cT
+
[
1+
θ (1− ζ)
ζ
]
ln PT
}
− αβ
1− αβ
[
1+
θ (1− ζ)
ζ
]
lnΠ∗
⇔ ln Pot (j) = (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
{[
ζ
ζ + θ (1− ζ)
]
m̂cT + ln PT
}
− αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗
Let
Θ′ ≡ ζ
ζ + θ (1− ζ) 〈F.46〉
and rearrange further by subtracting ln Pt−1 from both sides:
ln Pot (j)− ln Pt−1 = (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
(
Θ′m̂cT + ln PT − ln Pt−1
)− αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗
〈F.47〉
Step 5 Equation 〈F.47〉 can be rearranged into a difference equation in inflation. To do
so, start with the part of the sum term on the right-hand side that contains the price
levels:
(1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (ln PT − ln Pt−1)
= (1− αβ)Et[(ln Pt − ln Pt−1) + (αβ) (ln Pt+1 − ln Pt−1)
+ (αβ)2 (ln Pt+2 − ln Pt−1) + . . .
]
= (1− αβ)Et[(ln Pt − ln Pt−1) + (αβ) (ln Pt+1 − ln Pt + ln Pt − ln Pt−1)
+ (αβ)2 (ln Pt+2 − ln Pt+1 + ln Pt+1 − ln Pt + ln Pt − ln Pt−1) + . . .
]
≈ (1− αβ)Et
[
pit + (αβ) (pit+1 + pit) + (αβ)
2 (pit+2 + pit+1 + pit) + . . .
]
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= Et
[
pit + (αβ) (pit+1 + pit) + (αβ)
2 (pit+2 + pit+1 + pit) + . . .
]
−Et
[
αβpit + (αβ)
2 (pit+1 + pit) + (αβ)
3 (pit+2 + pit+1 + pit) + . . .
]
= Et
[
pit + αβpit+1 + (αβ)
2 pit+2 + . . .
]
= Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t piT
Plugging this back into Equation 〈F.47〉 gives
ln Pot (j)− ln Pt−1 = Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(1− αβ)Θ′m̂cT + piT
]− αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗, 〈F.48〉
which can be rearranged in two ways. For one, it can be shifted forward once, yielding
Et
[
ln Pot+1(j)− ln Pt
]
= Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(1− αβ)Θ′m̂cT+1 + piT+1
]− αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗
⇔ Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(1− αβ)Θ′m̂cT+1 + piT+1
]
= Et
[
ln Pot+1(j)− ln Pt
]
+
αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗.
〈F.49〉
On the other hand, one can rearrange the sum term (using Equation 〈F.49〉 in the second
step already):
ln Pot (j)− ln Pt−1 = αβEt
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(1− αβ)Θ′m̂cT+1 + piT+1
]
+ (1− αβ)Θ′m̂ct + pit − αβ1− αβ lnΠ
∗
= αβ
{
Et
[
ln Pot+1(j)− ln Pt
]
+
αβ
1− αβ lnΠ
∗
}
+ (1− αβ)Θ′m̂ct + pit − αβ1− αβ lnΠ
∗
= αβEt
[
ln Pot+1(j)− ln Pt
]
+ (1− αβ)Θ′m̂ct + pit − αβ lnΠ∗
To conclude this step, first substitute out pit via Equation Equation 〈F.40〉 and later sub-
stitute it in again (twice):
α [ln Pot (j)− ln Pt−1] = αβEt
[
ln Pot+1(j)− ln Pt
]
+ (1− αβ)Θ′m̂ct + α (1− β)pi∗
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⇔ (1− α) [ln Pot (j)− ln Pt−1]
= β (1− α)Et
[
ln Pot+1(j)− ln Pt
]
+
(1− α) (1− αβ)
α
Θ′m̂ct + (1− α) (1− β)pi∗
⇔ pit − αpi∗ = β (Etpit+1 − αpi∗) + (1− α) (1− αβ)
α
Θ′m̂ct + (1− α− β+ αβ)pi∗
To make the equation more legible, introduce the shorthand
Θ′′ ≡ (1− α) (1− αβ)
α
Θ′ 〈F.50〉
and rewrite the last equation as
pit − pi∗ = β (Etpit+1 − pi∗) +Θ′′m̂ct. 〈F.51〉
Step 6 In this final step, replace the marginal-cost expression via Equation 〈F.37〉 and
use the shorthand κ as defined in Equation 〈7.38〉 (see also Equations 〈7.36〉, 〈F.46〉 and
〈F.50〉) to arrive at the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve 〈7.37〉:
pit − pi∗ = β (Etpit+1 − pi∗) + κy˜t
This relatively general form with possibly decreasing returns to scale in the production
function (if ζ < 1) can also be found in Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) and Sbor-
done (2002), for instance.
F.3.3.3. A Relegated Derivation
In↗Step 3 of the previous subsection, it is argued that the last term on the right-hand
side of Equation 〈F.44〉,
− (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (T − t+ 1) lnΠ∗,
is finite. To see this, consider the following series (in a general notation), where || < 1:
© ≡
J
∑
j=0
(j+ 1)j = 1+ 2+ 32 + . . . + (J + 1)J
⇒ © = + 22 + . . . + JJ + (J + 1)J+1
⇒ (1−)© = 1+ + 2 + . . . + J − (J + 1)J+1
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⇒  (1−)© = + 2 + . . . + J + J+1 − (J + 1)J+2
⇒ (1−) (1−)© = 1 − (J + 2)J+1 + (J + 1)J+2
With regard to the last two terms on the right-hand side of the last equation, taking
limits as J → ∞ gives expressions of the form ‘∞ · 0.’ Rearranging and applying de
l’Hôpital’s rule, we have (for the last term, but the same applies to the second-to-last
term)
lim
J→∞
J + 1
1
J+2
l’H.
= lim
J→∞
1
−
(
1
J+2
)2
J+2 ln
= lim
J→∞
J+2
− ln = 0.
Therefore,
© ≡
∞
∑
j=0
(j+ 1)j = 1
(1−)2 .
Applying this to the term originally under consideration, with (T − t) =ˆ j and αβ =ˆ,
we arrive at
− (1− αβ)Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t (T − t+ 1) = − (1− αβ) lnΠ∗ 1
(1− αβ)2 = −
lnΠ∗
(1− αβ) ,
which is then used in the rearrangement leading to Equation 〈F.45〉.
F.3.4. Approximate Consolidated-Government Budget Constraint
The first step is to linearize the law of motion for consolidated-government liabilities
〈F.18〉 around steady state:
zt − zSS =
( zSS
Π∗
− sSS −mSS
)
(it+1 − iSS) + 1+ iSSΠ∗ (zt−1 − zSS)
− 1+ iSS
(Π∗)2
zSS (Πt −Π∗)− (1+ iSS) (st − sSS)− (mt −mSS)
Dividing through by |zSS| (in order to reach the form of Equation 〈7.31〉) and using
steady-state renditions of Equation 〈F.18〉 as well as definition 〈2.23〉 on the first term in
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parentheses on the right-hand side, this becomes
zˇt =
zSS −mSS
|zSS|
(1+ it+1)− (1+ iSS)
1+ iSS
+ β−1zˇt−1 − β−1 zSS|zSS| Πˆt
− (1+ iSS) |sSS||zSS| sˇt −
iSS
|zSS| (mt −mSS) .
Some more rearrangements affect the log-deviations of the nominal interest rate and
inflation rate (making use of the relationship between↗Gross and Net Rates, p. 231), the
definition of consolidated-government liabilities 〈2.28〉, and the inclusion of mˆt. The
final result is Equation 〈7.39〉:
zˇt = β−1zˇt−1 +
bSS
|zSS| (it+1 − iSS)− β
−1 zSS
|zSS| (pit − pi
∗)− (1+ iSS) |sSS||zSS| sˇt −
iSSmSS
|zSS| mˆt
F.3.5. Policy in the Log-Linear Model
Taylor Rule The interest-rate rule 〈7.18〉 can be linearized using the ↗Simple Method,
which results in
it+1 − iSS = (1+ iSS) γCpi (pit − pi∗) + (1+ iSS) γCy
(
yˆt − yˆnatt
)
+ (1+ iSS) εit
⇔ 1+ it+1 − (1+ iSS)
1+ iSS
= γCpi (pit − pi∗) + γCy y˜t + εit,
where Equation 〈F.10〉 is used to to receive y˜. Using the relationship between↗Gross
and Net Rates 〈E.3〉 on the left-hand side, we arrive at Equation 〈7.41〉:
it+1 = iSS + γCpi (pit − pi∗) + γCy y˜t + εit
Surplus Rule Similarly, linearizing Equation 〈7.23〉 produces
st − sSS = γTy
[
(yt − ySS)−
(
ynatt − ynatSS
)]
+ γTz
[
1
Π∗
(zt−1 − zSS)− zSS
(Π∗)2
(Πt −Π∗)
]
− γTm
[
mSS
(1+ iSS)
2 (it+1 − iSS) + I˙SS (mt −mSS)
]
+ (εst − εsSS) ,
where ∂I˙/∂i = (1 + i)−2 is used. Utilizing the relationships between ↗Natural vs.
Steady-State Output 〈F.10〉 (p. 246, for y˜) and ↗Gross and Net Rates (p. 231), the above
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equation can be rearranged to
sˇt = γTy
ySS
|sSS|
[
yˆt − yˆnatt
]
+ γTz
1
Π∗
1
|sSS|
(|zSS| zˇt−1 − zSSΠˆt)
− γTm
1
1+ iSS
mSS
|sSS|
[
̂(1+ it+1) + iSSmˆt
]
+
1
|sSS| ε
s
t
= γTy
ySS
|sSS| y˜t + γ
T
z
1
Π∗
1
|sSS| [|zSS| zˇt−1 − zSS (pit − pi
∗)]
− γTm
1
1+ iSS
mSS
|sSS| [(it+1 − iSS) + iSSmˆt] +
1
|sSS| ε
s
t.
Finally, inserting the Taylor rule 〈7.41〉 for it+1 leads to Equation 〈7.42〉:
sˇt = γTy
ySS
|sSS| y˜t + γ
T
z
1
Π∗
1
|sSS| [|zSS| zˇt−1 − zSS (pit − pi
∗)]
− γTm
1
1+ iSS
mSS
|sSS|
[
γCpi (pit − pi∗) + γCy y˜t + εit + iSSmˆt
]
+
1
|sSS| ε
s
t
=
1
|sSS|
(
γTy ySS − γTm
mSS
1+ iSS
γCy
)
y˜t − 1|sSS|
(
γTz
zSS
Π∗
+ γTm
mSS
1+ iSS
γCpi
)
(pit − pi∗)
+ γTz
1
Π∗
|zSS|
|sSS| zˇt−1 − γ
T
m I˙SS
mSS
|sSS| mˆt − γ
T
m
1
1+ iSS
mSS
|sSS| ε
i
t +
1
|sSS| ε
s
t
F.4. Calibration and Robustness
Introductory Note The following points should be understood as caveats rather than
full-on robustness checks. On the one hand, this acknowledges that the present model,
like most modern DSGE models, strongly depends on the parameters it is fed (aside
from policy parameters of course, the influence of which is one of the main concerns of
this thesis). On the other hand, the baseline calibrations chosen here are common in the
literature so I (warily) rely on them to analyze the monetary-fiscal interactions instead
of ‘including another thesis’ on sensitivity analysis.
Utility Weights The weight of utility from real money in the utility function 〈7.3〉 is set
to ξm = 0.0013. Along with the calibrations of the other relevant parameters, this can be
plugged into the steady-state money-demand equation 〈F.17〉 and then leads tomSS/ySS
ratios between 5.5% and 7.8%. This is in line with the 5.0% average ratio of base money
to GDP in the United States from 1980 to 2007 (average M1/GDP over the same time
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period is 12.1%).35
It is already expressed in the main text that the details of modeling the supply side of
the model are not the main focus of this thesis (see Footnote 16, for instance). Accord-
ingly, the weight of labor disutility is set to unity for simplicity.
Autoregression Coefficients Mostly, the impulse-response functions of the two base-
line calibrations (following Galí 2008 with γa = γCε = γTε = 0.5 and Kim 2003 with
γa = γCε = γ
T
ε = 0.8, respectively) resemble each other with the expectable grad-
ual differences in amplitudes and speeds of adjustment. It has to be noted, however,
that setting the persistence parameters is not entirely inconsequential: Switching the
parameters (from 0.5 to 0.8 in the Galí 2008 calibration and from 0.8 to 0.5 in the Kim
2003 calibration) leads to sign changes in the responses of the nominal interest rate i,
real money m, and real treasury debt b to an interest-rate shock. By contrast, these sign
changes are not observed when autoregressive parameters are switched in the analyses
of technology or surplus shocks.
Surpluses The fixed component of surpluses sfix is set to 0.005 in the baseline cali-
brations. This is guided somewhat by its repercussions on steady-state consolidated-
government liabilities zSS, which are also affected by other parameters, however (see
Equation 〈F.19〉 in Appendix F.2.2), so that a definitive calibration of sfix cannot be given.
While sfix = 0 is not permitted in the current state of themodel (see↗Non-Zero Steady
States, p. 235), both positive and negative values sufficiently far away from zero are pos-
sible. Further, because of the additive structure of the equations depending on the con-
stant sfix (again, see Equation 〈F.19〉), zero is typically not the demarcation line for sign
switches in the impulse-response functions.
Public Relative to Private Spending The ratio of treasury expenditure to private con-
sumption Γ is set to 2/3, but (unreported) robustness checks show that setting it to
different values only causes gradual changes in the impulse-response functions.
35 Data taken from↗FRED (cf. Footnote 27, p. 159). Data series: ↗MBCURRCIR,↗M1,↗GDP.
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F.5. Figures and Tables for the Sticky-Price Model
no. variable type description
1 aˆ log-lin technology
2 bˇ lin treasury debt
3 cˆ log-lin consumption
4 gˆ log-lin treasury expenditure
5 i level nominal interest rate
6 ℓˆ log-lin labor
7 mˆ log-lin real money
8 rˆ log-lin real interest rate
9 sˇ lin budget surpluses of the treasury
10 tˆTH lin transfers to households
11 wˆ log-lin real wage
12 yˆ log-lin output
13 y˜ log-lin output gap
14 yˆnat log-lin natural output
15 zˇ lin consolidated-government liabilities
16 εi level AR(1) interest-rate shock
17 εs level AR(1) surplus shock
18 pi level inflation rate
Table F.1a: Overview of Variables in the Linearized New-Keynesian Model. ⋄
Explanations: Variables of type “log-lin” are linearized via
Equation 〈7.29〉, variables of type “lin” are linearized via
Equation 〈7.31〉, and variables of type “level” emerge from
linearization in levels (see Section 7.2.1 of the main text and
Appendix E).
F.5. Figures and Tables for the Sticky-Price Model 271
Figure F.2a: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Galí
(2008) calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
Figure F.2b: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Galí
(2008) calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
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Figure F.2c: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Galí
(2008) calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury ex-
penditure rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Func-
tions on p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
Figure F.2d: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Galí
(2008) calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury ex-
penditure rule 〈7.25b〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Func-
tions on p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
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Figure F.2e: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Kim
(2003) calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
Figure F.2f: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Kim
(2003) calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25b〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
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Figure F.2g: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Kim
(2003) calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury ex-
penditure rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Func-
tions on p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
Figure F.2h: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Technology Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Kim
(2003) calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury ex-
penditure rule 〈7.25b〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Func-
tions on p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.1.
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Figure F.3a: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Galí (2008)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25a〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.2.2.
Figure F.3b: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Galí
(2008) calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.2.
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Figure F.3c: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Galí (2008)
calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.2.
Figure F.3d: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Galí (2008)
calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.2.
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Figure F.3e: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Kim (2003)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25a〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.2.2.
Figure F.3f: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Kim (2003)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.2.2.
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Figure F.3g: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Kim (2003)
calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.2.
Figure F.3h: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock. ⋄
Source: Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Kim (2003)
calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.2.
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Figure F.4a: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Galí (2008)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25a〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.2.3.
Figure F.4b: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Galí (2008) cal-
ibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.2.3.
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Figure F.4c: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Galí (2008) cal-
ibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expenditure
rule 〈7.25a〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137
and Section 7.3.2.3.
Figure F.4d: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Galí (2008)
calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.3.
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Figure F.4e: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Kim (2003)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25a〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.2.3.
Figure F.4f: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Kim (2003)
calibration, no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.2.3.
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Figure F.4g: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Kim (2003)
calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25a〉. See also ↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.3.
Figure F.4h: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock. ⋄ Source:
Own illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Kim (2003)
calibration, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expendi-
ture rule 〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on
p. 137 and Section 7.3.2.3.
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Figure F.5a: Simulation of the Sticky-PriceModel: Technology Shock with Dif-
ferent Policy Reactions to the Output Gap. ⋄ Source: Own illus-
tration. ⋄ Explanations: εa = −0.25, Kim (2003) calibration,
no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule 〈7.25b〉.
See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and Section
7.3.3.4.
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Figure F.5b: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Interest-Rate Shock with
Different Policy Reactions to the Output Gap. ⋄ Source: Own
illustration. ⋄ Explanations: εi = 1, Galí (2008) calibra-
tion, seigniorage rebate granted, treasury expenditure rule
〈7.25b〉. See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and
Section 7.3.3.4.
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Figure F.5c: Simulation of the Sticky-Price Model: Surplus Shock with Differ-
ent Policy Reactions to the Output Gap. ⋄ Source: Own illus-
tration. ⋄ Explanations: εs = −0.01, Galí (2008) calibration,
no seigniorage rebate, treasury expenditure rule 〈7.25a〉.
See also↗Impulse-Response Functions on p. 137 and Section
7.3.3.4.
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no. equation description
1 〈7.19〉 AR(1) interest-rate shock
2 〈7.24〉 AR(1) surplus shock
3 〈7.32〉 dynamic IS
4 〈7.37〉 New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
5 〈7.39〉 law of motion for consolidated-government liabilities
6 〈7.40〉 technology
7 〈7.41〉 Taylor rule
8 〈7.42〉 surplus rule of the treasury
9 〈7.43〉 treasury surplus (linearized definition)
10 〈7.44〉 treasury expenditure rule
11 〈F.10〉 output gap
12 〈F.20〉 Fisher equation
13 〈F.21〉 labor supply
14 〈F.27〉 aggregate production function
15 〈F.28〉 goods-market clearing
16 〈F.36〉 natural output
17 〈F.41〉 money demand
18 〈F.42〉 consolidated-government liabilities
Table F.1b: Equations in the Linearized New-Keynesian Model.
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calibration: Galí (2008) Kim (2003)
seigniorage rebate: not granted granted not granted granted
var. regime
bSS AMPF -0.1802 -0.1733 -0.1837 -0.1764
PMAF 1.0000 0.9379 1.0000 0.9347
cSS AMPF 0.6214 0.6214 0.9184 0.9184
PMAF 0.6214 0.6214 0.9184 0.9184
gSS AMPF 0.4143 0.4143 0.6123 0.6123
PMAF 0.4143 0.4143 0.6123 0.6123
iSS AMPF 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101
PMAF 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101
ℓSS AMPF 1.0540 1.0540 1.5310 1.5310
PMAF 1.0540 1.0540 1.5310 1.5310
mSS AMPF 0.0621 0.0621 0.0653 0.0653
PMAF 0.0621 0.0621 0.0653 0.0653
rSS AMPF 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101
PMAF 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101
sSS AMPF -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0018
PMAF 0.0100 0.0094 0.0100 0.0093
tTHSS AMPF -0.4125 -0.4126 -0.6104 -0.6105
PMAF -0.4243 -0.4237 -0.6223 -0.6216
wSS AMPF 0.6551 0.6551 1.0000 1.0000
PMAF 0.6551 0.6551 1.0000 1.0000
ySS AMPF 1.0360 1.0360 1.5310 1.5310
PMAF 1.0360 1.0360 1.5310 1.5310
zSS AMPF -0.1180 -0.1111 -0.1184 -0.1111
PMAF 1.0620 1.0000 1.0650 1.0000
Table F.2: Steady-State Values of the Sticky-Price Model. ⋄ Explanations:
Some of these values enter the linearized model as parts of
steady-state coefficient ratios. The active-monetary/passive-
fiscal regime is denoted by “AMPF” and the passive-
monetary/active-fiscal regime is denoted by “PMAF” in this
table.
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